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Abstract 
 
Current debates on space reveal a dichotomy between two apparently conflicting 
understandings of space: on the one hand, space is understood as a physical, tangible entity 
that has an impact on how we perceive, feel and emotionally inhabit the world, and on the 
other hand, space is conceived as an abstract entity, suggesting that space has no active role (a 
productivity) within everyday life, being solely a conceptual product of intellectual reasoning. 
As a result, the commonly used word: ‘space’, will be discussed as an ontologically 
paradoxical, ambiguous and elusive concept; a concept that cannot be captured within a single 
definition. This thesis consequently researches the ontology of space by informing a 
framework that embraces the complexity of space as an ambiguous and unrepresentable 
entity. It aims to reconcile the multiple understandings of space, liberating it from the binary 
thinking that opposes the abstract to the physical, disclosing its potential productivity. 
This thesis thus proposes a methodology departing from a transdisciplinary approach 
that addresses the variability, multiplicity, paradoxicality and ambiguity of space through a 
‘bastard’ epistemology that defies binary logic by considering what falls out of order and 
norm. To research an ontology through a bastard epistemology is to work outside of (but in 
combination with) the intelligible and sensible realms, through a framework that is non-
representational, but instead enactive and performative, driven by experience, affect and 
aesthetics; thus allowing access to an entity that is both ambiguous and also unrepresentable. 
In doing so, this thesis argues that space is diversely implicated in the constitution of research 
methodologies through its interactions with order and structures, as well as agential in the 
constitution of understandings of human interactions with the world; and therefore, it will be 
argued, space has methodological purchase. The consequence of this methodological 
purchase is that space can reveal itself if a research strategy is implemented that works 
through the multiple dimensions of space. Within this context the diagram will be introduced 
as a productive path because enables a bastard epistemology to work through the multiplicity 
of space, since the diagram, is a performed, materialised outcome of multiple experiences of 
the making of order through the interaction between physical and conceptual dimensions. In 
synthesis, the diagram is used to recursively research an ontology of space, showing the main 
contribution of this thesis: of how without negating its complexity and multiplicity, space can 
be useful, constructive and productive within contemporary contexts of research 
methodologies. 
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Introduction 
	  
As a practitioner (a sculptor) working within an artistic framework, my curiosity has 
been fired by the paradoxical nature of what is called ‘space’, and it has become an 
increasingly important presence in both my practice and my thinking. Although it was 
a somewhat concealed presence at first, the concept of space has always, in some 
sense, underlain my artistic practice, especially in the exploration of site-specific 
works and their different implications – notions that were broadened through my 
interest in the idea of landscape and the artistic practices related to it, particularly in 
the associations with walking and movement. The idea of landscape was further 
extended to other dimensions such as the city. Because of its specific spatial 
characteristics, the city became a privileged site (and idea) for my exploration of the 
interactions between site, place, landscape, dwelling and inhabitation, focusing on the 
notion of public art. These artistic explorations were also fuelled by a curatorial 
practice. This thesis therefore concerns the latent imperative behind my artistic 
practice and its trajectory: the need to understand the reasons behind the ubiquitous 
presence of this concept (space) has been the spur to my attempt to render it visible.  
The question is, why is it that space is not seen as part of the everyday? 
Anthropologist Tim Ingold (2011) expresses a similar awareness of the absence of 
space in everyday thought. However, for Ingold, such absence is symptomatic of a 
negative aspect in the concept of space that results from its connection with abstract 
thinking and intellectual activity – activities that are detached from the everyday. 
However, if space is an abstract and intellectual notion, how is the feeling of 
‘spaciousness’, described by anthropologist Yi-Fu Tuan ([1977] 2008), to be 
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explained? This thesis takes as its starting point these two apparently conflicting 
understandings of space: on the one hand, space as a physical, almost material entity 
that has an impact on how we perceive, feel and emotionally connect to sites and 
places, and on the other, space as an abstract entity, purely the outcome of the human 
intellect. How can two such disparate, possibly conflicting, understandings of space 
(the material and the abstract) co-exist? Are both understandings referring to the same 
thing or are they two entirely different things that are, or have been, related in some 
way? This problematic provides the point of departure for this thesis, and in response 
to my artistic background, it has become the central question, the placeholder, guiding 
the research. In relation to the challenge of the ambiguous and paradoxical nature of 
space, the first question this thesis asks is: can space be used as if it were a material, 
and if so, how? Or, to pose the question in a less challenging way, how can space be 
used as a device, how can it be employed productively?  
Not only does space have different, distinct and opposing understandings in its 
mundane, everyday existence, a disciplinary enquiry shows that multiple 
understandings and approaches to space also permeate the disciplines across the 
sciences, humanities and arts, revealing differences both between disciplines and 
within them. Despite the fact that it is considered a fundamental concept, space is not 
fully understood or controlled by any one of the disciplines. However, two distinct 
positions towards space are visible. On the one hand, many disciplines ignore the gap 
that exists between the many ways of knowing space and take their own definition 
and understanding of the concept of space for granted. They generally proceed 
without either questioning what space is or its implications for their own 
epistemological and methodological frameworks. Space is taken as a given. On the 
other hand, space is directly recognised as complex and difficult to understand, 
	   12	  
express or know. Consequently, just as it is in the context of mundane, everyday life, 
space although seemingly knowable is only partially realised in the disciplinary 
context. 
 The many different cognate terms that refer to some dimension of space (such 
as those the author’s artistic practice has revealed – site, place, location, landscape, 
territory – and others such as outer space and the cosmos) and the multiple 
understandings of space itself are symptomatic of the fact that space is not fully 
realised. This becomes apparent if we observe the way the different 
conceptualisations, meanings, interpretations and uses of the word ‘space’ have been 
researched over time, both in disciplinary discourses and in common parlance. There 
is no agreed definition for what seems to be an ubiquitous term which, on the face of 
it, appears to have universal significance.  
Given the wide range of understandings and degrees of existence attributed to 
space – varying from a physical, almost material, primordial entity, which influences 
how human beings perceive, feel and emotionally connect with the world, to an 
overtly abstract construction with no connection to everyday life, a concept that is 
purely the outcome of the intellectual mind – the commonly used word, ‘space’, 
seems to stand for a puzzling, ambiguous, elusive concept. This is the paradox from 
which the first proposition of this thesis emerges: these opposing understandings of 
space allude to the idea that although space plays a major role in our understanding of 
and consequent interactions with the world – as a primordial entity that we both 
confront and are confronted with when constructing our perceptions and cognition of 
the environment in which we live, a necessary constant in our interaction with the 
world and our understanding of this interaction, an entity with affect – it is not 
possible to pin-down what it is. As a result, space emerges as ontologically 
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paradoxical and ambiguous, a concept that cannot be captured within a single 
definition. But if this is so, how can space be used or spoken about? What then is it? 
Instead of regarding this as problematic for the research, the result of a failure 
in the way the concept has been articulated, this thesis begins by turning the problem 
around so it can be opened up to an understanding of and enquiry into space. Despite 
trying to grasp the nature of space, such an enquiry cannot be embarked on with the 
aim of reaching a single, predetermined, unchanging and straightforward definition, 
as this would constrict the subject of the research itself. Rather than simplifying the 
problem (in the usual reductive, analytical way), the research can only gain a purchase 
if the subject is allowed to remain at a certain level of complexity. This implies 
embracing its complexity, conducting the enquiry in a way that ensures that space is 
not deprived of its variability, multiplicity, paradoxicality and ambiguity.  
While maintaining the complexity inherent to space, this thesis takes as its 
foundational impetus the ontological question: what is space? However, as ontology is 
part of the subject matter of metaphysics,1 which deals with what exists and how it 
exists, this thesis falls within the remit and agenda of the metaphysical realm; that is, 
in the realm of questions without a single, definitive and reproducible answer as it is 
to some degree unanswerable. This raises the query of how a metaphysical question 
can be answered in the context of a thesis: how can an unsolvable matter be 
approached through research? The awareness that in order to move towards other, 
more pragmatic questions the research needs to revisit and investigate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By metaphysics within this context is understood a philosophical area of enquiry that studies reality 
and existence from a meta and abstract level, asking questions as: what does it means to exist, or to be 
real? However, behind a metaphysical enquiry exists a meta-metaphysical one that questions the 
plausibility of answering a metaphysical question, thus establishing a problem for this thesis. In 
addition to this use of the word metaphysics, after the introduction of this thesis the word is used with a 
different connotation; it is used to express what lies beyond the physical. 
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metaphysical dimension has led to the realisation that, although it concerns a specific 
subject (space), this project is also about the methods and methodologies required to 
approach space as a metaphysical question. This means discovering how space can 
constitute an object of research. As such, this thesis is driven by the need for a fuller 
methodological reflection and critique. The reasoning behind such a decision lies in 
two major realisations: 
1. The concept of space is inconsistent with a single definition, and this 
demands that the enquiry maintains a level of complexity in order to avoid 
depriving space of its variability, multiplicity, paradoxicality and 
ambiguity. 
2. The methodology used to reflect on and research this complexity, given the 
fact that there is a methodological question (how can space be researched?) 
underlying the ontological one, needs to mirror and incorporate this 
variability, multiplicity, paradoxicality and ambiguity.  
Consequently, this thesis starts from the point of view that metaphysical 
questions can be (or arguably should be) discussed from positions other than that of 
the discipline of philosophy, and that other strategies and approaches can be used to 
hold a metaphysical discussion. Indeed, this is not a thesis on philosophy: it does not 
follow the processes and methods of the discipline of philosophy, although 
philosophy is helpful in understanding the problem and the type of question to be 
asked. In contrast to philosophy, this thesis draws from the author’s artistic 
background to shape its methods, using notions such as diagramming and drawing, 
affect, (bodily) experience, performance and enaction to inform the research process. 
This is supported by a methodology that allows the adaptation of disciplinary methods 
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and the exploration of knowledge across disciplinary boundaries; that is, a 
transdisciplinary methodology. 
Changing the framework in which the question of how to research space is 
placed allows this thesis to make a detour away from the traditional routes used to 
approach the ontology of space and enables it to bring its two initial questions 
together. These are: 1) can space be thought of as productive and 2) what is space 
ontologically, given its apparently paradoxical and ambiguous nature? As such, this 
thesis approaches the research into the ontology of space – with the aim of disclosing 
its potential productivity – through an artistically based approach that liberates it from 
the binary thinking that opposes the abstract to the physical, and instead embraces the 
complexity of space as an ambiguous, indeterminate, unrepresentable and 
unknowable entity. It asks the question: how can space be understood ontologically, 
without losing its complexity, paradoxicality and ambiguity, so that it retrieves its 
productivity? However, although it concerns an enquiry into the ontology of space, 
this thesis is also about discovering a possible process, a methodology, through which 
to research the topic. That is, it also asks the question: how can a paradoxical and 
ambiguous entity such as space be researched? In synthesis this thesis asks: How can 
space be understood ontologically so that it retrieves a productivity? 
 
 
Interactions Between the Problematic of the Ontology of Space and the 
Methodology 
 
Methodologically, this thesis uses an artistically based approach to discuss a 
metaphysical question (as mentioned above). However, the author’s background and 
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the artistic foundations from which the enquiry arose, as well as the need to use 
artistic processes to develop the research, did not determine the nature of the research. 
It did not entail that this thesis be researched and developed in the artistic domain as 
either a practice PhD or as theoretically driven by artistic disciplines or disciplines 
associated with the arts; instead, this thesis uses a methodology that is consonant with 
and receptive towards an artistic practice and thinking, and through the exploration of 
this methodology, the artistic background emerged as a privileged and necessary 
position from which to develop its main concerns, exploring the specificity of the 
enquiry, through transdisciplinarity. As such, the arts are present in this thesis through 
the position and perspective that the author brings to it in order to explore these 
concerns – they act as an epistemological determinant, bringing to the fore the 
aesthetic, affective and experiential dimensions of the investigation. Due to this 
epistemological framework, the arts are also present in the approaches and methods 
chosen to develop the research. As a consequence, the visual (and written) elements 
presented in this thesis should not be seen as an intended artistic outcome, as works of 
art, but as part of a research methodology which is inclusive of artistic methods. 
There is a strand of transdisciplinarity which focuses on strategies that enable 
academic environments to engage with each other in an integrated way and on the 
exchange of research processes and knowledge between stakeholders (academic 
and/or non-academic institutions, and more generally, society), exploring the 
dimensions and types of collaboration and the importance of their contribution 
(Nowotny, Gibbons, among others). However, this is not the approach this thesis 
adopts for its methodology; it does not develop through the establishment of a 
collaborative framework in which to research its concerns – a strand of research that 
Nicolesco (2008, p. 12) calls ‘phenomenological transdisciplinarity’. In contrast, this 
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thesis follows a theoretical transdisciplinarity, which Nicolescu (2008, p. 12) says 
implies both a “general definition of transdisciplinarity and a well-defined 
methodology (which has to be distinguished from ‘methods’; a single methodology 
corresponds to a great number of different methods)”.  
Empirical transdisciplinarity creates the impression that transdisciplinary 
research requires a collaborative project, involving multiple institutions, even when it 
involves research with special particularities. Theoretical transdisciplinarity, however, 
dismantles this notion. Hence, in this thesis, transdisciplinarity stands for both a 
methodology with implications for the kind of knowledge produced and a process that 
reflects upon that production. In contrast to Nicolescu’s approach, because it sees 
methodology as a framework informed by a given epistemological and ontological 
system, which is expressed in the research through the choice of methods and 
strategies, transdisciplinarity in this sense stands for a methodology and not a theory. 
This does not mean there is no collaboration; rather, it involves a collaboration that 
does not imply the need for multiple institutions to physically participate in the 
construction of a project. It is a silent collaboration – it takes place through the silent 
exchange of knowledge between disciplines, or more generally, the exchange of 
contexts of knowledge production. As such, this thesis involves a collaborative 
process in that it integrates the knowledge produced by multiple disciplines.  
But what is it that distinguishes transdisciplinarity from multi-, inter- or cross-
disciplinarity when all these approaches seem to derive from the connections and 
interactions between disciplines? In contrast to multidisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity 
does not only concern the establishment of collaborations between disciplines. It is 
not about approaching a problem or topic developed within a particular discipline by 
using several disciplines at the same time (Montuori, 2008, p. ix; Nicolescu, 2008, p. 
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2). In multidisciplinarity, the topic is still located in the main discipline (and only this 
discipline) but is enriched by the insights of other disciplines; despite the extension of 
the enquiry into multiple disciplines, its goals still remain fixed in the discipline 
leading the enquiry (Nicolescu, 2008, p. 2). It is also different from interdisciplinarity, 
a topic-led approach that works through the transference of methods and concepts 
from one discipline to another, but which is still centred on and led by the main 
discipline (ibid.). Instead, transdisciplinarity  
 
… leads to the transformation of the very identity of disciplines by identifying new 
topics and concerns. Transdisciplinarity extends the scope, methods and perspectives 
of existing disciplines whilst at the same time respecting and using the existing 
disciplinary frameworks. (Blassnigg and Punt, 2013, p. 2)  
 
Transdisciplinarity is a practice that is complementary to disciplinary and 
other approaches, such as those using multi-, inter- and cross-disciplinary frameworks 
(ibid.). As such, it does not reject a disciplinary approach, but dismisses a reductive 
understanding that relates to disciplines as if they had always existed the way they do 
today, as if they did not have a history and have not been subject to the 
transformations associated with the fact that they exist in a changing world. 
Transdisciplinarity also opposes the epistemological separation of disciplines because, 
as Blassnigg and Punt (2013, p. 1) state, “no discipline is ever completely isolated and 
has to be understood always in relation to other knowledge practices”. For Nowotny 
(2006), knowledge itself is transgressive as it cannot be contained by any one 
discipline but can emerge from anywhere; there are no specific areas that determine 
what knowledge is. Transdisciplinarity implies, therefore, that no strand of knowledge 
is the domain of a specific discipline, even if that discipline has been the only or main 
area researching a specific topic. However, while questioning the static boundaries 
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and limits of disciplinary frameworks, transdisciplinarity also relies heavily on the 
knowledge produced by the different disciplines. What is under question is not the 
knowledge itself; the aim is to use this knowledge to open up further avenues. In this 
context, transdisciplinarity aims to find to the ‘blind spots’ that disciplines, given their 
paradigms, methodologies and boundaries, cannot see (Montuori, 2008, p. xv). 
Thus, transdisciplinarity is a methodology that  
 
…forge[s] innovative approaches to research collaboration that is enquiry-driven and 
seek[s] to identify new topics and concerns. In this way transdisciplinarity is sought 
to bridge disparate areas of discourse and research topics not merely by transcending 
or transgressing disciplinary boundaries around problem-driven inquiries, but by 
letting the inquiry in itself drive the methods, tools and theoretical formation”. 
(Blassnigg and Punt, 2013, p. 3) 
 
For Montuori (2008, p. xi), the fact that transdiciplinarity is enquiry-driven and not 
discipline-driven implies that knowledge is produced for the purpose of acting in the 
world and this requires that the paradigms guiding the research are interrogated and 
questioned from a meta-dimension. Therefore attention must also be paid to the 
context and connections of knowledge. As Piaget (cited in Nicolescu, 2008, p. 11) 
states, transdisciplinarity is a “total system without stable boundaries between the 
disciplines”. This does not imply the creation of a super-discipline: transdisciplinarity 
does not represent the practice of laying one discipline beside another, but neither 
does it create a meta-discipline that surveys all the others (Nowotny, 2006, p. 1), 
despite the fact that transdisciplinarity interrogates its topics from a meta-dimension. 
The fact that transdiscipinarity is enquiry-driven and integrates a meta-dimension into 
its processes – that is, it is a total system – does not mean that the intention is to 
develop a meta-knowledge base (Montuori, 2008, p. xv). In drawing from other 
	   20	  
disciplines, the aim is not to produce a globalising description or map of all the 
knowledge produced by the disciplines the enquiry looks at; rather, the intention (as 
stated above) is to identify new topics and concerns by finding the ‘blind spots’ that 
disciplines cannot see, given their specific paradigms, methodologies and boundaries. 
This is achieved through discovering what other directions can be discovered in the 
intersections, gaps, overlaps and erasures of existing knowledge – in sum, by 
observing what is on the other side (‘trans-’) of past and present knowledge. 
Consequently, in researching the ontology of space and its productivity, this 
thesis does not proceed by constructing an extensive list of different definitions and 
understandings from all past and current disciplines or of what has been written on 
space and by whom, even if such a task were possible (as it cannot be, given the 
immensurability of the framework of the research). Thus this thesis does not intend to 
map all, or even the most important, understandings of space, but instead to 
investigate the ontology of space by using the literature and knowledge produced in 
multiple disciplines. It does this by identifying the key operators and reducing the 
literature to what is sufficient to highlight the problematic. This could be described as 
a ‘sketching’ procedure, preliminary to exploring the problematic through means that 
fall outside the literature and disciplines used (despite their intimate relationship with 
it). 
The aforementioned intentions of transdisciplinarity are extremely important 
to bear in mind in order to avoid the accusations of superficiality that are still levelled 
by those sceptical of the use of such a methodology. Despite the processes used to 
sketch the problematic, transdisciplinarity is a way of approaching a problem without 
reducing its complexity; on the contrary, it encompasses this very complexity – the 
uncertainty of the world and its plurality – while also recognising the presence and 
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agency of the enquirer (Montuori, 2008, p. ix). Sketching a problematic through a 
survey of the different disciplines is not a simplified or superficial way of exploring a 
subject, but a way of revealing a problematic that is not situated in any single 
discipline – or even in the sum of all these disciplines. As such, in order to find the 
problematic it is fundamental, as Montuori (2008) says, to recognise the presence and 
agency but also to accept the limitations/constrains of the enquirer. No one researcher 
can be expected to know and have full dominion over all the disciplines they use or 
their knowledge – as is the case for the author of this thesis. To recognise the 
presence, agency and limitations/constrains of the enquirer is to know where the 
strengths of the enquiry lie, as well as its anchors. This will overcome any accusations 
of superficiality, because the investigation is driven by the expertise of the enquirer, 
not their particular discipline or the disciplines used in the research. In the case of this 
thesis, as mentioned above, the expertise of its author lies in the field of the arts and 
its related practices, not in all the other disciplines it uses, and this is why in this 
thesis transdiscipinarity is particularly driven by artistic methods and concerns. 
Accepting the agency and constrains of the enquirer is not merely a question 
of recognising and establishing the limits and grounds of the research, but it is also 
part of the transdisciplinary epistemology and ontology:  
 
With the integration of the cognitive, affective, and physical dimensions, and of the 
subjective/objective, inquiry moves into a new realm. Inquiry is now not just directed 
‘outwards’ towards the external world, but it is rather seen as an ongoing process, a 
dialogue that engages knower and known, inquirer and inquiry. (Montuori, 2008, p. 
xvi) 
 
It is through this dialogue that transdisciplinarity becomes enquiry-driven, as it lets 
the interaction between researcher and enquiry build the path for the researcher to 
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follow in a self-reflective and recursive way. Recursiveness is  
 
… a general principle of transdisciplinarity research… It points to the iterative 
procedures that characterises both the entire research process … and its individual 
phases. This implies that the research process has to be shaped in such a way that 
concepts and methods can be repeatedly tested. (Pohl, Hirsch Haddornet al, 2008, p. 
430) 
 
As such, questions that emerge from the research are not seen as problems to be 
resolved and swept away or transferred to another research framework; they become 
incorporated into the research itself (Blassnigg and Punt, 2013, p. 3), following a 
process of ‘bootstrapping’.  
The notion of recursiveness is crucial to this thesis: it entails stepping outside 
the notion of a meta-enquiry that is driven by the conception of an exhaustive 
knowledge base, informed by the multiple understandings of space or a taxonomy of 
cognate concepts. This thesis, rather, undertakes a process of continued exploration 
and self-reflection, revisiting the underlying principles and assumptions regarding the 
notion of space throughout the enquiry. There is never a fixed, stable position that 
cannot be changed because the enquiry constantly returns to what may be classed as 
the ‘beginning’, albeit a beginning without origins (an idea that is explored in the 
second chapter). Following a transdisciplinary methodology means that it is only 
through such a process that the limits of both the research process and the 
comprehension of the concept of space can be revealed, and a wider understanding of 
the problematic achieved.    
It is also important to state again that it is intended that the methodology 
should mirror and reflect the topic of research. It is not merely a case of using a 
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methodology that enables the researcher to conduct a complex and dynamic enquiry, 
but such an enquiry requires a methodology that reflects the variable essence of the 
concept of ‘space’ across its many different disciplinary understandings, becoming 
coincident with and a replica of the concept itself. Consequently, the necessity of 
using a recursive methodology in this project is embedded in the paradoxical 
understanding of space and arises from its paradoxical nature. 
Given the two hypotheses presented earlier – that the concept of space is 
inconsistent with a single definition and demands an enquiry that maintains a level of 
complexity so that space is not deprived of its variable, multiple, paradoxical and 
ambiguous nature, and that the methodology chosen to pursue the enquiry is one that 
embraces and mirrors this nature – the purpose of this thesis is not to solve the 
problem of the ontology of space, providing a solution to the question of what space 
is. This position is in tune with the second article of the fundamental principles of 
transdisciplinarity, developed by the First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity held 
in Portugal in 1994. The article states:  
 
[T]he recognition of the existence of different levels of reality governed by different 
types of logic is inherent in the transdisciplinary attitude. Any attempt to reduce 
reality to a single level governed by a single form of logic does not lie within the 
scope of transdisciplinarity. (Freitas, Morin and Nicolescu, [1994] 2008, p. 262) 
 
This thesis does not intend to map the concept of space (as discussed earlier) 
or to deepen any one aspect of the existing definitions of space; instead, it chooses to 
approach the problematic transversally by creating a ‘corral’. A corral is built to pen 
an animal – not to prevent it moving but simply to delimit the territory in which it can 
move. In addition, because it is a delimitation of territory and not of the animal itself, 
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the attention placed on the activity of creating the corral is displaced from the animal 
to the territory. As such, by creating a corral around the problematic, the aim of this 
thesis is not to constrain the variable nature of the concept of space in a single 
definition; rather, this method is a strategic move to allow research into the variable 
nature of the concept – that is, in order to show the dynamic and variable nature of 
space (as with the movement of the animal), it is better to displace attention away 
from the concept of space itself to the other elements that comprise the corral. An 
analogy that helps explain this strategy can be found in the activity of drawing 
(discussed further below). 
In this regard, the work of Michel Serres (1982) is central to the approach of 
this thesis, particularly his theories on the porous nature of knowledge and the notion 
that it is not static or constrained by boundaries, and therefore the researcher can 
displace, twist and be creative not only with the production of knowledge but with the 
use of that knowledge which has already been produced. A methodology can thus be 
something perverse, out of order, a ‘bastard’ (see Chapter Two for an explanation of 
this term) methodology that does not respect established norms; a methodology 
through which frameworks for action (for the use of knowledge and production of 
new knowledge) can be applied. The mixing of systems, however, requires 
consistency, which Serres (1982) found by using mathematics as a structure in which 
different theories and principles could be used to test and reflect upon a current 
reality/topic. As stated earlier, this author’s expertise lies in artistic practice. 
Consequently, and also crucially, this thesis adds artistic and creative discourses and 
practices to the process of the research and its discussion and understanding of space.  
The artistic methods used in this thesis developed out of the interactions 
between the author’s artistic background and the perceived problematic in a process 
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of continual evaluation and self-reflection. Using artistic methods means that 1) the 
aesthetic dimension of all material sources – not only those falling within an artistic 
framework, such as paintings, sculptures, architecture, film, design, and so on – can 
be used creatively in the enquiry and in the construction of the argument. Thus, 
sources are not read and interpreted, but all their dimensions are explored, including 
their affective, experiential, sensuous and aesthetic dimensions. In addition, sources 
are also made to work by accepting and recognising their agency. This implies 2) 
using imaginative processes that extend beyond logical and analytical systems to 
include the paradoxical and mythological or a ‘bastard’ epistemology (a notion 
developed in the second chapter of this thesis).  
Furthermore, the use of artistic methods recognises that the expertise of the 
artist lies in a practice, a tacit knowledge, and as such, artistic methods 3) rely on the 
development of a critical mass through an artistic practice. Consequently, the practice 
of producing any kind of artistic outcome can be used as a means by which to 
understand, explore and employ the materials, ideas and contexts presented in the 
enquiry. Artistic methods are used as a means of experimentation, of research, and not 
just as a means to produce a work of art. This implies a non-separation between 
practice and conceptualisation, and the acceptance of an enacted world composed of 
multiplicity and multidimensionality, and therefore the dissolution of the notion of 
representation. Such is the case with this thesis, as theory and practice work together: 
the practice is not an outcome of a theoretical exploration, an example of the theory; 
neither is the theory a post-hoc rationalisation and explanation of the practice. 
Exemplary of this interaction is the use of drawing within this thesis. 
Throughout the enquiry into the ontology of space the practice of drawing was used in 
multiple ways. On one hand, by reflecting and observing drawings, primarily 
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scientific ones, informed by the practice experience of the author of this thesis with 
drawing within a artistic, but also scientific, context. This form of analysis and 
reflection guided and stood at the basis of discussions about the necessity of a non-
representational epistemology, one that is driven by performance and enaction. These 
discussions are more visibly present within the two papers in the appendix, but their 
implications within this thesis are revealed on Chapter One and ultimately lead to the 
emergence of the notion of the diagram. A notion that reveals itself crucial to the 
development of the argument and enquiry on the ontology of space but also to the 
implementations and exploration of the methodological implications of space as 
having a productive potential.  
The practice of drawing, particularly in its interactions with the diagram, was 
situated throughout the enquiry to deepen and reflect upon the insights of the enquiry. 
This practice was specifically explored to think upon the interaction of all the 
elements, notions, ideas, areas of knowledge, paths explored and produced insights in 
order to create a coherent and consistent whole, as king questions as: what is the core 
of an argument and were can this core be placed? Which interactions can be created 
between the core (centre) and what produces the core (the areas that lie next to the 
centre but also at the periphery and margins)? How do the multiple parts of an entity 
differently inform a whole and how can this be structured and revealed? These 
diagrammatic drawings are appended to this thesis, providing a visual reference to the 
importance and role of drawing and diagraming within this thesis. Through them it is 
possible to observe not only the explorations of formal solutions that express, reveal 
and perform an idea, but also a genealogy of some of the concerns and insights 
fundamental to the creation of the work The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body. 
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The strategies described above, which are used to ‘perform’ the 
transdisciplinary methodology – the idea of building a corral and using artistic 
methods alongside more traditional ones such as a literature review that transverses 
several disciplines – seems to follow the overall epistemology of transdisciplinarity, 
particularly in so far as article 4 of the First World Congress of Transdisciplinarity is 
concerned. This article states:  
 
The keystone of transdisciplinarity is the semantic and practical unification of the 
meanings that traverse and lay beyond different disciplines. It presupposes an open-
minded rationality by re-examining the concepts of ‘definition’ and ‘objectivity’. An 
excess of formalism, rigidity of definitions and a claim to total objectivity, entailing 
the exclusion of the subject, can only have a life-negating effect. (Freitas, Morin and 
Nicolescu, [1994] 2008, p. 263) 
 
It is also crucial that transdisciplinarity looks to overcome dualistic and dichotomous 
thinking and instead aims at thinking by means of interactions (Montuori, 2008, p. 
xii), using dialogic processes to develop the enquiry. Morin describes the term 
‘dialogue’ as  
 
… [the] equivalent or the heir of dialectic. I intend ‘dialectic’ not in the reductionist 
fashion in which we currently understand the Hegelian dialectic – namely, as simply 
moving beyond contradictions through synthesis – but as the necessary and 
complementary presence of antagonistic process or instances ... thus here too we have 
the possibility of reconnecting ideas without denying their opposition. (Morin, 2008, 
p. 26) 
 
As such, transdisciplinarity is a methodology that  
 
…departs from an integrative model of engagement that accommodates difference, 
paradox and speculative research. Proceeding from this we take the view that a key 
aim of transdisciplinarity is to facilitate emergent insight, knowledge and interaction 
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that could not have been foreseen or designed in anticipation of a specific outcome or 
solution to a problem. (Blassnigg and Punt, 2013, p. 3) 
 
Several methods are used throughout the chapters of this thesis to drive the 
central argument as part of this transdisciplinary process. Sometimes a general 
overview is given through a transversal literature review; at other times it falls into 
almost intimate conversations with other scholars. Sometimes speculations and 
thought experiments are used; at other times the discussion is led by the arguments, 
concepts or ideas established in different disciplines. Sometimes visual materials are 
used to explore ideas; at other times they used to inform the framework of the 
research, supplying the enquiry with questions. This panoply of methods is used to 
support a methodology that aims at an engagement with ideas that transverse many 
disciplines – turning on their persistence and consistency or their tensions and 
discrepancies – instead of being situated within a single disciplinary discourse.  
The intention therefore is to build a coherent and consistent whole, a 
‘cosmology’, in which space can be discussed on multiple levels – retaining its 
paradoxical, ambiguous and variable nature – through a methodology that mirrors and 
reflects this very nature without limiting or constraining the topic of enquiry. The 
necessity for coherence and consistency is first addressed in this thesis when 
discussing the Timaeus in the second chapter. The Timaeus is shown to be a work in 
which the argument is repeated and re-presented through all the various elements that 
constitute the piece of writing: it was not sufficient to speak of the argument but it 
also had to be shown and put into practice.  
The creation of an integrated and consistent whole is also the aim of this 
thesis. It seeks to construct an ontology of space, attempting to avoid limiting and 
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defining this ontology at the same time as giving it a unity. The idea is that the 
ontology of space can be researched through several elements, dimensions and levels 
of existence, as alluded to in the notion of the corral. However, each of these elements 
not only provides access to the ontology of space, to the whole (despite displaying 
different facets of it), but they also comprise space: the corral is the animal and the 
animal is space, despite the fact that neither one of them equals the other. As will be 
reiterated throughout this thesis, an understanding of the ontology of space cannot be 
driven by continuing to enforce the split between the physical and the conceptual, 
because they co-constitute and co-construct each other. Thus, the interplay between 
the construction of a thesis and that of a discussion on the ontology of space cannot be 
seen as simply an analogy, because this thesis and the discussion it contains are co-
constituted and co-constructed. 
 
 
The Interactions Between this Thesis Outline and the Methodology 
 
Chapter One introduces the central problematic of this thesis: the impossibility of 
defining space and, given its paradoxicality, ambiguity, variability and 
unrepresentability, of fully knowing what it is. In accordance with the previous 
discussion, instead of presenting it by mapping all or even some of the most important 
understandings of space, the chapter reveals indications of the problematic through an 
exploration of the impact of the ontology of space – how this notion is used – in the 
humanities, focusing on how the disciplines of geography, anthropology and 
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sociology approach the concept. However, because the aim of the chapter is to 
illustrate the nature of the problematic rather than provide an extensive knowledge 
base – following the transdisciplinar methodology as discussed in the methodology 
section of this thesis – the names of many scholars who have conducted other 
discussions on the topic are not included as the main intension is to reveal the 
identified problematic and not to be expositive of multiple understandings and 
appropriations by disciplines and scholars2, deepening disciplinary understandings of 
the space.  
Consequently, this chapter begins to approach the impossibility of reaching a 
full understanding of space by revealing how this problematic is reflected in and has 
impacted on how scholars from the twentieth century onwards have thought of and 
used space. It reveals the existence of a crucial tension among contemporary scholars: 
a split regarding the significance of the concept, epitomised by the respective work of 
Doreen Massey and Tim Ingold, the former recovering the concept of space and the 
latter dismissing it. Nevertheless, when this separation is put to the test by enquiring 
into the physical constitution of space, it emerges that there is no clear, consensual 
understanding of what physical space is and why it is seen as distinct from 
conceptual, metaphysical space. As such, this thesis understands as being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Within this framework the work of anthropologists as Edward Twitchell Hall ([1966] 1988) (who 
developed the concept of proxemics –the different and multiple uses of space by an individual and 
those by the individual within his cultural framework) is not discussed, as it does not provide a 
discussion of what — ontologically — may constitutes space but instead a discussion of space through 
its categorization within a cultural and sociological framework, which is not the framework of this 
thesis. Because a discussion of space through a cultural and social framework is not the intention of 
this thesis, and given the political dimension of much of the work produced within this environment, 
also scholars as Michel de Certeau ([1984]1988) (social scientist) or Nigel Thrift (2007) (geographer) 
have been left out of this enquiry. In addition, and because this thesis specifically aims to discuss the 
singularly the notion of space and not the interactions of space with either of its family cognates or 
associated concepts, also scholars who do not present a direct discussion of what space is understood to 
be, by addressing other concepts as landscape, place, geographies, territory and maps have been 
addressed, or just briefly as guiding anchors through the argument. 
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fundamental, within the context of enquiring the ontology of space, to re-think the 
interaction between space as a physical, ‘real’, thing and space as an abstract, 
conceptual, thing. This is approached within this thesis from the perspective that in 
order to research and re-think ambiguous entitys as space, is required an enquiry on 
engagement, materiality and existence, driven by a non-representational epistemology 
and an enacted ontology that is based on the emergence of multiple realities from 
interactions amongst their constituents. 
This realisation enables the chapter to focus on the notion of structure, 
exploring it from the perspective of a non-representational epistemology and an 
enacted ontology. The notion of structure is revealed to be present and relevant, in 
discussions of the ontology of space, particularly within structuralist and pos-
structuralist contexts. However, if structures brought into the discussion of space the 
idea of a system of relations their dependence on closed systems, a-temporality and 
synchronicity need to be questioned. Structures are then discussed from a framework 
built over the notions of lines, maps and drawings from which emerges the idea of the 
diagram as a possible way of overcoming the separation between the physical, ‘real’, 
and abstract, conceptual. The diagram is thus understood as an enacted, non-
representational, material outcome of the process of experiencing and perceiving 
order through interaction between the two realms of the physical, ‘real’, and the 
abstract, conceptual. More simply put, a diagram combines the practice of drawing 
with structures from the point of view that the two realms are co-constitutive and part 
of a same whole process. 
In the second part of the chapter, the work of Annemarie Mol and John Law, 
in particular, provides the opportunity to think anew about the relationship between 
space and structures by addressing in a positive way the possible interactions between 
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physical, ‘real’ space and abstract, conceptual space when constructing topologies. 
Their notion of ‘fluid space’ is of particular importance as it integrates continuous and 
discontinuous processes, creating a framework in which dichotomies are seen as non-
conflictual. As a result of their work it is possible to conceptualise space outside of its 
representational limitations, as an active entity with epistemological purchase. This 
segues into one of the main questions of this thesis: how can we consider space as 
productive? 
This first chapter therefore provides the grounds for a notion to emerge which, 
it argues, is a critical determinant in thinking about the ontology of space: 
representation. A second notion emerges more clearly in the second chapter: 
language. Both these ideas will be discussed in different instances throughout this 
thesis due to their importance to the ways in which space has been understood and can 
be understood today and in the future. Both ideas traverse this thesis as an inescapable 
or inexorable presence in the discourses it surveys, not only in isolation but also, and 
most relevantly for this thesis, in combination. Representation is seen as a guiding 
principle underpinning contemporary understandings of space, in particular those that 
derive from a modernist epistemology. Within this representational epistemology 
things need to be represented as there is a separation between Man and world, subject 
and object, conceptual and physical; for something to be represented (presented again) 
it is necessary that the thing, subject of representation, exists as part of a detached and 
static realm, the ‘real’, that is conceptually accessed by a knowing Man who is able to 
re-produce the thing either directly or indirectly (as for instance through language). 
As such it is required to freeze meaning and consequently notions and understanding 
of the thing also becomes static and unchanging. However, sustaining the separation 
between physical and abstract – that this thesis argues against – deprives space of its 
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multiplicity; by observing space as something static that can be represented, it denies 
variability (contingency) and provisionality to space and while separating humans 
from the world it also dismisses the notion of a co-construction between them, 
negating agency to space within this co-construction. As such, representation, acting 
as an epistemological and ontological filter, has prevented the full emergence of other 
(non-representational) epistemologies. Further, the importance to observe these two 
concepts extends beyond this, because in order to understand space, it is necessary to 
understand the limitations of language and linguistic models, when addressing the 
issue of inaccessible and unrepresentable entities as space is shown to be in Chapter 
Two. In order to step outside a representational epistemology mediated by linguistic 
models it is necessary a non-representational epistemology in which new 
understanding of what is materiality3 are integrated – as Karen Barad (2007) discusses 
in its interactions with language and Tim Ingold (200, 2007, 2011) in its implications 
within anthropology. 
Chapter Two reveals that space is an ambiguous and unknowable concept; 
one, however, that plays a productive role in the constitution of epistemological and 
methodological frameworks. The chapter approaches the literature review on the 
ontology of space by focusing on the Platonic concept of khora (one of the ancient 
Greek words for space), which is imbued with a set of characteristics that make khora 
emerge as something other, as a third thing, between the realm of the sensible and that 
of the intelligible, connecting, while at the same time keeping its distance, but 
potentiator of transformation – a ‘bastard’ kind of reasoning, as Plato presented. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 As Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010) highlight, a new thinking strand is emerging: new 
materialism, that is rethinking matter, materiality and materialization; putting forward an ontological 
and epistemological framework that from a post-humanist perspective observes matter as something 
alive and with agency within everyday life. 
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Khora therefore exists outside a binary epistemological system. This otherness of 
khora has however given place to a difficulty in approaching and understanding the 
concept, becoming thus the concept the subject of debates and appropriations that are 
revealing for an enquiry on the ontology of space.  
The difficulties in conceptualising khora are revealed in Plato but also 
throughout time, as revealed within scholars interpretations, which struggle with the 
spatial connotation of the term, thus revealing a set of preconceptions in relation to 
what space is, and is not, about. This struggle, and supporting the findings of Chapter 
One, is based on a persistence in the separation between realms that supposedly are 
conflicting and thus cannot come together within a single concept as that of the 
physical and the metaphysical, the material and the immaterial, the intelligible and the 
sensible. In addiction, the debates reveal a multiplicity of understandings and 
conceptualisations that also support the findings of the first chapter in relation to the 
ambiguity, unattainability and indeterminacy that sustain the difficulty in pining down 
the ontology of space. Importantly then to overcome this perspectives on khora (and 
space), is the work of contemporary scholars as Jacques Derrida ([1993]1995), for 
whom khora becomes a placeholder to designate the unutterable, highlighting the 
limitations of language in expressing that that is unreachable, unknowable, evasive 
and thus unrepresentable. 
In the second part of the chapter, the work of Peter Eisenman and Jacques 
Derrida (1993) for the Park de la Villette shows how a representational and 
linguistically based approach towards the concept of khora hinders the recognition of 
what it means to build space (architecturally). This question of what space means, and 
the implications of materialising it, reflect the intention of this thesis to explore a 
conception of the ontology of space as productive. As such, Eisenman’s and Derrida’s 
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project raises the question of the nature of a practice that would research space by 
embracing and reflecting its ontological conundrum (in contrast to the aborted Park de 
la Villette garden), approaching it not as a representational concept but as a 
performative and productive entity. 
Nonetheless, interventions about the practical potential of khora in questioning 
knowledge and setting frameworks of research, point towards the idea that khora -
space- cannot be approached directly, only laterally, building a corral around it. 
However, through the analysis of khora, and supporting the findings of the first 
chapter, becomes possible to assert the possibility of a framework to explore space as 
a productive methodological device that brings together the constitution of order 
within a context that defies binary logics, linearity and the existence of an origin – 
thus a ‘bastard’ self-reflexive and enacted order. If space through its interaction with 
structures and diagrams can then be thought as something with methodological 
purchase is a matter of discussion throughout Chapter Three and further explored in 
the second part of this thesis. 
Chapter Three begins the work of constructing such a corral by displacing 
the discussion of space into the context of an historiographical discussion on the 
nature of history. The chapter starts by verifying the spatial productivity described in 
the first two chapters by placing it in those epistemological frameworks that deal with 
ambiguous or unattainable concepts. This is done by drawing an analogy between the 
ambiguous nature of space and the ambiguity of the past, using the insights of 
historiography, a field that specifically addresses the implications of building a 
discipline (history) out of such ambiguity. It is crucial to understand, however, that 
this analogy is not intended as a way of researching historical understandings of 
space; rather, it is used to observe the problematic of space in a new light by 
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displacing it into the realm of an historiographical debate about the ontology of the 
past. The importance of such displacement, apart from aiding in the construction of a 
corral in which to research space, lies in the fact that historiography discusses the 
ontology of the past in relation to its own research. By approaching the discipline of 
history, this thesis uses the transdisciplinar methodology to facilitate the emergence of 
insights that cannot be found within the disciplines that take space as their primary 
concern.  
Thinking in terms of a methodology to research space leads the chapter to 
discourses that discuss the implications of methodologies in historiography, from 
those of Michel Foucault to Hayden White, and more recently Frank Ankersmit and 
Alun Munslow. These discussions have prompted methodological shifts not only in 
the practice of history, but also in the approaches of other disciplines towards history 
and historical objects. Thus, using this discussion, the chapter enquires how an 
ambiguous entity can be methodologically researched. The historiographical context 
prompted the question of the possibility of researching space outside a linguistically 
and representationally driven framework: what are the limitations of these 
methodologies in relation to space and how can a model of research be based on an 
emergent process instead of a representational one?  
Displacing the discussion from space to the past liberated a set of concerns 
and insights that ultimately led to a major realisation: that the productivity of space 
could be found in a methodological context. The provisional hypothesis, which is 
researched in the following chapters, is that space is an entity that is ambiguous, 
evasive, un-representable and unknowable, and yet has a methodological purchase, as 
it reflects the frictions and tensions between the multiple and multidimensional realms 
that inform everyday life. In the previous chapters, space emerges as a concept that is 
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related to order, classification and structuring activities. This sets the stage for a 
conception of space as a concept that plays a role within disciplinary epistemologies 
and thus has a productive methodological purchase. As such, this thesis not only 
concerns an enquiry into the ontology of space, but also asks what the methodological 
framework would be if the ontology of space were to be reframed – if space were seen 
to have a methodological purchase. As a consequence, the transdisciplinary 
methodology becomes fully performed, as the methodology of this thesis embodies its 
problematic, creating a recursive, self-reflective process, a mise-en-abyme in which 
space researches itself, placing the main intervention of this thesis within a 
methodological context. 
This ontological and methodological insight is further encouraged by another 
methodological turn: in order to explore the possibility that space has a 
methodological purchase it is necessary to perform this productivity. In the context of 
this thesis, this entails approaching such an exploration through merging the practices 
of drawing and structuring in a diagram. Inspiring this methodological turn is the 
specific methodology that art historian Aby Warburg used to create his Mnemosyne 
Atlas, which is discussed in the Preamble to the second part of this thesis. Thus, Part 
Two of this thesis introduces a way of researching an ontology of space through a 
speculative and experimental practice-based enquiry, driven by an aesthetic analysis 
of visual artefacts. The focus is on finding a path by which to research the ontology of 
space by looking not at space itself, but at the objects and artefacts that surround it 
and are affected by its productive nature. As such, the second part of this thesis 
presents an artistic experiment, The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body, 
which comprises a visual diagram, an encyclopaedia and an allegorical story 
composed of a set of meditations.  
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Throughout this thesis – at different moments for different purposes and in 
different forms – images, drawings, artefacts of material culture are brought together, 
creating a platform to be worked with, from and through, following the artistic 
approach that this thesis brings to the transdisciplinary methodology. As a result, a 
combination of two research paths inform The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body: the first is a research into how a diagram is created and through its application 
explores the potentiality of space as a methodological tool and the second is a 
research into the ontological possibility of space as ambiguous and with multiple 
existences, while being a unified entity.  
Chapter Four introduces the speculative experiment – a diagram entitled The 
Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body – through a discussion of its constitution 
and the interaction between the visual structure and the materials. This discussion is 
conducted by means of the creation of an encyclopaedia, which becomes a constituent 
part of the overall work. The encyclopaedia is a textual experiment that not only 
presents the captions describing the materials that make up the diagram, but also 
reveals the presence of multiple structures and grids, showing how space is at work in 
the construction of order. Through the encyclopaedia, the productivity of space as a 
methodological device is simultaneously revealed textually and performed, by 
highlighting the non-linear, recursive, indeterminate and non-representational 
dimension of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body. As such, this list of 
entries is informed by the attempt to capture the materiality of the images as they 
unfold endlessly from medium to medium, in intervention after intervention, through 
a process of shared authorship. The encyclopaedia works through the possibilities and 
potentialities of each image, which being decontextualized lacks origins, thus 
becoming an archaeological artefact that is enhanced by its interactions with the other 
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images, in an imaginary and aesthetic realm. The archaeological nature of the images 
and the non-linearity of their interconnections enable the creation of The Mouth of the 
Monster and the Hollow Body as a mise-en-abyme4 in which the multiple images 
construct a wider, recursive, infinite whole, created from the infinite narratives of 
each image and the infinite associations and relations between them.  
As such, this chapter puts forward the diagrammatical side of The Mouth of 
the Monster and the Hollow Body, as a discussion of the possibilities of space being 
methodologically productive, as the diagram allows the formation of a strategy that is 
based on a framework that is: archaeological, self-reflective, aesthetically driven, in 
which disruptions and jumps are welcomed and that remains in constant formation. 
This is possible as the diagram is informed by a concurrent coexistence of multiple 
structures, each of them presenting different dimensions of space, working on an 
integrated, interactive an non-hierarchical mode. Through the diagram The Mouth of 
the Monster and the Hollow Body bypasses the impossibility of utterance by 
presenting a single unity constituted by non-unifiable but interactive, infinite 
dimensions, thus enacting the paradoxical and impossible nature of space. 
Consequently, Chapter Four presents space as having methodological purchase when 
informed by an open an accepting conceptualisation of space as informed by a 
multiplicity of dimensions and facets that nonetheless still constitute a single entity. 
Chapter Five presents the artistic outcome of the notion of space as a 
methodological device or strategy with which to research the ontology of space itself. 
It is the outcome of applying the diagram as a spatial methodological device that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The concept of mise-en-abyme is explored throughout this thesis but explained fully in Chapter Two. 
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works in a non-linear, discontinuous, archaeological, recursive mode and uses 
aesthetic affect to reach a conceptualisation of space. This chapter follows from the 
necessity of constructing a corral in which to approach space. This corral is informed 
by displacing the ambiguity, unattainability and indeterminacy of space onto the 
notion of the monster. This displacement allows a way (through the figure of the 
monster) to interrogate space, an interrogation that concerns the possibility of multiple 
existences that nonetheless coexist. Thus it is possible to explore through this figure a 
wide array of situations in which the physical, the material, the abstract, the 
conceptual, the imaginative, the affective, the experiential and the aesthetic interact, 
as traces of the monster can be found in the processes of transformation and 
metamorphosis that occur in the interaction, friction and tension between the physical, 
the material, the abstract, the conceptual, the immaterial, the metaphysical, the 
imaginative, the affective and the experiential that inform everyday life; that is, the 
frictions, tensions and interactions between multiple dimensions of existence. These 
multiple existences all constitute the monster as a single entity, just as the multiple 
existences of space constitute the single entity of space. The work of Chapter Five 
therefore is a written thought experiment that draws from the speculative artistic 
practice of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body as a mode of research. 
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Chapter One 
Problematics of the Ontology of Space 
 
This chapter presents a review of Western literature dealing with the concept of space 
from the perspective of the humanities, focusing particularly on the scholarship that 
has emerged from the so-called ‘spatial turn’ of the twentieth century. It therefore 
takes as its point of departure the belief that, over time, space (as an idea) fell into 
neglect, until the mid-twentieth century attempt to recover and re-conceptualise it. It 
observes the implications that such a recovery – driven by its opposition to modernist 
conceptions of space as a static entity – has had on contemporary thought, and is 
motivated by the desire to reveal the set of elements, concepts and notions that form 
the basis of current reflections on space. 
In reviewing the literature, and in particular through a close reading of the 
work of Doreen Massey and Tim Ingold, two concepts emerge as fundamental to 
contemporary thought relating to space: representation and structure. These notions 
seem to underlie contemporary conceptualisations of space, particularly in the 
discussions that distinguish space from other family cognates: space is frequently 
defined by opposing it to place, site, landscape, region or location, as well as other 
concepts that are frequently thought of in relation to space, such as limit, boundary 
and distance. Two findings surface in the analysis of these discussions. The first is 
that when discussing space there is generally a separation between physical or ‘real’ 
and abstract or conceptual understandings. This separation, with its non-integrated 
perspective, has led to the formation of two antagonistic positions towards the role of 
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space within contemporary epistemologies. The work of Massey illustrates one side of 
the argument: she calls for an urgent recovery of the concept of space from the notion 
of it as a static container. The other view, illustrated by Ingold, argues that because of 
the weight and persistence of understandings of space as an abstract, representational, 
lifeless concept, it is better to dismiss the term ‘space’ altogether. The second finding, 
however, suggests that the separation between physical/‘real’ and abstract/conceptual 
space is symptomatic of a problem that goes far deeper than a mere linguistic 
insufficiency. The problematic underlying the separation is the lack of consensus over 
what physical space is, because it does not seem possible to pin down a referent. 
Space, in its totality, emerges as something ambiguous and unknowable. 
In order to dispel the tension provoked by this ambiguity, the second part of 
the chapter will investigate Ingold’s work more closely, alongside that of Annemarie 
Mol and John Law. Together, their work provides a practical framework for an 
ontological discussion in which it may be possible to overcome the separation of 
physical/‘real’ and abstract/conceptual space. This framework segues into the 
intention of this thesis to discuss space as a methodological device. Adopting a 
dialogic rhetoric, this thesis introduces the notion of the diagram as an enacted 
structure that can be used as a methodological device to embrace both the physical 
and abstract dimensions of space. As such, it takes the position that instead of simply 
separating the concept of space from the idea of it as representation, a more 
productive outcome can be achieved if representation is also re-thought, moving 
towards the idea that space is non-representational (as Ingold suggests). This implies 
that a different way of understanding engagement and materiality is needed in order to 
work with, and think productively about, space – a concept that is ontologically 
ambiguous. It also assumes that the notion of structure can be positively re-thought. 
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This notion, when associated with the act of drawing, becoming a diagram, can be 
used to catapult us into thinking of space as a methodological device – that is, into 
thinking of space productively. 
 
 
Space and the Difficulties of its Conceptualisation Amongst its Family 
Cognates 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, a new awareness of space emerged 
within the humanities, which led some scholars to take a different approach in the 
hope of re-empowering the concept. This movement arose as a response to the 
modernist paradigm, which it believed had disempowered the concept of space. As 
Massey ([2005] 2010) reveals, contemporary scholarship deemed it necessary to re-
think the concept after a perceived change in the relationship with space in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when it became a symbol of modernity. This was 
primarily due to the effort to revolutionise the concept of time – an attempt that was 
mainly driven by the concerns of process philosophers and thinkers such as Henry 
Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead. To some extent, as Massey ([2005] 2010) 
shows, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries became time-focused and time-
orientated: in the words of Edward S. Casey, the last two hundred years have been 
dominated by ‘temporocentrism’ (Casey, 1998, p. x). According to Casey (1998, p. 
x), and also Massey ([2005] 2010), at stake was the liberation of time from, on the 
one hand, the constraints of chronology, which deemed time to be a passive, 
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utilitarian device, and on the other, the scientific conception that time had to be 
stopped or put on hold in order to allow reality to be isolated for scientific analysis 
and the writing of results and conclusions. 
As a result of modernity, time was seen as regulated by science. Changing this 
situation, rethinking time, opened up the possibility of also changing the modern 
scientific paradigm (Massey, [2005] 2010). Time could then be conceived of as a 
process, as ‘temporality’. However, in order to facilitate such a conceptual 
transformation, it was necessary to set it against a perspective that would stand for the 
old paradigm. As a by-product of this agenda, the modernist perspective came to be 
symbolised by space. This was due to the rationale that when time is put on hold the 
result is the creation of space (Massey, [2005] 2010). Consequently, space came to be 
understood as something that stands in opposition to time; it came to represent all the 
things that time is not – namely, the static, the fixed, the immutable. Warf and Arias 
(2009) refer to the same underlying notion that space had become subordinate to time 
in nineteenth century thought. They identify the historicism of Hegel and Marx, as 
well as the Whiggish accounts of history, as the driving force behind this process of 
subordination. This, they believe, was due to a de-spatialisation of the social and 
cultural realms by linear, teleological accounts (Warf and Arias, 2009, p. 2), an 
understanding that the twentieth century inherited, but which the humanities has 
subsequently, since the second half of the twentieth century, deemed problematic. 
Several voices began to emerge in the effort to recover the concept of space 
from this approach; they were intent on forming an understanding of space from the 
perspective of the humanities, as distinct from the spatial understanding of the 
sciences. This movement for the re-instatement of space came to be known as the 
‘spatial turn’ (referred to above), whereby space came to be seen as a social and 
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cultural construct (Warf and Arias, 2009). The spatial turn, according to Warf and 
Arias (2009, p. 1), is a movement in the humanities, particularly within the disciplines 
of geography, sociology, social science, anthropology, history, art history and cultural 
studies, which claims that a spatial awareness is necessary in order to overcome 
universalist and single-voiced narratives within epistemological frameworks. The 
underlying assumption is that space is important, “not for the simplistic and overly 
used reason that everything happens in space, but because where things happen is 
critical to knowing how and why they happen” (ibid). 
Possibly the most recognisable of these voices is that of philosopher and 
sociologist Henri Lefebvre. In his work, The Production of Space ([1974] 2005), 
Lefebvre wants to rescue space from the conceptual domain (particularly that of the 
sciences, led by mathematics) and bring it into the practical domain. However, the 
practical domain, for Lefebvre, is the domain of the social. Despite the reduction of 
what ‘practical’, or in his words, ‘real’ space can be, Lefebvre expresses the following 
aspiration: 
 
The project I am outlining, however, does not aim to produce a (or the) discourse 
on space, but rather to expose the actual production of space by bringing the 
various kinds of space and modalities of their genesis together within a single 
theory. (Lefebvre, [ 1974] 2005, p. 16) 
 
In other words, he wishes to set space free from existing discourses in order to give it 
its own authority. Despite the impact of the publication of The Production of Space 
([1974] 2005), Warf and Arias identify an earlier movement in the 1920s among 
sociologists and geographers of the Chicago School as the first attempt to recover the 
concept of space. It was only later, however, in the 1960s and 70s, that the work of 
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Lefebvre, in conjunction with that of Michel Foucault and David Harvey, provoked 
the stirrings of a wider discussion (Warf and Arias, 2009. p. 3). Their work was 
continued by a multiplicity of scholars, who – to a greater or lesser degree – 
gravitated around the discipline of geography. Despite interventions from other 
disciplines and academic fields, contemporary thinking about space has remained 
fundamentally driven by geographical concerns. The impact of this is better 
understood by considering the relationship between space and place. 
The act of bringing the concept of space into the humanities released another 
concept – ‘place’ – into the discussion, through a focus on the relational aspects of 
space within social, cultural, political and economic structures. This has generated 
confusion between the terms: the two concepts are used indiscriminately, with little 
clarity or precision, not only in daily parlance, but also within the humanities. 
Hubbard and Kitchin, in the introduction to Key Thinkers of Space and Place, state: 
 
In popular discourse, space and place are often regarded as synonymous with 
terms including region, area and landscape. For geographers, however, these twin 
terms have provided the building blocks of an intellectual (and disciplinary) 
enterprise that stretches back many centuries. (Hubbard and Kitchin, [2004] 2011, 
p. 4) 
 
Hubbard and Kitchin thus separate space and place from other terms, attributing them 
a greater importance within geography-driven discussions (this view can however be 
extended to the humanities in general). Nonetheless, a separation between the two 
terms themselves is hard to pin-down and the differentiation between them has been 
left to paradigm changes inside the discipline of geography. However, due to the 
broad use of these terms in the humanities, scholars from diverse disciplinary 
backgrounds – such as historian of philosophy Keimpe Algra (1994), geographer Yi-
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Fu Tuan (2008), anthropologist Tim Ingold (2011) and philosopher Edward S. Casey 
(1998) – believe it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between space and place. 
The tension between space and place is an old one in the history of Western 
thought. For instance, Plato and Aristotle took distinct positions on this subject: Plato 
developed the notion of khora (which is explored in greater detail in Chapter Two), a 
concept that is closer to the idea of space, while Aristotle advocated the idea of place 
or topos5. For Casey (1998, p. ix), place as a concept has been subordinated to space, 
due to its ubiquity and pervasiveness that derives from the very fact that “[t]o be at all 
– to exist in any way – is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in some kind 
of place”. And, given the scientific understanding of space as an absolute, space 
emerged with a stronger presence. Casey (1998, p. ix) states that the concept of place 
was understood as a ‘modification’ of space, which triggers Casey to show how the 
notion of place was present throughout history in the thinking of some of the best-
known philosophers dealing with the idea of space. 
Addressing the concept of place, anthropologist Marc Augé ([1992] 2006) 
makes a distinction between places and non-places; however, it becomes necessary to 
ask whether non-places are ‘spaces’ or ‘sites’. Thus another concept emerges between 
space and place, that of ‘site’, which instead of clearing the path for a distinction 
between space and place only makes it more diffused and unclear. According to 
Algra, in Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (1994), what governs the decision to 
use the term ‘space’ or the term ‘place’ is the fact that space is generally assumed to 
be broader and more inclusive than place. Furthermore, he declares that 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The discussion between Plato and Aristotle and the potential misunderstanding of Plato’s khora 
by Aristotle when pleading for the primacy of place is a matter of in-depth study by Algra (1994). 
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… ‘place’ is rather used in a relational setting (place being, either potentially or 
actually, the place of something) whereas ‘space’ rather refers to an underlying 
frame of reference or to the sum total of all places. (Algra, 1994, p. 20) 
 
The same idea is put forward by Tuan:  
 
[T] he meaning of space often merges with that of place. ‘Space’ is more abstract 
than ‘place’. What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to 
know it better and endow it with value. (Tuan, 2008, p. 6) 
 
Place then emerges as a site or location which is invested with historical and cultural 
meaning; in distinction, the abstract nature of space connects space to the idea of an 
absence of human emotions and thus as playing a role in everyday living. 
The distinction between space and place has therefore diminished space, to the 
point that, in his book, Being Alive (2011), Ingold includes a chapter on space entitled, 
‘Against Space’. He argues that when someone wants to refer to the way we inhabit 
the world in everyday speech, the word ‘space’ is rejected in favour of terms that are 
more specific, grounded and related to practice, such as environment, land, earth, 
field, country, landscape, indoors, sky, air, place, site or room (Ingold, 2011). Thus 
according to Ingold, because we have all these other terms that are much more closely 
linked with the experience of, and everyday activities involved in, inhabiting the 
world, space – in its relationship with modernity – has kept its meaning as an empty 
and abstract concept, one that is detached from experience, and even from life itself. 
This conceptualisation of space as divorced from the everyday realm, trapped within a 
representational paradigm and deeply connected with modernist thinking, leads Ingold 
to (once more and despite the spatial turn) disempower space by deeming it 
unnecessary. 
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A closer look at Ingold’s thought proves fundamental to comprehending the 
contemporary understanding of space and recognising how space has once again 
become disempowered through the tensions created between space and place, and the 
idea that it is necessary to opt for one or the other because they each stand for distinct 
ontological and epistemological positions that are irreconcilable – particularly in 
relation to the perceived division between human beings and the world. This thesis, 
however, argues that space and place do not represent different understandings of 
humanity and the world, and the interactions between them. Each word has a meaning 
that reflects such understandings, but as both are historically contingent, there is no 
clear-cut boundary between them, and consequently there are dimensions that are 
currently attributed solely to place which are also shared by space, particularly when 
dealing with the physical, material and everyday dimensions of spatiality. This 
distinction anticipates an important differentiation: the misleading use of these two 
concepts reveals the existence of a relationship between the way that human beings 
experience, interpret and connect with the world (and with existing and emerging 
conceptualisations) and the attribution of meanings to words. 
 
 
The dis-empowerment of space 
 
When portraying space as a concept of modernity, Ingold, in Being Alive (2011), 
departs from the relationship between the terms ‘space’, ‘place’ and ‘room’. In the 
modernist epistemology, Ingold (2011, p. 146) argues, space is the container of more 
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than one place, there are places nested inside other places (like a Russian doll); in 
such a system, each time we move upwards and outwards we become more and more 
detached from the Earth, from real and lived experience, moving into increasingly 
rarefied levels of abstraction. For Ingold, this succession of spaces creates the notion 
of continuous, infinite space – something that is constantly present but, because it 
contains all places, is at the same time necessarily infinite and absolute. “Space is 
nothing, and because it is nothing it cannot truly be inhabited at all” (ibid, p. 145). 
The notion of space as infinite, absolute and abstract leads Ingold to perceive it as 
something without materiality or physicality. Thus, in terms of a discourse on 
everyday praxis, space becomes an unnecessary idea. According to Ingold, we have 
ended up with this abstract and reified concept because of an epistemology in which 
human beings are seen as separate from the world. Due to this sense of separateness, 
we occupy the world but do not inhabit it. Ingold (2011, p. 148) says, however, that 
our daily experience of inhabiting the world is one of constant movement, not of 
living inside bounded domains, and consequently we cannot separate off places, 
moving from one to another; instead, our movements constitute a place in themselves. 
Ingold explains this notion of place by means of the word ‘room’, in the 
Germanic sense of the term ‘living space’, in which ‘room’ and ‘life’ are part of the 
same concept (ibid, pp. 145-147). This combination of life with place allows Ingold to 
reframe of the notion of ‘dwelling’, which for him means the process of inhabiting the 
Earth and is associated with an absence of boundaries and limits, since life is not lived 
in enclosed spaces. According to Ingold, place is a concept that reflects the 
inhabitation of Earth, while space is completely detached from this dimension, and 
hence is an abstract and empty concept. Thus, for Ingold, we have gone from a notion 
of room as something that is open, a way through life, to a notion of space that is 
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closed as it represents the suspension or enclosure of life. What space lacks is the 
notion of life as movement and process, in the sense of something that is lived and 
constructed through inhabiting a site. In losing this dimension of movement, of 
passage, space has gained boundaries or limits and become enclosed – somewhere we 
can place other things. This concept of space is a product of modernity, since the 
above epistemology is paradigmatic of modernity (ibid, p. 145). 
Ingold’s position, however, threatens to lead us once again towards a 
disempowerment of the concept of space, obliterating its presence from the 
contemporary epistemological system – particularly given the current sensibility 
towards and awareness of the idea of change, movement and process (especially when 
thinking about the everyday). However, not everyone takes the same position, and 
scholars such as Massey have investigated ways of rethinking space in order to 
instigate its re-empowerment. As such, Massey ([2005] 2010, p. 13) argues for an 
understanding of space not as static, but as a product of relations, associated with a set 
of terms relating to process, such as heterogeneity, relationality and coexistence. 
Massey sets out the three propositions that inform her understanding of space. The 
first is that space is “the product of interrelations”; the second, that it is “the sphere of 
possibility of existence of multiplicity”; and the third, that it is “always under 
construction … a simultaneity of stories-so-far” (Massey, [2005] 2010, p. 9). These 
three premises derive from questioning the preconceived ideas of space, but 
particularly from an interrogation of the association of space with representation and 
structures. For Ingold, the absence of life in the concept of space is a reason to deem it 
unnecessary; for Massey, by contrast, this lack of life is simply a by-product of a 
certain epistemology – the concept of space is not necessarily lifeless, and if it is, this 
is only a temporary situation until it becomes detached from this epistemology.  
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The re-empowerment of space 
 
In her work, For Space ([2005] 2010), Massey presents her arguments for the urgency 
and importance of re-thinking space in terms of its place in politics. She identifies 
representation as the guiding principle underpinning contemporary understandings of 
space, in particular those that derive from a modernist epistemology. Massey ([2005] 
2010, pp. 26-7) identifies two steps in the process of equating space with 
representation: first, representation is concerned with fixing meaning, and second, this 
representational process (of constructing frameworks outside time; frameworks that 
do not incorporate notions as movement, temporality, and hence life itself) is equated 
with space. Agreeing with Ingold, Massey argues that this association with 
representation has turned space into a concept that is about fixing the meaning of 
things, extracting the life from them. In developing her argument, she accepts the first 
step in the process, but contests the second. For Massey, it is the fact that space is 
associated with representation – informing the understanding of space as static, 
lifeless and limiting – that led nineteenth century process philosophers such as 
Bergson to place all the value on time, to the detriment of space. 
Massey argues that in the process of releasing time from the constraints of 
modernity (as discussed above), space has been neglected, left behind in the 
movement towards process. Time needed a point of opposition from which it could 
move away, departing from the static conceptualisations that previously constrained it 
as a concept – and that point was space. Space then became the opposite of time, its 
negation, and came to signify the non-temporal (Massey, [2005] 2010). Recognising 
the interdependence of space and time – despite the implications this conception 
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possessed in the past, when space was confined in the notion that it is omnipresent 
and immutable – Massey argues for a concept of space which is also about processes. 
She take her lead from the movement against modernity in order to argue for a notion 
of space that is non-static and living, and thus for its re-empowerment. 
In bringing space to life, Massey recovers the idea of process through 
temporality. In so doing, she follows a strategy that is dependent on the association of 
space with time. Consequently, she traces the understanding of space through its 
recent connection with time, showing the multiple ways in which the relationship 
between space and time has been conceived of negatively. However, in her reading, 
space is constantly contrasted with time and temporality. She therefore not only sees 
space as informed and defined by temporality, but by following this strategy Massey 
in turn limits the formation of the concept of space to that of time and time’s 
conceptualisation as temporality. Thus space is prevented from claiming a distinct 
ontological imaginary and establishing its own authority over what constitutes it. 
In Massey’s battle to rescue space from its association with representation, a 
particular notion emerges: that of the ‘container’. This notion of space as a container 
is one of three understandings of physical space that Algra (1994) identifies as present 
in Western thought (he distinguishes physical from metaphysical conceptualisations 
of space). However, despite the fact that Massey addresses conceptual understandings 
of space, what appears obvious is that her battle to dissociate space from 
representation is a battle against the conception of space as a container. The equation 
of space with representation does not simply arise from its appropriation by modernist 
preoccupations – an idea that rests on the assumption that, up until that moment, space 
was an empty concept waiting to be filled with meaning. The idea of space already 
carried associations with stasis and connotations of it as a container, as Algra (1994) 
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shows in his enquiry into physical understandings of space in ancient Greek thought. 
In the Greek context, when space is associated with the idea of a container it emerges 
as the place in which all things exist – because everything must exist within 
something. 
The idea of space as a container can be found in two instances in which the 
concept of space is associated with representation. The first instance is frequently 
called the bird’s eye view, a position in which the subject is distant and separate from 
the object under observation. This perspective is associated with the idea that human 
beings are distinct from the world and are therefore able to observe it as if existing 
independently of it. This understanding of space has been associated with the 
emergence of the subject/object divide in modernity, whereby an enquiring subject 
can stand outside a container and look into it, observing the things that exist within it. 
This perspective equates representation with the notion that, because the observer is 
detached from the observed object, it is possible for an undistorted, rational and 
logical knowledge to emerge, and through this knowledge, the object can then be 
reproduced, reconstructed and re-presented in its entirety. The second instance in 
which space is connected with representation arises from the idea of space as a 
background. In this perspective, space is the medium in which things are brought 
together. As such, it could be called the blank page conceptualisation. In contrast to 
the first perspective (although they are related), space does not necessarily contain 
things that can be looked upon, but receives them. As a consequence, the enquiring 
observer does not only have a delimited framework within which these things can be 
observed, but also acquires the possibility of choosing what can be placed inside the 
container. 
Modernity’s efforts to construe a way of understanding the world encouraged 
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an epistemology in which the subject, Man, is perceived as existing outside and apart 
from the world, the bird’s eye view. Therefore, it was thought possible to construct 
frameworks, the blank page perspective, that could be suspended and detached from 
reality, in order for Man to observe and understand it. This meant that Man could re-
construct parts of reality – that is, nature or the world – in order to represent it. In both 
instances, space is understood not only as an entity that is static and passive, but one 
that also allows things to be controlled and constrained in order to be observed, 
understood, identified and categorised; thus conferred with an identity and a meaning. 
The central problem with equating space with models of representation is that 
it reveals the persistence of the modern epistemology. As Ingold (2011) argues, 
representation is the position of being everywhere at the same time – an omnipresent 
and immobile position that allows apprehension but at the same time generates 
distance. This stance, for Ingold, contradicts the concept of dwelling/life. Concurring 
with this position, Massey ([2005] 2010) argues that when understanding the world 
through representation (and in materialising that understanding) it is necessary to 
freeze meaning, and this presupposes that our understanding also becomes static and 
unchanging in relation to the objects thus represented. As a consequence, both Ingold 
and Massey argue that this is an epistemology that sets itself against life, and both 
these understandings of space are therefore abstract, conceptual constructions of space 
that are deprived of life. 
Massey ([2005] 2010) associates this deprivation of life, or separation from 
life, with the notion of structure, another product of the modernist epistemology. As 
representation became associated with space through the modern definition of space, 
so structure (as a practice fundamentally identified with modernity) also became 
associated with space. If representation was the way in which fixed, static knowledge 
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was presented as a synthesis, then structure was the way in which such fixed, static 
knowledge was acquired. As with representation, this structure became intimately 
related to the concept of space within the modernist epistemology. The reason behind 
the identification of space with the notion of structure is, Massey argues, because 
structures are directly related to the notion of the static – they are seen as lifeless 
tables, where things are placed in order to be analysed, or as devices that slice through 
time to stop its flow, enabling the observation of whatever is captured in that specific 
slice of time. More importantly, structures create a framework in which meaning can 
be fixed, or through which it was believed that the meaning of an object could be 
discerned. As such, structures are the epitome of the notion of “containing of the 
temporal” (Massey, [2005] 2010, p. 36), the underlying basis of the bird’s eye view 
and the idea of the blank page. Massey believes that the association of space with the 
static and lifeless through the notion of structure was deepened by the structuralist 
movement, because it not only associates space with the non-temporal but also with 
the a-temporal. 
Massey ([2005] 2010, pp. 36-37) sees structuralism as a movement that aimed 
to re-instate space as a counterpoint to process philosophy that recovered time from 
the paradigm of modernity. Space was put forward as the banner against the two ideas 
that structuralism opposed: the first being the notion of causality, particularly when 
associated with written narratives, and the second, the idea of the linear progress of 
history and culture. As such, she argues that structuralism moved from the diachronic 
to the synchronic. However, such a shift carried with it the continuation and 
reinforcement of the idea that space stands in contrast to time. Synchronicity stands 
above and beyond the idea of a slice though the linearity of chronology, as it 
represents the absence of temporality (ibid). 
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As a result, Massey identifies two problems with the structuralist use of space. 
The first is the absence of change associated with the idea of holding the world still 
(ibid, p. 38). She sees this notion as an outcome of the binary thinking of Western 
civilisation, which sets the static against the dynamic, ignoring the idea that they are 
in fact integrated. Consequently, Massey ([2005] 2010, p. 39) rejects the idea, often 
offered as a solution to the binary problem, of building a bridge between the two 
opposing concepts through the idea of the third6. Massey’s opposition to this idea is 
due to the fact that she believes that dichotomies can only be resolved through the 
idea of multiplicity; that is, through the dissolution of the binary system. The second 
problem that Massey identifies in the structuralist understanding of space is the 
observation of structures as closed systems that cannot accept change, as this would 
entail the introduction of temporality. For Massey, the fact that these structures are 
closed systems implies that the relations present within the system are locked, leading 
to necessarily essentialist perspectives. Because the relations are fixed and inflexible, 
not open to change, the system does not allow for juxtaposition and prevents those 
things that are generally regarded as unrelated from cohering (ibid). 
Despite the problems that structuralism poses for the conceptualisation of 
space, Massey ([2005] 2010, p. 39) recognises that the idea of structure also contains 
a positive element: space is thought of in terms of relations between the elements that 
the structure addresses, and this means that, on the one hand, space can potentially be 
thought of in a productive manner, and on the other, relations can only be fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Massey states that Plato’s khora as the third element is an example of such a  thinking- process in 
conceptualisations of space. The concept of khora will be the  subject of close attention in the 
second chapter of this thesis. However, despite the definition of khora as the third element, this 
thesis does not take a position that, as Massey puts it, s ees  i t  as a bridge between two t h i n g s . 
Instead, the third in Plato is considered t o  be a constituent of a whole, and not an external 
element bridging the other two elements. 
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understood by means of an open conceptualisation of spatiality. Thus Massey 
concludes her enquiry into structuralism by saying:  
 
[S]pace is indeed a product of relations (first proposition) and for that to be so 
there must be multiplicity (second proposition). However, these are not the 
relations of a coherent, closed system within which, as they say, everything is 
(already) related to everything else. Space can never be that completed 
simultaneity in which all interconnections have been established, and in which 
everywhere is already linked with everywhere else. A space, then, which is neither 
a container for always-already constituted identities nor a completed closure of 
holism. This is a space of loose ends and missing links. For the future to be open, 
space must be open too. (Massey, [2005] 2010, p. 12) 
 
Although recognising the importance of relations, Massey dismisses their 
connection to structure, which she discards. But is not the notion of structure essential 
to the conception of relational systems? Thus the first proposition of this thesis arises 
from Massey’s discussion of structuralism. Instead of arguing for the severance of the 
relationship between structures and space (a relationship that is fundamental to a 
discussion on the ontology of space), this thesis takes the position that it is more 
productive to re-think the notion of structure, particularly in relation to space. Re-
thinking structure therefore is at foundation of this thesis: it investigates the forms and 
shapes structures take, and how models of change, multiplicity, multidimensionality 
and relationality can be integrated with them. It asks how a structure can be 
contingent, provisional and indeterminate. Ultimately, this thesis explores whether, 
through re-conceptualising structure, space can be conceived of as an instrumental 
element, particularly in terms of the emergence and use of knowledge, and whether it 
can therefore provide a new framework for a discussion on the ontology of space 
itself. 
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A second realisation that arises from this chapter’s close engagement with the 
work of Ingold and Massey is the fact that the relationship between abstract space and 
physical or ‘real’ space remains unresolved. Whereas Ingold makes the separation 
between them clear when he dismisses space as an abstraction in favour of life or the 
fabric of the everyday, the separation is more hidden in Massey. However, her 
argument concerning representation and space can only be pursued if the idea of 
representation remains unquestioned. Things can only be represented in a framework 
in which there is a separation between the conceptual and the physical, as the 
representation is the conceptual counterpart of the ‘real’. It is only through a 
representational model that a separation between the conceptual or abstract and the 
physical or ‘real’ can be sustained – conceptual, abstract space is a representation of 
what is viewed as physical, ‘real’ space. Thus only conceptual, abstract space is 
associated with representation, not ‘real’ space – precisely because it is ‘real’. This 
framework becomes more evident when Massey discusses Lévi-Strauss’s use of the 
concept of space. Massey ([2005] 2010, p. 38) argues that Lévi-Strauss’s 
interpretation of space is a taxonomic one and does not involve ‘real’ space. This 
taxonomic space is, for Massey, just a representation or a grid that is applied to 
‘reality’ without engaging with it; the result, she believes, is that Lévi-Strauss works 
“through an imagination of the spatial as a synchronic closure”.  
Thus a notion of ‘real’ space emerges, one that is distinct from conceptual 
space, despite the fact that it is neither clearly presented nor discussed. However, 
contrary to Lefebvre, for whom ‘real’ space is social, Massey identifies it as 
belonging to human geography. This, however, begs the question of what it is in the 
‘real’ world that is identified as the ‘real’ space that is then conceptualised or 
represented by the notion of conceptual space. Furthermore, if these different spaces 
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are observed as separate things, what is separating them and how are they related – in 
other words, why are they both called space? This thesis therefore interrogates the 
validity of the separation of and distinction between these two understandings of 
space. It also looks at how a different representational model could impact on the 
relationship between physical and conceptual space – a model that is non-
representational, in which humanity and the world are not seen as separate entities but 
are instead mutually informed, each by the other. As a consequence, it argues, the idea 
of bounded entities would dissolve, so that knowledge would no longer be seen as the 
product of human actions but as emergent in this mutual construction. 
 
 
The importance of ‘physical’ space 
 
Despite the fact that when discussing the everyday the humanities turn with interest to 
space, it is most frequently examined using the notion of ‘place’ (even if the notion is 
unstated and the word ‘space’ is used instead). However, the observation of what 
appears to be the ‘real’, concrete dimension of the world, the everyday, does not 
replace the idea of physical space, which still needs to be factored in as a constituent 
of the everyday. Algra (1994), in his study on ancient Greek conceptions of space, 
looks at notions of physical space or how space was conceptualised as existing in the 
physical world. He identifies three distinct categories into which concepts of physical 
space before the twentieth century – in the ‘pre-Einstein era’ – were divided (Algra, 
1994, p. 15). According to Algra, until the nineteenth and twentieth century 
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developments in mathematics and physics, theories about the ‘functions’ of space in 
Western thought were limited and rooted by everyday experience and parlance. 
Consequently, space was observed as: 
 
(a) a kind of prime stuff or ‘reservoir of physical possibilities’, or 
(b) a framework of (relative) locations, or 
(c) a container, the ‘fixed stage where things play out their comedy’, a space in 
which things are and through which they can move, to paraphrase Epicurus. 
(Algra, 1994, pp. 15-16) 
 
There is a striking resemblance between this division of conceptualisations of 
physical space and the conceptual understandings that Massey presents: the idea of 
space as a container, which runs through the notion of the bird’s eye view and idea of 
the blank page; the structuralist idea of relational space; and most evidently, the fact 
that the opposing notions of content and container bring forth a third idea bridging the 
two – the relation between them. This reveals that beneath both the abstract 
conceptualisations of space and the understandings of space that derive from everyday 
experience lies a starkly binary system which is only mitigated by the introduction of 
a third element. It also reveals how muddy and undefined the distinction between 
physical/‘real’ space and abstract/conceptual space is. This is because understandings 
of space that derive from everyday experience have informed physical theories of 
space, which in turn inform the abstract conceptual understandings that the humanities 
on one hand seem to resist and on the other to adopt. The blurred, fuzzy distinction is 
made even more obscure when Algra (1994, p. 19) argues that the reason for the lack 
of integration in Einstein’s understanding of space is that non-classical physics “has 
hardly any connection with everyday experience or with common parlance”. Thus an 
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understanding not only of what physical, ‘real’ space might be, but also of what 
separates these two dimensions of space, appears increasingly distant and seemingly 
unachievable. 
Physics does not seem to provide the means to fully understanding space in a 
‘real’ sense; it is unable to justify the separation between physical/‘real’ and 
abstract/conceptual space. To start with, when thinking about what ‘real’ space could 
be, it is possible to agree that there are sensations and feelings, if not of an entity, then 
of something that is referred to as ‘space’, although – as we have seen so far – it does 
not appear easy to identify it precisely. Therefore, although it might be difficult to 
pinpoint space, there is a belief in something with a physical existence that is called 
‘space’, to which we can attribute a set of properties, if only provisionally and 
contingently. But what are these physical or material properties that allow us to think, 
imagine and feel that space has an existence? What are the things that may have led to 
these multiple understandings of space? And can an enquiry into what might 
constitute a sensation of space provide some answers? 
 
 
A sensation of space 
 
In order to answer these questions this thesis has surveyed literature across 
psychology and the cognitive sciences relating to the perception of space, in particular 
work that introduces the perspective that space should be considered using a non-
static model – for example, through movements such as walking. This derives from 
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the assumption that the perception of space should not be equated with visual 
perception alone, but that other sensations, experiences and affects should be 
considered. However, the literature appears to have a deficit in this approach: when 
psychologists and cognitive scientists use the term, ‘perception of space’, they 
generally appear to be referring, firstly, to a visually dominant perception and, 
secondly, to the use of the visual perception of objects to understand and discuss 
systems of relations and distances (Bugmann and Coventry, 2008; Carlson and Van 
Deman, 2004; Coventry et al., 2008) and the way this third dimension, space, is 
perceived (Judd, 1898; Mavridou, 2007). 
A potentially productive discussion of spatial perception through walking is 
thus reduced to a system of visual relations between objects, driven by the equation of 
space with distance, and approached through a correlation between the notions of 
sensed distance and physical distance. This begs the question of whether it is only 
possible to think about and discuss the perception of space through visual perception 
and the perception of things, or if there is a perception of space beyond the visual. For 
instance, how do blind people perceive space: if space is just a system of distances, 
how do they perceive or measure these? Can it be said that blind people do not have a 
concept of space, or is it still possible to talk about a concept of space that is not a 
matter of visual perception or the creation of a system of distances? The investigation 
into how formerly blind people who have recovered their sight construct their visual 
perception of the surrounding environment is especially critical for this discussion. It 
is reported (Sendon, 1960) that at first they face great difficulties in making sense of 
the information gathered by their visual senses, and in creating a correspondence 
between the visible world and their former perceptions of it. These difficulties are 
compounded when it comes to moving objects, leading to problems in understanding 
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the way a whole exists three-dimensionally, or in other words, making sense of 
objects that have multiple and disconnected existences (Sacks, 1995). This provokes a 
certain suspicion as to the reliability of understanding spatial perception through 
notions like distance, which are dominated by a visual framework. 
Orientation is connected with the notion of distance. However, the idea of 
orientation seems to be potentially more productive in terms of thinking of a physical, 
‘real’ space when it is associated with sensations that arise from the connection 
between our vertical walking position, the laws of gravity and the perception of 
directions such as up, down, left, right, in front or behind, as Franklin and Tversky 
(1990) show. Their study raises the question of whether we perceive and feel these 
directions in a distinct way according to how the body is positioned, not only in the 
ecosystem, but also in such exceptional environments as zero gravity and in non-
referential environments. However, in order to derive any conclusions from this 
perspective that relate to what physical space could be, it is necessary to first 
conceptualise the body in relation to its environment, and then to explore how this 
relation is a symptom of space – a subject that is not addressed in the literature. Thus 
we still need a model of space. The main conclusion that can be drawn from this is 
that every discipline appears to take for granted its own specific understanding of 
space. So the question is: how does the notion of distance or orientation come to 
constitute space, and in which particular framework is space equated with these 
notions? There appears to be no discussion of these questions, leaving the enquirer to 
either simply accept that notions like distance, orientation and gravity constitute 
physical, ‘real’ space, or to wonder whether these are the only elements that constitute 
space, and, if there are more ways of perceiving it, what these are and just how 
distinct they might be from the conclusions that physics draws. 
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One finding in particular surfaces when looking at the research into physical 
or ‘real’ space in psychology and the cognitive sciences: despite the fact that these 
discussions exist within a spatial framework (that is, they use spatial terminology), 
what is understood as ‘physical space’, a concept that is used to support and construct 
this framework, is never openly presented or discussed. As a consequence, none of 
these approaches to the perception of space appear to acknowledge the “feeling of 
spaciousness” that Tuan identifies ([1977] 2008). This is the feeling that the architect 
Bernard Tschumi points to when describing the perception of a white cubic room 
from the inside: 
 
No, You don’t really see the cube. You may see a corner, or a side, or the ceiling, 
but never all defining surfaces at the same time. You touch a wall, you hear an 
echo. But how do you relate all these perceptions to one single object? Is it 
through an operation of reason? (Tschumi, [1975] 1998, p. 232) 
 
This interrogation leads Tschumi to suggest that these feelings or sensations may in 
fact be an operation of reason that precedes perception. However, instead of following 
the route of arguing which activity takes precedence, Tschumi takes the position that 
perception is a construction that emerges through interaction, and asks whether this 
feeling of spaciousness is a shared or even a universal one, despite being contingent 
and provisional. In other words, does physical, ‘real’ space lie in a constant relation 
to, interaction with and co-construction of an active and responsive human being 
through an active and responsive environment? 
Ingold provides some important insights into this question when observing the 
concept of landscape. In The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, 
Dwelling and Skill ([2000] 2010), he takes, at a certain point, an ontological 
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discussion of landscape as the grounds for a discussion on the disciplinary and 
historical implications that unfold if it is re-thought in terms of temporality and 
rhythms, a place where anthropology and archaeology meet. The development of 
landscape as temporality, as a process, is supported by the notion of rhythm, “as 
rhythm, by contrast [with the metronome], is intrinsic to the movement itself” (Ingold, 
[2000] 2010, p. 197). This position allows Ingold to argue for a conceptualisation of 
landscape that goes beyond viewing it as just a cultural and symbolic construction. He 
argues that if we move beyond a representational epistemology to one in which there 
is no separation between the inner and outer worlds, then the landscape becomes part 
of an organic process in which multiple rhythms become congealed. 
However, the solidification of such rhythms does not come through the 
imposition of either nature or human actions, but as part of a continuous process of 
dwelling that informs the constitution of the landscape (Ingold, [2000] 2010, pp. 193-
200). For Ingold, this process requires the action of an agent or agents. However, this 
agent(s) does not need to be human, as rhythm it is not limited to human life – 
seasons, winds, tides, the cosmos, all have their own rhythms which inform and 
become imprinted on the landscape. Thus, although it requires agents for its 
formation, these can be any kind of force, making the landscape a process that is part 
of the world, which Ingold perceives to be a living organism. He therefore argues that 
the landscape is the emerging form that comes out of the constitution of the 
environment (the interaction between the organism and nature). For Ingold, the 
recognition that landscape possesses a temporality means that it can be thought of as 
the solidification of the processes that constitute the environment, according to a 
different set of rhythms. It is through the notion of landscape’s temporality that Ingold 
is able to bring together anthropology and archaeology as disciplines that have a share 
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in the same enterprise. In so doing, Ingold ([2000] 2010, p. 208) suggests that it is 
possible to not only move beyond the idea of the scientific as a-temporal, observing 
nature as if it were a static entity, but also beyond the perspective that the calling of 
the humanities is to study a history that does not recognise materiality. 
While developing this notion of landscape’s temporality, Ingold considers 
rhythm (using music as a metaphor) as a continuous process, despite the fact that 
 
… there may of course be rests or sustained notes within a piece, but far from 
breaking it up into segments, such moments are generally ones of high tension, 
whose resolution becomes ever more urgent the longer they are held. (Ingold, 
[2000] 2010, p. 197) 
 
However, by adopting such a perspective, landscape becomes tainted by linearity, as 
there are no discontinuities, no disruptions. By using this notion of rhythm, in which 
breaks and rest are seen as negative, not sustainable and to some degree non-existent, 
landscape comes to share the same dimensionality as place. Both landscape and place 
are continuous processes, the outcome of the interaction of multiple agents that co-
constitute each other. This interaction Ingold (2011; 2012) calls the ‘meshwork’, a 
confluence and entanglement of lines that are in constant construction, interacting 
with each other, informing each other, sometimes diverging, at other times forming 
knots. Consequently, place becomes not a geometric circle on a map, but a knot that 
arises from the interweaving of several lines representing the pathways of its 
inhabitants (Ingold, 2011, pp. 148-9). In this way, landscape becomes not the cultural 
and symbolic framing produced by a glance over the Earth, but the continuous 
solidification of multiple forces (natural, cultural, social and imaginary) (Ingold, 
[2000] 2010). 
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Ingold ([2000] 2010, p. 191), however, conceives of space within this 
framework in the same way as he does in his discussion of place (reviewed earlier in 
the chapter); that is, as something that does not exist in this dimension. He dismisses 
it from the perspective of his meshwork epistemology, arguing that landscape is 
‘dwelling’ while space arises from a necessity to represent. Nonetheless, Ingold 
presents a non-representational epistemology, in which the human and the 
environment are not separate but co-constitutive, using such concepts as place and 
landscape that are deeply related with space. This opens up the opportunity to re-think 
space in its dual dimension of the physical/‘real’ and the abstract/conceptual through 
this epistemology. Thus space can be understood without any distinction between its 
aspects if it is thought of as a porous and ambiguous entity that is informed by a set of 
elements that derive not only from the physical, ‘real’, sensory and even material 
dimensions of both the human being and the environment, but also from their abstract, 
conceptual, imaginary and metaphysical dimensions. In this sense, we can find a 
degree of plasticity that allows us to manoeuvre and push the concept into other 
dimensions, letting space emerge in its full potential – that is, as potentiality for 
conceptualisations of order and organisation in the world, and of the relationship 
between human beings and the world. Hence, despite the impossibility of a consensus 
over what it is, this thesis argues that space can be observed as a productive concept. 
 
 
Space Through the Practice of Lines, Maps and Topologies 
 
The first part of this chapter has discussed the ambiguity of space, and the difficulties 
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associated with the separation of physical/‘real’ space from abstract/conceptual space. 
The second part will carry this discussion forward through a re-conceptualisation of 
structures from the perspective of drawing. It intends to explore the interaction 
between the idea of structures and the conceptualisation of space in order to 1) open 
up a path by which space can be understood as productive, despite its ambiguity, by 
2) establishing a framework in which there is no separation between physical space 
and abstract space; instead, these will be conceived of as co-constitutive and part of 
an overall process – the process of space. The impetus behind this exploration of the 
interaction between structures and space through drawing will be a close reading of 
and dialogue with Ingold’s work on structures and lines, which he characterises 
through the notions of the ‘network’ and the ‘meshwork’. 
As discussed above, Ingold sustains the separation between abstract space and 
everyday place, in which the first is associated with the static and the absence of life, 
and the second with process and being alive. However, as seen in his discussion of the 
landscape, Ingold argues for an epistemology, and consequently an ontology, in which 
there is no separation between humanity and the environment – as they do not exist 
independently – in terms of their formation and agencies. Thus Ingold’s work can in 
fact provide a framework in which space can be unleashed from conceptualisations 
that either reduce or dismiss it.  
 
 
Space, drawing and diagrams 
 
In Being Alive (2011), Ingold refers to the drawing of a line to exemplify what he 
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means by ‘living through’ or the interaction between the human (organism) and the 
environment. When using this analogy, Ingold distinguishes between two different 
kinds of lines, the hand-drawn and the abstract. For him, a drawn line is a continuous 
movement that does not stop, even if the line that has just been drawn is a circle 
(Ingold, 2011, p. 148). This notion can be better understood through figure a (below). 
Such a line, Ingold argues, is antagonistic to the notion of a perfect geometric circle, a 
figure that is completely bounded and enclosed (figure b), where the line stops and 
does not flow.  
 
Fig. a (left): A circle as a pathway; Fig. b (right):  A geometric circle 
 
According to Ingold (2011), the movement required to make the circle in 
figure b is one that does not exist in life, because it is impossible to draw a perfect 
geometric circle by hand; the geometric circle, therefore, is something that only exists 
in the abstract, not in everyday life. By contrast, everyday life corresponds to the 
movement of encircling, a movement that does not cease; although it creates a shape 
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that is recognisable at any point, the line cannot be reduced to the shape created by its 
movement. The line of its formation remains as a path that predates the shape and that 
will continue after the shape is drawn. Consequently, for Ingold (2011, p. 148), as the 
line is a path, so a place is a pathway and not a bounded entity (as seen earlier). We 
exist in the same way as the line does: through gesture and movement. The geometric 
circle not only stands for the bounded but also for the static; it exists on the plane of 
the paper but is lifeless in itself because it lacks movement (ibid). Ultimately, this 
leads to the notion that there are a-priori instances – because there appears to be no 
movement (that is, no intervention by an agent), the perfect geometric circle is seen as 
a ‘given’, as something that pre-exists; it is a-priori. As such, it leads to the extension 
of this perspective of the bounded, static and a-priori to an understanding of life itself. 
The framework that Ingold (2011, p. 150) chooses to work within and that 
supports his study of lines is, in his words, that of “growth and development, or of 
self-renewal” – a processual epistemology. However, within this line study but also 
within this epistemology, periods of rest or pauses are identified as moments of 
tension. They are seen as negative and unsustainable moments, as tension always 
requires new movement; consequently, there are no actual moments of rest or pause, 
but just the tension of the creation of a new movement forward. The tension of the 
pause is characterised by Ingold (2011, p. 150) as a dotted line (figure c), which he 
perceives as lacking in movement because it is interrupted by pauses. The creation of 
a dotted line, for Ingold, has no fluidity and no continuation but comprises instead a 
set of broken movements; the movement towards the next dot is incidental and not 
connected to the line itself. As a result, the movement in the creation of a dot in a 
dotted line is a non-existent movement that is not part of the earlier movement that 
made the previous dot (ibid). Thus Ingold does not recognise the potential for a dotted 
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line to possess the same validity as the line itself. 
 
Fig. c: A dotted line conceived without movement and a line conceived with 
movement (Ingold, 2011, p. 150) 
 
However, in observing lines from this perspective, if only for the purpose of 
creating an analogy, Ingold 1) reduces the activity of drawing to the inscription of 
movement, which has epistemological consequences because 2) process becomes 
impaired by linearity and continuity. Drawing (as in the creation of a line) is a matter 
of presenting a given movement; however, if movement only exists in the gestures of 
hand drawing, then movement itself is seen as something that can only be the 
outcome or expression of a physical, ‘real’ activity. Nevertheless, if movement is 
detached from the idea of it as merely a physical activity, then, in terms of drawing, 
both the creation of a fluid circle and the creation of a geometric circle correspond to 
movement. These are necessarily different types of movement but both are equally 
important, not because they correspond to different epistemological positions, but 
precisely because, ontologically, they aspire to different outcomes, or evidence 
different aspects of the same life. The geometric circle can exist hand-in-hand with 
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the fluid one and they do not need to be observed as mutually exclusive. Just as the 
fluid circle points to a continuation of movement, but a movement that extends 
beyond the circle, thus creating a transient circle, so the geometric circle can also be 
seen to point to a continuation of movement, a movement that goes beyond the circle 
itself, creating a perpetual motion that is stabilised in the creation of a form – a 
movement that uses a form to support its own formation. Both circles have meanings: 
it is possible, with both, to encircle things and to see beyond the line or the form. 
As with circles, a dotted line does not necessarily need to be posed, 
epistemologically, in opposition to a continuous line. A line can be discontinuous, 
with different intensities of movement, and still be part of the same movement. 
Further, if the dotted line were to be considered as a combination of several disrupted 
movements, would that necessarily be negative, of less importance and less 
expressive? Is such a line limited in its possibilities and affect? In a drawing, both 
kinds of lines are used; they are not necessarily exclusive, neither one should be 
privileged over the other. There are no higher instances of mark-making. There are no 
hierarchies between different kinds of lines, or between lines and other forms of 
expression such as dots. A drawing cannot be defined by the combination of lines that 
comprise it, not only because a drawing is not just made out of lines, but more 
importantly because a drawing is not about the marks that are created on paper 
through movement. 
The absences, suggestions, desires and intentions, what is expressed and what 
is absent, left on hold or even stopped, all have the same importance, all have affect. 
In Ingold’s Looking for Lines in Nature (2012), there is an emerging sense that a 
drawing cannot be defined by a certain kind of line, since it contains multiple lines. 
However, Ingold only recognises the existence of ‘animated forces’ in the line, 
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instead of seeing the line as a part of a process – the process of drawing (the result of 
a meshwork of elements) – that, as a whole, is an expression of these animated forces. 
Thus even for the purposes of analogy, the activity of drawing should not be 
simplified, not only for the sake of drawing itself, but also for the sake of the other 
elements in the process. The implication of this simplification is that it limits an 
epistemology driven by process to an infinite and continuous ‘line’ that denies the 
existence of disruptions, breaks and pauses, including the ultimate break of death. 
Also, the simplification of drawing through the establishment of a category division 
between physical – hand-drawn – and abstract – geometric – drawings leads to the 
perpetuation of the division between the physical or ‘real’ and the abstract or 
conceptual. 
An understanding of drawing that incorporates both physical/‘real’ and 
abstract/conceptual dimensions is discussed in previous work by the author of this 
thesis (see Disclosing Space: Order and Mediation From Hand-Drawn Scientific 
Illustration to Geometry (Appendix A) and Earth-Sky Cosmologies: A Reflection on 
Cosmology Through Human Practices (Part 1) (Appendix B) ). Seen through this 
perspective, drawing is not just the inscription of movement and life through lines, but 
is also an enacted performance that exists as the expression of an interaction between 
what Foucault ([1966] 2002) identifies as the ‘encoded eye’, ‘reflexive knowledge’ 
and the experience of order in its multiple modes. This is because, in a drawing, 
abstract, conceptual processes exist alongside physical, material ones, and thus it 
cannot be categorised as being either expressive with movement, therefore alive, or 
abstract, conceptual and static, therefore dead. For the same reason, a drawing is not a 
representational activity, but a non-representational one. The drawing of a line, like 
that in figure a, is also an abstract, conceptual process, while the drawing in figure b is 
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equally filled with unlimited movement and life. 
The foregoing arguments, discussed using the analogy of drawing, can be 
further developed in terms of the points made in the first part of the chapter – 
particularly those concerning the distinction between space and place – through a 
consideration of map-making. The implications of a limited approach to drawing are 
reflected in a similar approach to the map. For Ingold (2011), a map is illustrative of 
the modernist epistemology as it upholds the unsustainable position that places can be 
observed as dots on its surface. In order to show why transforming a place into a dot 
is problematic, Ingold draws from nomadic understandings of place, movement and 
life, as these are often contrasted with Western ways of living and of perceiving the 
world. 
According to Ingold, nomadic peoples carry a process epistemology in their 
way of living. Such ways of life are set within an idea of inhabiting the world that 
arises from their practical and daily interaction with the environment, informing their 
perspective of the world as co-constituted (Ingold, 2011, pp. 149-152). The inhabited 
place, the home, is not defined by a physical site or a set of physical sites but through 
a sense-construction that derives from their everyday inhabitation. Observing the 
perspective of a people that have a way of inhabiting that requires extensive, 
continuous movement encourages an understanding of the inhabited place as 
something that is also extensive and processual, that feels unlimited and boundless, 
and that therefore can exist everywhere (ibid). On the other hand, to say that someone 
lives everywhere, in a Western epistemology, would be inconceivable, as that would 
equate to the idea of living nowhere. For Ingold, the nomadic perspective of 
‘everywhere’ is distinct from that of ‘nowhere’; de facto, it is in opposition to 
nowhere. The ‘nowhere’ is seen as another dimension that hovers over the ‘real’ 
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world of the everyday as a rationalisation and abstraction. As a result, ‘nowhere’ is a 
non-existent position that can only come into being with a perspective of inhabitation 
that is detached from practical, everyday life – a perspective that is abstracted instead 
of being grounded (ibid). According to Ingold, ‘nowhere’ equals space, while 
‘everywhere’ is place. As noted earlier, this corresponds to the abstract space of 
modern epistemology, which in this case, is able to transform ‘everywhere’ into 
‘nowhere’, and thus unite them. For Ingold, the Western notion of inhabitation is one 
that is bound to a specific site on the surface of the Earth, a site that is occupied, 
delimited and therefore can be circled geometrically on a map. Consequently, in 
Western societies, the term ‘everywhere’ is conflated with the term ‘nowhere’ 
because we can only live within bounded sites, and neither term can be constricted 
into a site that can be represented on a map. This creates tension as both ‘everywhere’ 
and ‘nowhere’ become empty entities that cannot be lived in because they cannot be 
localised and pinned down representationally. 
But does the movement characteristic of nomads constitute the only way in 
which one can conceive of inhabitation, of a home, as being everywhere? Does one 
need to be a nomad in order to understand the idea, even to feel that one can live, or 
lives, everywhere? If the answer is no, then the problem, the tension, does not come 
down from the need for Western civilisation to understand inhabitation as situated, or 
as the marking of a dot on a map. What emerges through asking such questions is the 
necessity to assess the equation of site with place (the distinction between a physical 
location  – site – and the quality of the experience of inhabiting that location – place). 
Place and site are two distinct concepts: place, on the one hand, can be understood as 
a meshwork of lines of inhabitation, the constant qualitative construction of a sense of 
belonging out of an interaction with a multiplicity of factors, as exemplified by the 
	   78	  
nomad. Site, on the other hand, is a physical location on the surface of the Earth. The 
fact that we can distinguish between these two notions does not mean that they have 
distinct and separate existences; rather, the two seemingly distinct concepts have both 
emerged from the process of interaction with the environment and refer to 
distinguishable parts of that process. As such, each of these notions can be (either 
independently or in their interrelationship) depicted and marked on a map. 
Consequently, when using indeterminate concepts like ‘everywhere’ and ‘nowhere’, 
we should consider the specific interaction between the concepts of place and site at 
the moment of use, as there are multiple correlations between them. For example, in 
saying that he/she lives everywhere, the nomad is most probably referring not to 
actually living everywhere, but to a sense of possibility given by a specific 
understanding of life that is built into everyday experience. The idea that one’s place 
is everywhere still derives from the inhabitation of a specific site or sites, which is not 
the same as the action of physically inhabiting every single existing site on the surface 
of the Earth. In parallel, as the term ‘everywhere’ can be understood either through 
place or site, so ‘nowhere’ can also be understood through place or site. If ‘nowhere’ 
in terms of site is seemingly impossible, in terms of place it is plausible that someone 
feels that they live nowhere; that they have no place, no home. However, if both terms 
can be meaningful, how do the two become conflated, giving rise to the idea that 
neither of them can be pinned down on a map? 
As discussed above, Ingold, in presenting the distinct epistemologies of 
nomads and Westerners, refers to the map in order to reveal the incongruities of 
Western thought, as the map is exemplary of a Western abstract epistemology. But 
what is a map? Ingold, despite a lack of clarity about which kind of map he is 
referring to, seems to be using the example of a cartographic map: a bi-dimensional 
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surface that stands for the flattened surface of the Earth, on which locations are 
inscribed. The depictions of a surface on another surface might seem to have a direct 
reciprocity, as if the surface of the Earth had been compressed into the bi-
dimensionality of the paper, and as a consequence the map is seen as an exact 
depiction of the surface of the Earth, a representation that stands for the ‘real’ thing. 
From this perspective, a map could be said to be a scientific drawing, in the sense of 
the belief in the possibility of depicting things objectively, without any subjective 
intervention, as if the object had chosen to present itself through the form of a 
drawing. However, in a map, as with scientific drawings, there is no direct reciprocity 
between the drawing and the depicted object, as each constitute their own realm. This 
is a realm that is not representational but is multi-layered – what this thesis calls a 
‘diagram’. A diagram, like a drawing, is the making visible of multiple structures: an 
enacted, materialised outcome of multiple experiences of order through the interaction 
between physical and conceptual dimensions (the idea of the diagram will be 
discussed in more depth in the second part of this thesis). 
Following the framework of the diagram, the map can then be described as a 
bi-dimensional surface on which is inscribed a multi-dimensional realm or set of 
realities. The referent elements are flattened or displaced into another realm through a 
process of abstraction, in which symbols and signs do not bear a direct equivalence to 
the referent. A cartographic map, specifically, combines the geometric flattening of 
the surface of the Earth with a multitude of symbols and signs that address a 
multiplicity of things (the actual and potential interrelations among them), but also a 
diversity of dimensions or realities that, once inscribed, open up layers of discourse. 
However, Ingold seems to disregard the interplay between abstraction and action 
(drawing/inscription) that enables and empowers a multiplicity of dimensions and 
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realities to cohere on a map. Instead, he assumes that neither ‘everywhere’ nor 
‘nowhere’ (in whichever combination of the notions of place and site) can be 
inscribed on a map, but only physical locations. As such, for instance, the physical 
‘everywhere’ (all possible existing sites) would be tantamount to the entirety of the 
map, which would be pointless. It would also be pointless to depict a physical 
‘nowhere’ (a non-existing site) on a map. 
Nonetheless, if what is being inscribed on a map is either imaginary or 
potential, everywhere or nowhere, then there are no possible constraints. If the 
flattening of the Earth is detached from the blank surface of the inscription, then the 
blank surface opens itself up to other inscriptions, to other layers, realms and realities, 
even to the possibility of inscribing the physical ‘everywhere’ and the physical 
‘nowhere’. Yet the map even goes beyond this, allowing further inscriptions, as the 
every-site and no-site can be related with the every-place and no-place – and not only 
with each other, but also with other dimensions, realms and realities. Consequently, 
the tension deriving from the depiction of everywhere and nowhere on a map only 
seems to be possible if where is observed as a place instead of a site, while being 
inscribed on a map as a site instead of a place – but this results in incongruence. In 
conclusion, the conflation of everywhere and nowhere can only take place 1) if it 
derives from the misleading term where, by which place and site are not seen as 
distinct notions (although they are related), and 2) if a map is seen as a one-
dimensional and reciprocal representation of a single reality, instead of a non-
representational activity of multiple realities. 
In order to understand Ingold’s resistance to the map we need to go back to the 
discussion of the circle and the line. As seen earlier, Ingold tends to privilege an 
understanding of the line as a linear process, disregarding pauses, breaks and 
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discontinuity. The tension that Ingold observes in the pauses and breaks of a dotted 
line, or in the bounded and abstract geometric circle, are recognisable in his work in 
the tension between two different types of structural frameworks: the meshwork and 
the network. For Ingold (2011, 2012), a network is a kind of structural framework that 
aims to create points of connection between elements; thus the elements are seen as 
static and lifeless. The notion of the meshwork, on the other hand, provides a 
structural framework in which each existing thing is a line, with a movement that 
flows and grows, becoming at certain moments entangled with other lines and 
creating knots (Ingold, 2011, 2012). Consequently, in the meshwork, the direction, 
shape and texture of a line is affected by such entanglements and interactions, in 
distinction to the network, where each element is a dot which is separate and different 
from the line that connects it to another dot. As a result, in the meshwork – and again 
in distinction to the network – there is no room for breaks, ruptures, cuts, pauses or 
disruptions; it is a continuous, infinite process of growth (Ingold, 2011, p. 150). 
If the tension between the network and the meshwork is observed through the 
discussion in the first part of the chapter concerning the tension between the physical 
or ‘real’ and the abstract or conceptual, then the meshwork is associated with the 
animated everyday, as characterised by nomadic peoples, and the network with the 
lifeless, abstract and rational realm of Western civilisation. Consequently, the 
privileging of the meshwork over the network emerges from the difficulties of 
considering abstract thought in relation to everyday life. The epistemology of the 
nomad, whose path is a continuous process of a “practical understanding of the life-
world” (ibid, p. 154) – that is, the meshwork – lacks the dimensions of abstract, 
conceptual thought of Western civilisation, as well as the discontinuous, the static and 
the lifeless, which are also part of the process of living. 
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Thus it is necessary to have an understanding of the development of the 
interaction between the abstract or conceptual and everyday, physical ‘reality’ when 
creating structural frameworks. The idea of the integration of the network and the 
meshwork is fundamental to the perspective of this thesis, as thinking solely through 
continuous, uninterrupted lines hinders the construction of a disconnected reality; in 
other words, the possibility that coexisting multi-layered realities are not necessarily 
always connected as they do not emerge from a continuous, infinite, single process. 
The integration of the network and the meshwork can thus be realised in the map as a 
diagram. From the paradoxical and inexplicable to the identification of patterns and 
categories, everything becomes integrated and potentially relatable. How, then, can 




Space, topologies and structures 
 
In using the meshwork and the network as structural frameworks (or as systems of 
knowledge), epistemology and ontology become deeply connected, as both the 
meshwork and the network also exist as outcomes and structures of two different 
ontologies. The association of the meshwork with the relationship between organism 
and environment provides a framework in which to observe them as co-constructed 
and continuously undergoing change. As both organism and environment are not 
restricted to a biological, physical existence alone, but also have social, cultural and 
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imaginary dimensions, the meshwork provides a way of understanding how things 
come into being. This is a distinct ontological position from that of the network, 
which aims at understanding what something is in terms of a system of relations in 
which it can be compared with similar entities. An ontology that is based on the idea 
that entities exist independently of their environment, or can be abstracted from it, 
allows their displacement from their constitutive framework in order to compare them 
with other entities that might be similar. Ultimately, the notion of the network creates 
the logic of the container, as discussed in the first part of the chapter, in which people 
are receivers of knowledge, which they then pass down to another receiver. 
Therefore, and most importantly for this thesis, the meshwork differentiates 
itself from the network through its inseparability from the environment. An entity 
cannot be accounted for outside its environment because the environment is part of 
what it is. As a result, the ontology of something, or what something is, is 
apprehended by learning how it came to exist in a certain place, and consequently its 
ontology is inseparable from the ontology of the environment. Furthermore, in 
thinking of an ontology of the environment, it is not possible to detach it from the 
notion of place, landscape and an ontology of space (as seen in the discussions in both 
the first and second parts of this chapter). This correlation is particularly evident, as 
Ingold reveals, in the conception of the everyday, physical, ‘real’ side of the ontology 
of space. 
Despite the importance of the idea of the meshwork to thinking through the 
ontology of space in its everyday, physical, ‘real’ dimension, the full 
conceptualisation of space can only be complete with the integration of its abstract, 
conceptual dimension; that is, the integration of the network and the meshwork as part 
of the same ontology or as part of the ontology of space. However, despite Ingold’s 
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recognition that both network and meshwork have a place, his presentation and 
defence of the meshwork is achieved only through setting it in opposition to the 
network. He sees these as separate concepts when in fact they work together; they 
simply do different things. For Ingold, the identification of a structure is deeply 
related to epistemology, as structures express and reflect a direct relation with the 
practices with which they are associated and for which they stand. A structure, he 
states, is an orthogonal grid in which there are vertical and lateral lines:  
 
[T]o the laterally integrated geography of locations there corresponds a vertically 
integrated classification of the things found in them. The former is held together 
by chains or networks of point-to-point connections, the latter by the taxonomic 
aggregations and divisions of the database. (Ingold, 2011, p. 154) 
 
Ingold  (2011, p. 154) argues that this orthogonality allows us to gain some 
knowledge, but he says there is also another kind of knowledge that does not follow 
this grid and cannot be encapsulated by it: the knowledge of the inhabited or the 
meshwork. The activities of a way of being, of living practices, are translated from the 
marks and traces they leave behind, leading to a particular structural framework. 
Consequently, structures are not a means of researching – a research device – or a 
way of observing and testing ideas and thought experiments, but a direct expression of 
a way of being. As such, he believes the network and the meshwork possess distinct 
epistemological frameworks. 
A different position, however, can be found in the work of Mol and Law. In 
Regions, Networks and Fluids: Anaemia and Social Topology (1994), they accept the 
coexistence and productivity of these distinct positions, but they do not describe them 
as opposing one another. As these authors demonstrate, different structural 
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frameworks provide different answers to either different concerns or to the same 
concern, and as such, different questions should be posed to each structural 
framework. Each framework is therefore seen as representing a distinct approach to 
different dimensions of the same thing. This perspective helps alleviate the tension 
generated by observing the network and the meshwork as opposed epistemological 
and ontological positions, and opens up the possibility of different structural 
frameworks. The creation of such an opportunity is fundamental to a discussion of the 
ontology of space, given the interaction between structures and the ontology of space 
(discussed earlier), as well as providing a framework in which to think of space 
productively. This thesis therefore argues for an ontology of space in which, while 
recognising the inseparability (due to their co-construction) of organism and 
environment, it is nevertheless still possible, as part of the process of exploring the 
unknown dimensions of the entity or organism (and also of the environment), to 
compare it with other entities that do not arise within the same environment. 
Mol and Law (1994) argue for the idea that sociological space is topological; 
however, as there are multiple kinds of topologies, there are also multiple types of 
social space. In taking this position they show, on the one hand, a possible 
relationship between physical space and conceptual space, and on the other, the 
importance of structures to the apprehension of the ontology of space. A connection 
between structures and space can be established through the notion of topology 
(borrowed from mathematics). A branch of mathematics that they define as “[a field] 
that doesn’t localize objects in terms of a given set of coordinates. Instead, it 
articulates different rules for localizing in a variety of coordinate systems” (Mol 
and Law, 1994, p. 643). This opens up the traditional grid of X, Y, Z to a multiplicity 
and variability that otherwise could not be accounted for. The multiplicity and variety 
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these mathematical spatial structures reveal, over and above the traditional ones, 
provide Mol and Law with a platform on which multiple topologies can be used as a 
model, or research device, to analyse and re-think social spaces. According to Mol 
and Law, there are multiple ways in which space is used within the social sciences; 
however, it is generally used to ‘frame’ differences and similarities, creating a grid 
through which these can be read. As such, topological structures do not stand for a 
specific epistemology but are research devices that work through analogy. These are 
not structures that impose a certain way of thinking; they are simply guides for 
thought experiments. Not only can things change and move, but the guide itself can 
also assume multiple forms and characteristics. In their use of structures, Mol and 
Law show the different layers in which the physical/‘real’ and the abstract/conceptual 
are related. In other words, they show that there are multiple ways in which the 
physical/‘real’ and the abstract/conceptual interact and are implicated in each other’s 
co-constitution. 
In their work, Regions, Networks and Fluids: Anaemia and Social Topology 
(1994), Mol and Law present what could be described as a two-way study: two 
different objects (anaemia and social topology) are analysed through a study of their 
interaction with a common denominator. On one layer, there is anaemia, as seen 
through the perspective of social spaces, and on another layer, there is the notion of 
social spaces, explored through the methodological device of topology. However, 
these two layers are interrelated and inform each other throughout the study as they 
unfold through a common element: the blood. At the layer of the study of anaemia, 
blood is part of the subject itself as anaemia is a blood disorder; however, the different 
understandings of this disorder necessitate the exploration of multiple structures of 
interaction. Thus an ontology of blood (as seen through anaemia) necessitates in turn 
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a topological exploration. At the layer of re-thinking social spaces, the ontology of 
blood informs the conceptualisation of three different topologies, importantly that of 
fluidity. These three topologies are then translated into different kinds of social spaces 
(regional space, network space and fluid space). Thus the ontology of blood, by 
enabling the exploration of different topologies, informs the re-conceptualisation of 
social space. By exploring a common denominator – blood – Mol and Law construct a 
multi-layered study that applies on different, multiple levels of interactions between 
the physical or ‘real’ and the abstract or conceptual. 
According to Mol and Law (1994, p. 643), two kinds of topologies are 
traditionally used in the social sciences. The first is the traditional physical/‘real’ 
topology of the land, the site, which is determined by boundaries and in which certain 
events take place. This first kind of spatial topology creates its boundaries by 
distinguishing ‘here’ from ‘there’ – what Mol and Law (1994, p. 646) call a ‘regional 
topology’ – and this is used to enquire about the fabrication of the region and its 
boundaries, or “how regions are averaged and fixed” (ibid, p. 663). The second 
topology is the place of relations, the network, in which the tangible and intangible 
distances between the various elements are measured (ibid). This second kind of 
spatial topology therefore moves across boundaries to establish relationships. The 
network space says that although regions (the first kind of topology) exist, they are 
not intrinsic, nor do they exist by themselves, as a given, but they are in fact informed 
by networks (ibid, pp.  648-649). These networks, corresponding to the second 
topology, are built from a multiplicity of elements, ranging from words and gestures 
to machines, and their relations are not driven by the constitution of meaning but by 
their co-constitution (ibid, p. 649). As such, the network is not informed by the notion 
of physical proximity and metric distance, but by the concepts of similitude and 
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difference, formal and informal. As a result, the network has a coherence that is 
independent of its location in different regions and so allows these different regions to 
come together. However, a network, though not restricted by boundaries, is fixed, as 
“its elements do not change and the relationship between them is not altered” (ibid, p. 
649); the elements have invariable connections (ibid, p. 663). A problem then 
emerges, as the network requires the integrity of its elements, independently of its 
locations, and this may not always be possible to secure (ibid, p. 652). A network 
therefore cannot fully account for the changes in the elements and in the relationships 
between them, particularly when it is dislocated (ibid, p. 655). 
The limitations of the network can sometimes be solved by creating new 
networks, which, when interwoven with the old, can be made to account for 
mismatches. However, Mol and Law (1994, p. 658) suggest a different path – a path 
that is informed by structures, by “variation without boundaries and transformation 
without discontinuity”. This suggests something like a fluid. In this way, taking a 
position that there are multiple kinds of topological spaces, they introduce the idea of 
fluid space as a third topology. In this third topological space, the distances within the 
structure are not fixed; neither do they always connect the same elements: 
 
[N]either boundaries nor relations mark the difference between one place and 
another. Instead, sometimes boundaries come and go, allow leakage or disappear 
altogether, while relations transform themselves without fracture. (Mol and Law, 
1994, p. 643) 
 
Thus fluid spaces account for invariant: transformation (ibid, p. 658). 
According to Mol and Law (1994, p. 659), there are three main characteristics 
that make fluid space (the third topology) distinct from regional space (the first 
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topology) and network space (the second topology): the malleability of the boundary; 
the multiplicity of possible mixtures; and the robustness of the whole. The fluidity 
informs a transformational space in which boundaries cannot be determined because 
the elements that constitute fluid space are not stable in their definitions and 
meanings. These elements are inconstant, and it is not possible to distinguish stable 
differences or similarities between them that could determine either their identity or 
any kind of boundaries (ibid, p. 660). The indeterminacy and inconstancy of the 
elements that constitute fluid space therefore determine that the boundaries of this 
space are malleable in their form, thus overcoming the danger of breakage. However, 
the fact that its elements have such characteristics, also means that “it may or may not 
be possible to separate a fluid into its component parts [a]nd it may or may not be 
possible to mix these in with the components of another fluid” (ibid). But this also 
means that a fluid is not defined by any specific and determinate element, and thus 
any of its elements can be replaced or become superfluous. Consequently, there are 
multiple combinations and mixtures that can constitute fluid space. Finally, because 
the existence of fluid space as an integral whole is not dependent on any specific 
element, there is the possibility of continuous transformation without discontinuity: 
“There is no single strongpoint to be defended in order to preserve continuity” (ibid, 
p. 662). As such, fluid space is a robust whole, a thing in itself that, as a structure, is 
not informed by the unity of its elements but by the overall form of an entity that is 
flexible enough to keep its integrity despite the changeability of its constituent 
elements. 
In terms of the argument of this thesis, the importance of fluid space lies in the 
fact that it is able to combine continuity with discontinuity, movement with stasis, and 
in creating a consistent whole out of these dichotomies can overcome the problems 
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alluded to in the first part of the chapter when discussing the limitations of structures. 
For example, it is possible when watching a cloud or the flow of blood to observe 
how change depends on the way we look at things. Although blood is constantly 
flowing, it is still possible to determine patterns in it – an indefinite number of 
patterns – and to momentarily fix a dimension of blood without restricting the 
understanding of it to a specific pattern. Similarly, a cloud can become denser at a 
certain moment, and in the next, more rarefied; its shape constantly changes with the 
wind or the different currents of air. Despite these changes, it is still possible to see 
and play with the shape of one particular cloud: it may turn from white to grey and 
rain may fall, it may lose its boundaries and become indistinguishable from the sky, 
merging with other clouds; however, we can still pursue it and imagine it as the same 
cloud, as the cloud that we have defined and delimited. In this way, our cloud exists 
as a unified presence and will appear to last as such even though it is constantly in 
motion, constantly changing. If this approach to structures – as things that are 
diversely informed and follow different kinds of rules and norms – is added to the 
idea that they are detached from a representational model (as discussed earlier in 
Ingold’s notion of the meshwork), then structures can become an important device 
through which to analyse and explore the ontology of space. 
Mol and Law (1994, p. 663) conclude their study by highlighting the fact that 
these three topologies “have intricate relations. They co-exist”, and thus fluid 
topologies are not better than the other two topologies or any other kind of topology. 
In rejecting the idea of a hierarchy between these structures, Mol and Law open the 
way to a perspective in which all kinds of structures can be integrated and used to 
observe aspects of a reality that is itself multi-dimensional. However, Mol and Law 
apply, conceive and use these structures or topologies without any discussion on how 
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they are a result of understandings of space that allow the combination of 
physical/‘real’ space with abstract/conceptual space. In their work, they undertake this 
conceptualisation in relation to blood, but not in relation to space. 
Mol and Law therefore do not conceptualise the ontology of space itself, as the 
notion of topology is conflated with that of space. However, a topology is not only a 
set of elements but also the rules that determine the relationships between those 
elements. Thus a topology is a structure, and a structure, although related to space, is 
not space. Many notions have been associated with space, as discussed in the first part 
of the chapter, such as locations, regions, distance, boundaries, connections, 
topologies, but how do all these constitute space? Using Algra’s three-fold 
categorisation of physical space, it is possible to recognise type c in the regional 
space, type b in the network space, and type a in the fluid space. But overriding the 
composition of each structure or each kind of space is the mathematical notion of 
topology, and this is a relational type of space, or type b. The topologies that Mol and 
Law use are multiple variants of a single understanding of space – a relational 
understanding – even if each of these topologies are themselves guided by other types 
of space. So when using the word ‘space’ to refer to different structures, Mol and Law 
are not conceptualising the ontology of space, but multiple formats of the same kind 
of space. The multiplicity of spaces therefore comes from the different forms that are 
given to the same understanding of space. Nonetheless, they provide, within that 
variety, a panoply of ways in which the realm of the physical, the ‘real’, the everyday 
and that of the abstract and conceptual can be integrated. 
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Conclusion 
 
The literature reveals that space in its abstract and physical dimensions is an 
undefinable concept that scholars have been struggling with for a long time. As Algra 
puts it: 
 
The problem of space has not yet stopped worrying philosophers. The fact that 
space is on the one hand an ineliminable part of the furniture of the physical world 
– or at least an ineliminable aspect of the way in which we experience the world – 
whereas on the other hand it proves extremely difficult to reach a consensus about 
what it actually is, has fascinated many thinkers from the times of Parmenides to 
the present day. (Algra, 1994, p.  2) 
 
Moreover, these conclusions can also lead us into thinking that the perception of 
space per se does not exist and, as a consequence, to begin to conceptualise space as 
something that is not a specific and determined entity but a multiplicity of entities, 
and therefore that is ambiguous, fuzzy and not a totality, despite the possibility of it 
possessing the sense of a totality. As a result, what becomes interesting is the 
exploration and analysis of this concept in the duality and conflict, discrepancies and 
disruption of these two possibilities of space: physical or abstract. From the 
perspective of this thesis, this demands re-thinking the interactions between abstract 
space and physical space since the idea of them as co-dependent is fundamental to a 
discussion on the ontology of space. In this context, the work of Ingold, particularly 
his discussion of the line, hints at a framework outside the representational, opening 
up a discussion on the ontology of space that does not rely on the separation of the 
abstract and the physical – despite Ingold’s own dismissal of the notion of space due 
to his perception of it as abstract and detached from everyday life. Meanwhile, 
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Massey’s conceptualisation of space reveals the importance of structures to reflections 
on the ontology of space. In addition, Mol and Law, by addressing positively the 
potential interactions between the physical and the abstract within structures, open the 
way to thinking anew about the relationship between space and structures. In this 
way, they allow for the possibility of transforming space into an active 
methodological device. By combining Ingold’s take on lines and the everyday with 
Massey’s search for a relational structure and Mol and Law’s explorations with 
topologies, the diagram emerges as a possible way of overcoming the void between 
the physical and the abstract. It does this by combining the practice of drawing with 
structures. The interaction between thinking about the ontology of space and thinking 
about structures through the notion of the diagram seems to be a productive path to 
follow. By re-thinking space from this perspective, it then becomes an element with a 
methodological purchase at the level of disciplinary epistemologies. 
In conclusion, this overview of disciplinary approaches to space has revealed 
that the concept is only partially realised in disciplines that work with and through 
space (and/or the concept of space). The lack of a consensual understanding, however, 
is a manifestation of something deeper than a language/meaning problem, as the 
problematic is the very entity of space itself. Chapter Two will expose in greater 
detail the lack of consensus and understanding, affirming that space is not fully 
knowable and, in its entirety, escapes description. Nonetheless, this thesis argues, 
most notably in its second part, that aesthetics and art might alleviate the tension and 
potentially access space through a sensuous, experiential and imaginative exploration. 
It proposes that this can be achieved by a convergence of conceptual and physical 
accounts of space, particularly through their recovery in visual, diagrammatic, 
structures. This enquiry into the characteristics of what makes us conceive of space as 
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either physical or abstract is intended to release a provisional understanding of space 
– an understanding that neither brings together nor separates but steps outside this 
distinction altogether. It is precisely by working between the physical and the abstract, 
with the uncertainties that make it possible to conceive of space as both, and by 
acknowledging both the interconnections and the contradictions and discrepancies 
between these two understandings, that it becomes possible to enquire into the 
ontology of space. 
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Chapter Two 
Space Through Khora:  
The Possibility of Space as a Methodological Device 
 
The previous chapter discussed how space has been understood from the point of 
view of the Earth; that is, it looked at the everyday perspective of space guided by 
disciplines such as geography, anthropology and sociology. It observed how 
contemporary thinkers have moved away from a modernist epistemology towards a 
paradigm in which humanity is not separate from the Earth (the inhabited 
environment) but both are co-constructed, each being dependent on and an agent in 
the other’s formation, and it discussed the impact of this perspective on conceptions 
of space, particularly in relation to structure. The following chapter develops the 
argument by dismantling the dichotomy between space and Earth: the separation of 
Earth, where we dwell, from outer space, where the sky and cosmos exist. It shows 
how the relation of space to structures spans different modalities of thought that are 
not restricted by this Earth-sky split. 
An historical perspective of the emergence of the word ‘cosmos’, particularly 
in relation to cosmology, reveals a further dissociation apparent in the perception of 
space: the dichotomy between that which is known and with which we interact (Earth) 
and that which is unreachable and unknowable (the sky). In this thesis, the term 
‘cosmology’ is understood to represent a philosophical system that explains how the 
world has come into being, bringing together the physical, cosmogonic dimension 
(whether logical or mythological) and the metaphysical. The way these dimensions 
interact reveals the rules or norms that guide how human beings should live. An 
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analysis of cosmology therefore clarifies the Earth-sky dichotomy but also brings to 
light another dimension that has particular significance for a discussion on the 
ontology of space: the idea of the unknown and unknowable. It reveals that the sky 
has not only been associated with the idea of the untouchable, unreachable and 
unknown, but it is similarly related to the idea of space. 
An understanding of the relationship between the unknown and space is an 
important theme of this thesis: it raises the question of whether space is unreachable 
and unknowable, and if the answer is ‘yes’, how it is so. The previous chapter pointed 
to a deficit in the understanding of the relationship between physical space and 
conceptual, abstract, metaphysical space, and how, despite the everyday use of the 
word, there is no consensus on the nature of space. This chapter intends to explore the 
possibility that not only do we not know what space is or how to use it, but also that 
space itself might be a concept that expresses the unknowable. The idea of space as an 
unreachable dimension, impossible to apprehend, will be more closely explored by 
way of the key concepts of Plato’s cosmological work, the Timaeus. This work will be 
used throughout the chapter as a framework for a discussion on the different 
dimensions and implications of this question, particularly in relation to the 
interactions between the idea of the arche (or first cause) and the emergence of a third 
element within the Platonic Theory of Forms, khora.7 
The Timaeus is recognised as a work that has played a major role within 
European Christianity, but it has also recently assumed an important place in theories 
about the limitations of language, particularly the idea of ‘unutterability’, and in the 
development of rhetorical strategies. The different interpretations of khora allow this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A discussion of the meaning of this term is d e v e l o p e d  throughout the chapter. 
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thesis to discuss not only the possibility but also the limits of using the concept of 
space as a methodological device. This dimension is specifically approached in the 
second part of the chapter through the work of Rickert, which brings together within 
the sphere of invention the work of contemporary scholars such as Jacques Derrida, 
Julie Kristeva and Gregory Ulmer. The difficulties of conceiving of space as a 
methodological device, given the impossibility of fully reaching and materialising 
space (and Platos’s concept ‘khora’) is further analysed through a study of the 
collaborative work of philosopher Jacques Derrida and architect Peter Eisenman.  
However, in this chapter, and in the thesis as a whole, the stress is not on 
understanding khora in its spatial dimension – khora as space – in order to intervene 
in the discussion on whether the concept can be identified as space or not, but to 
speculatively explore the ontology of space through the multiple perspectives on and 
interpretations of khora that have emerged over time, and thus to understand space 
through khora. This does not necessarily imply a ‘charitable’ rational reconstruction 
of past theories (as Algra (1994, p. 74) puts it) but, rather, a dialogue with them from 
the position that it is not possible to fully account for the past.8 As such, this 
perspective generates a way of deepening the understanding of the ontology of space 
and furthering the exploration of its potential as a methodological device. The 
framework provided by Plato’s khora  (and by contemporary discussions on the 
concept) opens the way for an investigation into the idea of space as a conundrum,  a 
paradoxical and unknowable realm, based on the understanding that all 
conceptualisations of space are related and simply present different dimensions or 
facets of the same thing – one, however, that cannot be identified as a single entity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This position will be particularly addressed in Chapter Three by observing contemporary 
discussions on historiographic positions towards the past, history and historical narration. 
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Cosmological Aspects of Space 
Cosmology and the displacement of the unknown to space 
 
According to philosopher and philologist Remi Brague in his work, Wisdom of the 
World (2003), the word ‘cosmology’ – as opposed to ‘cosmography’ and 
‘cosmogony’9 – has its origins in the mid-seventeenth century, when it arose as a 
description of the accounts, particularly historical ones, of Man’s existence in the 
world. However, its first recorded use as a working concept within a discipline dates 
from 18th-century German philosophy. The fact that its emergence coincided with the 
coming of the modern age is telling: it reveals the underlying conditions that guided 
the formation of the term and its discipline. Brague (2003, p. 4) alerts us to the fact 
that cosmology, “as is implied by the word logos, is not that of a simple discourse, but 
a reflection on the nature of the world that as a world must be expressed”. As such, 
cosmology entails that in order to consider what the world is, it is necessary that 
human beings recognise their own existence and observe themselves as beings in the 
world. The existence of a human subject who is separate from the object of reflection 
is a necessary condition for the conceptualisation of the world. As a consequence, 
cosmology becomes a discourse not only of an ontological but also of an 
anthropological order, as it primarily concerns the relationship between Man and the 
world. The rise of ‘Man as subject’, and the consequent separation of Man from the 
world, was fundamental to the emergence of cosmology alongside modernity (Brague, 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Brague (2003, p. 3) defines cosmography as “the drawing or description (graphein) of the world 
as it appears at a given moment”, and cosmogony as “the story of the emergence of things or, 
perhaps, the story of cosmogenesis … [the explanation of ] how things come to form ( gignesthai) 
the world as we know it, in the structure in which we find it today”. 
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 2003); however, as Brague remarks, such a separation has a longer history, in which 
the emergence of the word ‘cosmos’ itself played a fundamental role. 
The foundations of cosmology, as well as its limits, lie in the origins of the 
word ‘cosmos’ in Greek civilisation when it was primarily related to the word ‘world’ 
and only secondarily associated with the sky. Brague (2003) provides evidence that 
prior to ancient Greek civilisation a term to describe the world as the totality of all 
existing things did not exist. He explains such an absence by reference to the thought 
of Brunner-Traut (2000), which associates the non-existence of such a concept with 
the fact that although phenomena were observed, understood, explained and 
integrated into an overall system, this understanding did not require that human 
beings perceive the system as a distinct unity, as if observed from a single exterior 
perspective. Consequently, such an independent structure could neither be 
conceptualised nor named. According to Brague (2003), however, the observation of 
an independent world is fundamental to the conceptualisation of the whole as a unity, 
as it is first necessary to see the entirety of that unity from the outside. More precisely, 
the whole only becomes such if it is conceived as an object that is separate from the 
thinking subject. The concept of the ‘world’ could only emerge with the shift of 
perspective that allowed an understanding of human beings as distinct from the rest of 
the totality. This shift came with the ancient Greeks, and the word chosen to express 
the unity of the whole, ‘kosmos’, is one that reflects the idea that the entirety of things 
needs an organising structure – the word itself meant ‘harmonious order’. It is thus 
possible to conclude from Brague’s work that the word ‘world’ was born of the need 
to designate a possible model for a structure or order in which the entirety of things 
could be organised and observed as a unity. As a consequence, the emergence of the 
word ‘cosmos’, the ‘ordered world’, goes hand-in-hand with the creation of the 
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dichotomies of the inner and the outer, and of Man and the world. 
Brague (2003) argues that the transformation of the idea of an ordered whole, 
the cosmos, into a synonym for the world depended on two fundamental ideas that 
came into being during Socrates’ time. The first, mentioned above, was the separation 
of human beings from the natural world – that is, from the entirety of things that 
constitute the whole. The second was the belief that nature was unknowable and 
consequently unreachable. These two ideas occurred when Socrates observed that it 
was only possible to know and discuss Man in his ethical dimension, and therefore the 
domain of physics and nature were truly unknowable as they were not subject to 
humanity’s moral laws. It is important to note, as Brague (2003, p. 29) points out, that 
the Socratic understanding broke from the dominant paradigm whereby “[t]he Greeks 
believed that the world and its human subjects were primarily connected through 
the existence of laws that governed them all, and that those laws were of a moral 
nature”. Such a transformation in belief created a chasm separating the laws of Man 
from those of the physical world, and ethics from physics and nature. The first 
outcome of this was a symbolic deferment of the world – the cosmos – to the sky. The 
physically distant sky came to symbolise the unreachable and consequently the 
unknowable (Brague, 2003), and as nature itself became unknowable, what once had 
been the immediate and perceptible domain of earthly, everyday phenomena became 
merged with the unreachable domain of the heavens. Nature and heavens, Earth and 
sky, were now part of the same domain. The second outcome was that Man became 
an entity that was independent of the whole – that is, of the world or cosmos, a world 
that existed symbolically in the heavens. 
Nevertheless, it was only with Plato that the idea of the cosmos as the world 
(and the beginnings of cosmology) occurred – or more precisely, with his work, the 
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Timaeus. Brague (2003) regards the Timaeus as the first cosmological work written in 
the West because it represents the moment in which the world was first reflected upon 
and characterised as such. However, in order to present the world as a whole, Plato 
had to bridge the chasm Socrates had created and establish a relationship between 
human beings and the world (the cosmos), reconciling humanity with the ordered 
structure of the whole while still keeping them in separate domains. He achieved this 
by integrating morality into the structured order of the whole, introducing the idea of 





In the Timaeus, divine regulatory deeds betray an inherent purpose: they are the fruit 
of the intelligible, ‘good’ design of a single Craftsman, bringing order to chaos. As 
such, the cosmos is presented as an hierarchical construction where things and beings 
mirror the prior realm of creation, albeit each time in a less and less perfect fashion as 
they become increasingly distanced from their ideal forms. In the Timaeus, therefore, 
Plato creates a macro-micro correspondence where both the physical and 
metaphysical realms are regulated by the same rational, harmonious rules, which are 
expressed through mathematics. Consequently, as the scholar of ancient philosophy 
Francis M. Cornford says: 
 
… [t]rue morality is not a product of human evolution, still less the arbitrary 
enactment of human wills. It is an order and harmony of the soul; and the soul 
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itself is a counterpart, in miniature, of the soul of the world, which has an 
everlasting order and harmony of its own, instituted by reason. (Conford, [1937] 
1997, p. 6) 
 
The presence of this ‘world soul’ is reflected in the macro-micro correspondence 
within human beings, and this enables Man to acknowledge the cosmos; the human 
soul shares in the divinity of the world soul and, in so doing, partakes in the realms of 
both Being and Becoming, of ideal forms and their counterparts, the individual 
instances of these forms. Similarly, it also enables human beings to acknowledge the 
ideal society, because the world soul is also present in social organisation 
(Kavanaugh, 2007, p. 19). It can be said that the Timaeus contains the notion of a 
‘distributed soul’, albeit present in differing degrees of perfection; however, the 
Platonic soul is more of an ideal pattern, a cosmic architectonic,10 perfectly ordered 
and harmonious, which in being “embodi[ed] in the world of instances” (Findlay, 
2007, p. 161) assumes distorted shapes. The soul of each thing within the cosmos is 
an imperfect reproduction of the world soul. 
Although, Plato bridged Socrates’ chasm in the Timaeus by presenting an 
ordered world that is regulated by an ideal pattern (the world soul), it was still 
necessary to define a system whereby the order and harmony of this world soul, 
manifest as ‘forms’, becomes the soul of ‘instances’ (for example, the human soul) 
within the realm of the sensible. If the microcosm of life on Earth is but an imperfect 
copy of a ‘macrocosmos’, a world soul, there must be laws determining this 
reproduction. The ambition of Plato’s cosmological work, therefore, is to present a 
system that explains how the rules of the cosmos operate in the pragmatic 
organisation of life on Earth, both at the level of the individual human being and at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The term is borrowed from Kavanaugh (2007). 
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the level of society. However, as seen above, Plato first had to solve the problem of 
the transformation of forms into instances and that meant it was necessary to address 
the primary cause that motivates this transformation. Plato says: 
 
We must, then in my judgement, first make this distinction: what is that which is 
always real and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming and 
is never real. (Plato trs. in Cornford, [1937] 1997, p. 22) 
 
If the static, unchanging and perfect world of forms is the beginning, how does this 
become the constantly changing realm of instances? 
A cosmological work discussing the genesis of the world thus proved 
fundamental to observations concerning the idea of a world soul and its implications. 
As the world soul caused the world to be created as a ‘good’ world, a discussion of 
the world’s genesis – of the first cause that is also the necessary cause – provided the 
perfect metaphysical ground for an explanation of how forms become instances. The 
Timaeus is therefore a reflection on beginnings and origins, presented on different 
levels, using multiple strategies. Yet it also shows how a beginning is something 
indeterminate. Cosmology consequently becomes an inherently metaphysical 
enterprise. The ideas concerning the genesis of the transformation of forms into 
instances, and the way that good becomes present in the soul, are presented not only 
through the Timaeus’ cosmogenic argument (the content of the work), but also by 
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The Timaeus as the search for the arche 
 
From its very beginning the Timaeus is concerned with the problematic of beginnings. 
The dialogue opens with the continuation of a discussion that Socrates had begun on 
the previous day – thus even before it starts, it has already begun. Due to its 
chronology and subject matter, many scholars argue that the discussion in the 
Timaeus unrolls from that of Plato’s earlier work, the Republic,11 in which Socrates 
expounds his view of the ideal city. This city, however, had remained in the realm of 
ideas. Thus the problem that Plato has Socrates put to his three guests at the beginning 
of the Timaeus, after a brief recapitulation of the arguments of the day before, is how 
this ideal city can become a living reality. To understand the importance of this 
question it must be noted that the term ‘city’ refers not just to the city itself, as we 
would understand it nowadays, but to the city-state. The problem Socrates poses goes 
beyond the local and pragmatic; it is a question directed at Greek society. The city 
question exceeds itself, expanding to the domain of the state, and from there to the 
constitution of the cosmos, replicating the question of how forms become instances. 
The fundamental question of the transformation of forms into instances is therefore 
twofold: on the one hand, it begets a quest for the beginning, the first cause that 
makes the reproduction endure; on the other, it is a practical question of how to create 
a perfect civilisation, how to realise the ideal city in practice. 
After setting the scene, the Timaeus follows with a concealed introduction to 
the overall problematic that the three guests are about to discuss and Socrates to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The connection is not only at the level of the continuation of the argument, but is also a temporal 
one – the continuation of the action from the Republic to the Timaeus. It is a continuation not only 
in terms of the development of a theory, but also at the level of the themes under discussion. 
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receive.12 It is presented through an account by Critias of the origins of Greek 
civilisation, foregrounding the mythological dimension that will later imbue the 
Timaeus. Critias highlights the idea that the Greeks have forgotten their origin; it can 
only be retrieved through the writings of the Egyptians: “The Egyptian priests found 
it necessary to recount to [Solon] the genealogy of the ‘first man’ because the 
Greeks had forgotten their own heritage” (Kavanaugh, 2007, p. 22).  
According to Critias, due to the absence of written documents and their 
reliance on oral tradition, the Greeks continually forget their past and have to re-start 
over and over again, never reaching maturity as a civilisation, remaining like children 
(Kavanaugh, 2007, p. 23). Greece (that is, Athens) is cyclically re-born; it has 
multiple beginnings, and as a result, is constantly trapped within a process of 
Becoming, never attaining Being. This account of the birth of Greek society is a 
premonition of the kind of story that will be needed to account for the origin of the 
cosmos: later in the dialogue, the discussion turns to the idea that Timaeus’ account of 
the cosmos is also a ‘likely story’, a mythos, just like that of Critias, and this in turn 
will provide the paramount opening for Plato to intervene in the conjecture over the 
nature of the arche. The significance of Critias’ story is that it starts to clarify the kind 
of knowledge that the mythos represents in the context of Greek society. 
As Kavanaugh (2007, p. 25) notes, “what is ‘unrecorded’ is considered ‘a true 
story’, recounting orally the true genealogy of the Greeks and the origin of the society 
based upon the law and first principles”. Critias tells us that it is not possible to know 
the true origin of the Greeks; however, because the narratives (the mythos) the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This act is a premonition of the notion of khora, which is discussed l a t e r  in the work. Khora 
therefore begins to be put in place from the beginning But the concept is also embodied by 
Socrates, as Derrida ([1993] 1995, p. 109), Rickert (2007, p. 260) and Kavanaugh (2007, p. 28) 
highlight, b o t h  through this act and Socrates’ later absence from the dialogue. 
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ancestors passed down have been kept alive, their account not only of the genealogy 
of the gods, but also of the descendants of the gods (humanity), is believable. These 
narratives are not the same as the truth conveyed by the logos, but they hold 
plausibility as stories that have been kept alive generation after generation. 
Consequently, despite following another system, another kind of understanding, these 
stories are authentic because they are in contact with the origin, with divinity, and 
have the legitimacy of custom (Kavanaugh, 2007). However, they do not reveal how 
the Greeks can emerge from the loop of Becoming, how the ideal state can be 
achieved in practice. 
Such is the concern of Socrates: after his presentation of the ideal city(-state), 
he wishes to see such a city(-state) in practice as he believes that this would represent 
a way of overcoming Greek civilisation’s cycle of Becoming. In order to respond to 
Socrates’ call, however, the discussion has to start at the very beginning, at the 
creation of the world. As a metaphysical enquiry presented in the form of a 
cosmology, the Timaeus approaches the problematic of beginnings as concerning the 
creation of order, of how chaos became an ordered cosmos. Given that the cosmos is 
ordered at its origin according to rules that structure it both as a thing in itself and as 
the total of all existing things, what is the relationship between the form and the 
instance, in terms of the genesis of the latter? The Timaeus is thus not so much a quest 
to define or discover the arche itself, but an attempt to reveal how it set in motion the 
genesis of the first instance, the cosmos, and all subsequent instances. The first guest 
to speak is Timaeus, a cosmologist, and so it falls to him to present the workings and 
formation of the world – the cosmos – and the arche. 
Timaeus says that the cosmos is the work of a Craftsman, who has created it 
according to a perfect design. As such, it is the primordial instance, that which 
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necessarily constitutes the only instance of its form – the reason why there is only one 
world (Cornford, [1937] 1997). Throughout his life-work, Plato defined instances as 
belonging to the realm of the sensible, and as they are subject to change and 
consequently only accessible through the senses, they can never be truly known 
(Patterson, [2009] 2012; Kananaugh, 2007). As it is the primordial and most perfect 
instance, where all other instances exist and from which they derive, the cosmos is 
unique – but it is still part of the realm of instances. As the cosmos, the world, is 
subject to constant change, it is an impermanent entity, a Becoming. This Becoming, 
however, cannot be interpreted as a process of progressively drawing closer to the 
realm of forms until it ultimately reaches it, because this is not the ideal towards 
which the instance is evolving (Cornford, [1937] 1997). The Becoming represented 
by the cosmos should be understood as a process of transformation that is inherent to 
its nature as a copy, an imperfect and therefore ‘unstable’ thing that has become, that 
has a genesis. Yet, as Cornford argues, this genesis is not the product of a Maker, but 
of a metaphorical Craftsman, and this necessitates a re-evaluation of what both the 
arche and the Maker are. 
According to Cornford ([1937] 1997), the world cannot have been created 
following a plan by an omnipotent and omniscient being because the Maker is not a 
literal figure but a metaphor, a placeholder, part of the construction of the mythos that, 
as a mythos, cannot be disclosed to the workings of the logos (or reason). The Maker, 
the Craftsman, is the ideal form – it is Being itself. The ontological status of the 
Craftsman negates the determination of a first cause in the genesis of the cosmos 
because, as Plato says in the Timaeus, existing entails a three-fold process of 
generation: Being, khora and Becoming (Cornford, [1937] 1997; Kavanaugh, 2007, p. 
66). This process could possibly be told as a mythos, but the locus (in place and time) 
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of the arche is left open and unclear. If the process of genesis is seen as causal – that 
is, one in which forms dictate the nature of instances as properties – then the system, 
as Patterson ([2009] 2012) shows, would fall into regression as the forms would be 
self-exemplifying. However, if there is no first property dictating the instance but only 
something that represents the common element in a group of things, and whose 
existence is dependent upon the constitution of the group, then there is no regression 
(Patterson, [2009] 2012, p. 19). However an arche is still required for Being to 
generate Becoming. As such, in the Timaeus, the arche is conceived of not as the first 
cause of a linear sequence of cause and effect, but as a first or fundamental principle 
that guides the organisation of the structure but does not generate anything other than 
the rules of generation. It does not give birth to a sequence of events, it just sets the 
guidelines that inform the structure. As a result, although the cosmos came to be, was 
begun, it is difficult to determine the locus of its beginning, indicating instead an 
extended, indeterminate beginning without a start or end.  
The beginning-without- apparent-beginning of the Timaeus alerts us to the fact 
that the beginning cannot be localised. As Rikert states, 
 
[a] ‘beginning’ as a singular, locatable moment is missing; what emerges instead 
is a distribution (or matrix) of beginnings. The insinuation is that a beginning is 
but an idea materialised in rhetorical space and character (Rikert, 2007, p. 257)  
 
The problematic of beginnings is mirrored or reproduced in the three new starts that 
Timaeus needs to make to tell his story. The beginning, or the lack of a location for a 
beginning, is thus solved through repetition, or as Derrida ([1993] 1995, p. 113) says, 
through mise-en-abyme, “a series of mythic fictions embedded mutually in each 
other”. The arche constitutes itself: encapsulating all possibilities, it repeats and 
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reveals what it already is – a beginning. 
Another implication of the fact that the cosmos is an instance is the idea that, 
in being impermanent, it cannot be known; there can be no rational or immutable 
account of it. For Plato (as noted earlier) although instances exist, they are not real but 
illusory; only forms are real because they are everlasting and immutable. It is possible 
to give an unchanging, logical and therefore true account of forms; however, it is not 
possible to give a true account of an instance. As the cosmos concerns the realm of 
instances, Timaeus’ account, like the story told by Critias, can only be a probable 
account. As such, the birth of Greek civilisation mirrors the birth of the cosmos, and 
the question of how the ideal city-state can be realised in practice is a dimension of 
the question of how instances are generated from forms; it is a way of reinforcing 
through a rhetorical strategy the macro-micro schema of the genesis of instances. It 
also represents the complexity of the process of formation: not only is the arche itself 
indeterminate, but what it gives origin to is also unknowable. Consequently, the place 
given to these two stories or mythical accounts in the dialogue is important. These are 
plausible mythical accounts, but they are not fictional,13 because – as opposed to 
fiction – myth can still be believed. The mythological is not tantamount to the 
fictional. However, in order to grasp the role of the mythological as representing a 
different method of understanding, Plato introduces the fundamental element of khora 
into the dialogue. This is something of a third kind or genus that stands alongside 
Being and Becoming at the arche, generating the cosmos, and it is known by means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The distinction between the mythical and the fictional is crucial to an understanding of the 
dialogue and its main elements: Being, Becoming and the third element, khora, which is introduced 
later, in the second beginning. The Timaeus is a mythical story, but it is not presented in opposition 
to science, because science, being an account of the physical world, cannot be true either. 
Therefore science is itself mythical. 
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of a ‘bastard’14 sort of reasoning. Thus khora becomes fundamental to Plato’s Theory 
of Forms, because if  
 
the body of the universe is not reduced by Plato to mere extension, but contains 
motions and active powers which are not instituted by the divine Reason and are 
perpetually producing undesirable effects (Cornford, [1937] 1997, p. 176) 
 
there must be something that accounts for this process. 
 
 
The Timaeus and the notion of khora 
 
In accounting for the generation of instances from forms, it is necessary to explain 
how movement, or the process of Becoming, is introduced into the system. How did 
the everlasting and unchanging forms generate perishable and changing instances? As 
discussed above, the pragmatic dimension of the question that Socrates presents to his 
three guests – how to bring the ideal city to life – goes hand-in-hand with the need to 
explain the existence of change and movement within the cosmos, and it is in order to 
account for this ontological process of formation that Plato introduces the new 
element of khora into the system. This third element, which lies at the core of the 
arche, along with forms and instances, has been the subject of multiple analyses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Despite the apparent strangeness of the term, this is the word used in the translations o f  Plato by 
all the scholars referenced in this thesis. In the context of this thesis, the term ‘bastard’ stands for a 
type of order. This order, however, i s  one that is abnormal and strange, not formed out of logical 
reasoning and thus difficult to recognise as such. ‘Bastard’ is not a synonym for chaos or noise; 
nonetheless, the case could be made that these two notions, chaos and noise, are an extreme 
example of what this notion signifies, as they represent orders in which no order can be identified. 
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holding disparate positions on its ontology. Plato’s own description has fuelled the 
debate about what it could be; the evasive, arcane language he uses reflects its nature 
as a spurious or ‘bastard’ kind of entity. As a consequence, the task of describing this 
elusive third element presents the same kind of difficulty as does that of locating the 
arche – it is almost impossible. In order to describe it, Plato resorts to several 
metaphors, and as discussed later, the difficulty of dealing with this concept is 
inherent to the term he finally chooses to give it: khora, or space. The fact that both 
the arche and the third element are so difficult to describe and locate provokes further 
reflection about the intrinsic relationship between space and beginnings. 
In order to understand the role of the third element, the arche, and space 
within this framework, it is necessary to examine Plato’s metaphorical descriptions of 
it. It is first presented as the receptacle, the bearer, the nurse of all Becoming, 
determining its position as that which receives; it holds the process of generation of 
instances from forms. However, as the various metaphors reveal, this is a special kind 
of receptacle. The first metaphors for the imprint-bearer are: gold; the base of 
unguents or perfumes; and other plastic materials.15 Gold, as with any other plastic 
material, can be continuously transformed and moulded to assume multiple shapes – 
Plato’s expression is that of “having moulded all figures out of gold” (Kalkavage, 
2007, p. 82). However, the gold itself – the material in which the shapes are formed – 
does not change; it always remains gold. The idea of a receptacle, a place of 
transformation, that is neither transformed nor altered by what it receives, is echoed 
by further metaphors. Plato extends the notion with his metaphor of the mother, or 
more precisely the mother’s womb, which nurses and holds the embryo until the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The translations of the metaphor vary from clay to wax. Although the process of working with 
these materials is very different, the general idea is that of a material with a high degree of 
plasticity. 
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moment of birth. As Kavanaugh (2007) reminds us, in ancient Greece, the role of the 
mother in the process of conception was as a receptacle for the man’s seed, holding 
and nurturing it until its transformation into a baby. The crucial point of these 
metaphors is that the receptacle can take any form yet remain neutral and unaltered; it 
simply allows transformation to take place. As a consequence, although it is a place of 
transformation, the receptacle does not materially participate in the process, neither 
receiving anything from nor giving anything to that which it receives. Nonetheless, as 
with the mother’s womb, or gold, or any other plastic material, the third element or 
receptacle retains an existence of its own. 
Finally, after presenting these metaphors, Plato concludes by naming the 
receptacle as ‘khora’, one of the ancient Greek words for space. In identifying the 
receptacle thus, Plato describes it as that which: 
 
… always is, admitting not of destruction and providing a seat for all that has 
birth, itself graspable by some bastard reasoning with the aid of insensibility, 
hardly to be tested, the very thing we look to when we dream and affirm that it is 
necessary somehow for everything that is to be in some region or to occupy some 
space and that that [which] is neither on earth nor something in heaven is nothing. 
(Plato trs. in Kalkavage, 2001, pp. 84-85) 
 
This description is the result of a systematic process of constructing the idea of the 
third element as khora/space through a succession of metaphors, gradually rarefying 
the concept, distinguishing it at each step from the previous one (Cornford, [1937] 
1997). The need for such a careful construction is arguably due to the difficulties 
Plato experienced in attempting to access space – to fully grasp it – through language. 
According to Algra (1994: 94) the inarticulate way in which the receptacle is 
presented is the fruit of “Plato’s attempts to cope with the problems of space within a 
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historical and philosophical context, in linking them up both with his own 
metaphysical system and with the ordinary usage of spatial terms in his own time”. 
Nonetheless, Aristotle credits Plato as the first philosopher in ancient Greece to strive 
to come to terms with the concept of space rather than simply using the currently 
available spatial terms. For Cornford ([1937] 1997, p. 177), however, the difficulty is 
associated with Plato’s intent to reveal the nature of this kind of space, which is “more 
‘obscure and difficult’ than geometrical space” – a ‘nature’ that flickers between the 
physical and the metaphysical realms. Part of the difficulty of grasping this third 
element resides in the problem of understanding what it means for the receptacle to 
have an existence of its own, particularly when it is presented as simultaneously space 
and part of the arche. This has been a matter of extensive debate throughout the 
history of the dialogue’s interpretation, particularly the interpretation of this passage, 
and it comprises the subject of the following paragraphs. As the metaphors used by 
Plato appear to bear traces of the idea that dimensions or degrees of the third element 
embody khora, or space, the discussions concerning the ontology of this element are 
fundamental to an analysis of the difficulties encountered in discussing the ontology 
of space. 
The metaphors presented thus far, including the idea of the receptacle, 
comprise the passage (48e to 52d) traditionally considered as the one in which Plato 
introduces and defines the third element of the arche. However, in order to fully 
understand its designation as ‘khora’, it is necessary to look ahead to the summary 
that immediately follows the passage, where Plato re-states the idea of the third 
element as space and introduces a final metaphor, that of a winnowing basket, to 
indicate the process through which the receptacle participates in the arche, in the 
generation of instances out of forms. This metaphor conveys the process of “swaying 
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and sorting, winnowing and separating” (Kavanaugh, 2007, p. 64) to which the 
receptacle subjects what it receives, but to which it is also, sympathetically, subject. 
As with a winnowing basket, this movement allows what is similar to come together 
and what is different to be separated. 
The metaphor reinforces the idea that something is received in the receptacle. 
But what are its properties? Plato says that it receives the four elements, which, 
according to Cornford ([1937] 1997), should be conceived as qualities rather than 
material entities. The receptacle receives the imprint of these qualities but is not 
constituted by them. However, referring back to the gold metaphor and the process of 
modelling, Plato uses the expression ‘out of’ – specifically, ‘out of gold’ – to describe 
the way the different shapes begin to surface. According to Algra (1994), the gold 
metaphor points to the idea that what comes out of the receptacle is material, despite 
the fact that what enters it is not. The apparent discrepancy over what emerges from 
the receptacle is therefore accompanied by an uncertainty over what goes into it, 
prompting Algra (1994, p. 105) to speculate that it remains ambiguous as to whether 
what enters the receptacle are qualities, which he identifies as ‘instantiations’, or 
instances themselves.  Such apparent incongruities beg the question of where exactly 
the receptacle exists. As Cornford ([1937] 1997) recognises, this is a three-fold 
question: it is necessary to understand the nature of the receptacle’s existence, its 
relation to forms and instances, and how we know it. As seen earlier in the Timaeus’ 
presentation and discussion of the arche, ontology goes hand-in-hand with 
epistemology throughout the dialogue, because what something is is limited by how it 
is known – that is, by the system of knowledge to which it belongs. 
Despite the difficulties in understanding the ontology of the receptacle, Plato 
does, however, describe it as something that is everlasting, indestructible and 
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immutable. Also, as his metaphors show and as Cornford ([1937] 1997, p. 178) points 
out, “the receptacle itself alone has some sort of permanent being”. It is “invisible and 
has shapeless form” (Plato trs. in Kalkavage, 2001, p. 83) and is not constituted by 
anything. These characteristics point to the idea that the receptacle shares the same 
hierarchical position as forms, as these are also indestructible, everlasting, invisible 
and truly real. As such, the receptacle is distant from instances and the realm of 
Becoming, which are visible, tangible and subject to mutation and decay. Kavanaugh 
suggests: 
 
Chora [sic], in fact, participates in the ideal forms, therefore is unchanging and 
prior/original to all material considerations. The chora is a ‘thing-in-itself’, except 
to say that the chora is also prior to all ‘thing-ness’; therefore, the chora has 
neither qualities nor characteristics nor predicates. (Kavanaugh, 2007, p. 57) 
 
How then can we account for the perceived material dimension encountered in the 
previous paragraph? And how can something be a ‘thing-in-itself’ and at the same 
time be prior to ‘thing-ness’? As a consequence, the idea of the receptacle appears 
confusing and “very hard to apprehend” (Plato trs. in Cornford, [1937] 1997, p. 186). 
It is something that by its very strangeness is set apart from its constitution and is 
‘formally’ distinct from forms and instances. The receptacle is not a multiplicity as it 
is not constituted by a set of elements in the way forms and instances are, and 
therefore its ‘name’ does not refer to a category of things but only to itself. As a 
result, the receptacle does not seem to belong to the same type of ontological family 
as Being and Becoming. Such distinctiveness, according to Kavanaugh (2007, p. 55), 
has prompted some scholars to claim, in opposition to Cornford and Kavanaugh, that 
the receptacle might be a ‘non-being’ (in contrast to Being and Becoming). Rickert 
(2007) suggests that it is a ‘non-place’ between forms and instances. In order to 
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further understand the receptacle, therefore, it is necessary to investigate the 
relationship between the receptacle and forms and instances, Being and Becoming. 
Although the receptacle and forms seem to exist, ontologically, on the same 
hierarchical level, their role in the arche sets them apart. Forms, as described by Plato, 
never enter into anything nor do they receive anything into themselves. They 
resemble a pattern, model, plan or design that is followed in the construction of 
something. Instances, however, are the entities that are generated from that design. As 
such, they bear materiality and consequently need to exist somewhere, because as 
Plato (trs. in Kalkavage, 2007, pp. 84-85) says when describing khora, whatever 
constitutes the cosmos must exist somewhere, otherwise it is nothing. The question 
that immediately emerges is whether khora, as space, is the receptacle that contains 
the cosmos – that is, all existing instances. Algra (1994) believes there are passages 
that can be interpreted this way – suggesting that the receptacle is the container of the 
sensible world – but there are others in which Plato takes a different position, where 
he appears to say that the receptacle is a constituent of the sensible world because it is 
constituted by qualities that are present within instances. However, as seen earlier, the 
receptacle receives the qualities and not the instances themselves. If it were to receive 
the instances, it would share their fate and belong to the realm of Becoming. Also, it 
would be necessary for a model for khora to exist, in which case khora could not be 
seen as analogous or parallel to forms. This does not seem to be the case because, as 
the previous paragraph shows, khora would not then be part of the arche, alongside 
Being and Becoming, but a part of Becoming, and it would be difficult to reconcile 
this with the structuring role of the receptacle, ordering the qualities of instances. 
This conundrum leads to the third question of how the receptacle is known – 
or what it means for khora to be to apprehend by a “sort of bastard reasoning” (Plato 
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trs. in Cornford, [1937] 1997, p. 192), as stated previously. The difficulty of grasping 
khora and its workings has prompted Kavanaugh (2007, p. 58) to say that “the chora 
[sic] is ‘hardly real’, meaning that it does not participate in the intelligible although it 
is eternal and formless”. The terms and expressions Plato uses throughout the passage 
to refer to khora alert us to the difficulty of apprehending the receptacle, and point 
towards the unknowable and intangible.16 This opens the way to a conception of the 
receptacle as a ‘bastard’ entity, that is “neither this nor that or that it is both this and 
that” (Derrida, [1993] 1995: 89). Derrida’s position is that khora is neither part of the 
sensible nor the intelligible but is precisely an intermediate or third kind of entity, ‘an-
other’. This also seems to be Kavanaugh’s (2007: 59) position: she states that the 
receptacle “is precisely the third term – intermediary between Being and Becoming, 
between the eternal Same and the generated and continually changing Different”. 
Although taking a different approach to Kavanaugh and Derrida, Cornford ([1937] 
1997, p. 193) also adopts a ‘middle’ position: he believes that the receptacle is a 
factor in the visible world despite being everlasting and indestructible. However, it 
also partakes in the intelligible, although it does so in a puzzling way, leading 
Cornford to associate the participation of khora in the arche with a process of 
abstraction. Thus it seems possible to say that khora is neither an object of rational 
understanding, as forms are, nor an object of belief, apprehended by the senses, as 
Becoming is; instead, it is something else that despite not being perceivable can be 
understood as active in the world by means of a different kind of reasoning, a 
‘bastard’ reasoning. As such, can we ever say what khora is? Would not such an 
effort immediately contradict khora? Following Derrida’s ([1993] 1995) line of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Although this is not expressed in Plato’s philosophy, it further denotes the importance of 
‘unknowing’, or of other kinds of knowing that are not logical or rational, as discussed by Derrida 
([1993] 1995). 
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thought, it seems that khora points to the impossibility of naming, of language, to an 
aporia of knowledge. 
 
 
The ambiguity of khora as that of ‘space’ 
 
The ambiguity present in Plato’s description makes the idea of the receptacle difficult 
to apprehend. This difficulty is evident in the way that scholars have thought about 
the ontology of khora. Although the receptacle is usually connected with spatiality by 
means of the concept of khora, different scholars have distinct, sometimes opposing, 
understandings of the meaning of the word, and this has led some to dismiss the idea 
of it as space. Khora has become the most iconic and identifiable element of Plato’s 
description, the term by which the receptacle has come to be known and referenced; it 
has thus become the actual name of the receptacle. The act of naming is of course 
never innocent or flawless: the word has therefore become detached from its original 
meaning, creating a chasm between the word itself, what Plato was trying to refer to 
by means of the word, and its actual meaning. However, this confusion has provided 
fertile ground for the emergence of multiple interpretations which afford fruitful 
material for a reflection on the ontology of space. 
According to Kavanaugh (2007, p. 55), khora came to be ascribed over time to 
six different things: matter; a medium; space; the void or non-being; the ‘obscure’; 
and both space and matter. Algra (1994) approaches this disparity in understandings 
by investigating the arguments of different scholars in combination with his own 
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analysis of the Timaeus. In particular, he focuses on three accounts of khora: those 
that see it as a kind of matter, those that see it as space, and those that see it as both. 
By focusing primarily on these approaches, all of which are informed by the 
opposition between matter and space, Algra discusses the difficulties in understanding 
physical space. He believes this separation is actually based upon  
 
...wrongheaded (essentialist) presuppositions concerning the ‘real nature’ of space 
and matter, [that have] as a corollary, premature conclusions about the 
incompatibility of space and matter as labels of one and the same thing (Algra, 
1994, p. 77) 
 
According to Algra (1994, p. 78), those who say that Plato’s receptacle solely 
comprises matter ignore its spatial dimension on the basis that space and matter are 
incompatible, and hence neglect evidence of the spatial terms Plato used to define the 
receptacle – hedra and khora. Algra examines two particular arguments holding this 
position in order to reveal the presence of preconceptions about the nature of space 
and matter. The first holds that space is not the receptacle’s actual nature but one of 
its functions, thus implying a separation between the nature of something, its essence 
and its function. Algra (1994, pp. 78-81) believes this ontological separation cannot 
be found in Plato’s description of the receptacle. The second argument is based on the 
notion that matter and space are incompatible because matter is corporeal (Algra, 
1994, pp. 81-83). However, although later observers took for granted the idea that 
matter is corporeal, there is no evidence that this was the case in the Timaeus; the 
definition of matter has varied greatly throughout time and it has not always been 
associated with corporeality (Algra, 1994, p. 82). 
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By contrast, those who identify the receptacle with space dismiss the presence 
of materiality in Plato’s metaphors, particularly the expression ‘out-of-which’, which 
can be associated with a material dimension (Algra, 1994, p. 83). Those scholars who 
take their stand on an exclusive association of khora with space perceive the use of 
material metaphors and the expression ‘out-of-which’ as an unavoidable result of the 
expressive limitations of Plato’s metaphors ( Algra, 1994, p. 85). However, and more 
importantly for the discussion, this position is also based on the idea of the 
incompatibility between matter and space, due to the fact that space is regarded as 
absolute (Algra, 1994, p. 84). However, Algra (1994, p. 84) suggests that if space is 
not seen as an absolute container, and if matter is generally thought of “as the 
‘underlying constituent of physical reality’, we may recognize that within different 
physical systems different ‘things’ answer this description”, and these ‘things’ could 
also serve as space. 
Algra (1994, p. 89) concludes that if we look at Plato’s account of the 
receptacle, without adopting preconceptions about the nature of space and matter, we 
can see that he does not present the receptacle as any one of the mutually exclusive 
notions mentioned above. “The receptacle might be at the same time matter and 
space, though not with respect to the same things” (Algra, 1994, p. 83). For Algra 
(1994, p. 118), the perspective of the receptacle as matter and the perspective of it as 
space can be combined if the ‘in-which’ expression that leads to the position that the 
receptacle as space is associated with immanent forms or qualities, and the ‘out-of-
which’ expression that leads to the position that the receptacle as matter is associated 
with phenomenal bodies from the perspective of the type a (extension) of space. 
However, in order to achieve this perspective it is necessary to understand the 
receptacle as if it were the extension of an individual physical body, instead of “a kind 
	   121	  
of absolute extension underlying physical change and motion” (Algra, 1994, p. 92). 
This would then mean that Plato was presenting a metaphysical theory of space not a 
physical one, and would imply that it is impossible to use this concept to explain the 
motion and location of an object. Cornford concurs with this position, stating:  
 
Plato’s Space is not a void which remains completely distinct from particles moving 
in it; it is a Recipient which affords a basis for images reflected in it, as in a mirror – a 
comparison that could not be applied to atoms and void. Space is to him the ‘room’ or 
place where things are, not intervals or stretches of vacancy where things are not. 
(Cornford, [1997] 2007, p. 200) 
 
However, as Algra (1994, p. 118) shows, Plato did not keep to this 
metaphysical perspective throughout his description of the receptacle. In the Timaeus, 
the receptacle is also seen as a receiver of phenomenal bodies, making the receptacle 
a type c space (a container). Algra (1994, p. 74) explains this incongruence – and its 
incompatibility with other conceptualisations of space – by the difficulty that Plato 
faced in attempting to “cope with the problems of space [in his] historical and 
philosophical context … linking them up both with his own metaphysical system and 
with the ordinary usage of spatial terms in his own time”. Algra believes Plato’s 
difficulty in attempting to explain the relationship between intelligible Being and 
sensible Becoming through khora were tantamount to the problems he encountered in 
explaining the arche. This explains Plato’s description of the receptacle as something 
obscure. Given the incongruence and incompatibility in Plato’s descriptions, Algra 
(1994) says it is not possible to present the notion of the receptacle as a coherent 
theory of space. As such, the various positions taken by scholars in relation to the 
receptacle, which are often incompatible, are the result of “over-charitable 
interpretations, each of them singling out and working out what is in fact only one 
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among several coexisting characterizations applied to the receptacle by Plato 
himself” ( Algra, 1994, p. 72). This has led Kavanaugh (2007, p. 55) to claim that 
Algra avoids giving any kind of definition of or attribution to khora, apart from the 
observation that it is “difficult and obscure”. 
Nonetheless, and as Algra (1994, p. 99) points out, it is possible to bring the 
two perspectives of the receptacle together as both metaphysical and physical theories 
by dislodging them from the position that the receptacle is considered as “nothing but 
aggregates of qualities in space”. Alongside this understanding is Kavanaugh’s (2007, 
p. 55) notion of khora as a medium that facilitates the process of transformation. For 
Algra (1994, p. 99), this perspective is distinct from that of the idea of the receptacle 
as both space and matter, and it therefore disregards the way that Plato presents the 
receptacle itself. However, Algra’s position is based on a perceived incompatibility 
between metaphysical and physical understandings of space, and the belief that they 
stand for two different things, as if they belonged to two completely separate realms 
without any sort of connection, interaction or dependency. Contrary to this idea, this 
thesis argues for the inseparability of these two realms (see Chapter One) – an 
argument that not only welcomes different approaches to khora (such as those of 
Derrida, Kristeva and Ulmer, which are discussed in the second part of this chapter), 
but also opens the way to a different understanding of space. 
If one understands space as having multiple realities and facets, depending on 
the analytical angle we adopt, it can assume all the ‘shapes’ that the Timaeus’ 
commentators have unveiled. Thus all of the above approaches to khora can be said to 
be not only valid and correct, but also appropriate to the complexity of the concepts of 
both khora and space. Throughout his reading of the Timaeus, Algra sees the 
metaphors as descriptions of an actual entity, instead of recognising them as a 
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strategy, a way of approaching something without actually making it stand for the 
thing itself. This is the position Kavanaugh and Cornford take: they both see khora as 
part of a conceptual system that Plato constructs in order to approach specific 
ontological and epistemological questions. This view is supported by the fact that the 
metaphors Plato uses follow the logic of progressive abstraction. Derrida’s 
understanding of the question is close to this position: he sees Plato’s khora as a 
rhetorical strategy that he uses to approach something that cannot be approached 
through language, something that is not bound by a physical-metaphysical dichotomy 
– that is, to a “distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, which is precisely 
what the thought of the khora can no longer get along with – a distinction” (Derrida, 
[1993] 1995, p. 92). Instead, Derrida identifies it as ‘an-other’, a third thing (or kind 
or gender). From the point of view of this thesis, the differences between all the above 
positions point to the idea that the ambiguity of khora is not inherent to Plato’s 
description, the real difficulty at the heart of the concept – as much now as it was then 
– is the ontology of space. 
In order to more fully comprehend the ambiguity of khora in its relationship to 
spatiality, it is necessary to look more closely at the word Plato chose to use by 
placing it in the context of ancient Greece. As Algra (1994, p. 4) elucidates, until the 
period of the Hellenistic schools, the ancient Greeks did not have a term exclusively 
denoting space such as we have now, but three concurrent terms: kenon, topos and 
khora. The meaning of each word depended on its context, but they each conveyed 
different aspects of spatiality; the term referring to spatiality as a unified entity was 
therefore absent (Algra, 1994, pp. 22-24). These terms held a provisional signification 
that makes a simple, single translation of them appear preposterous. As such, 
according to Algra (1994), in a text like the Timaeus, we cannot directly translate 
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khora by the term ‘space’ because it can also be thought of as ‘place’. This difficulty 
is the source of Plato’s loose and evasive description of khora as the receptacle. 
However, this begs the question: is this difficulty inherent to ancient Greek – that is, 
is it a deficiency of an immature language – or does it signify the difficulty of 
grounding spatiality and trying to use language to capture its essence? Be that as it 
may, both then and now (as discussed in Chapter One), the concepts of space and 
place are used in a promiscuous way, with little distinction between them. As such, 
the decision to use either term in a translation is dependent on the context and not on 
an intrinsic and fixed signification (Algra, 1994). If khora can in fact be translated as 
either space or place, it becomes not only exemplary of this promiscuity but also of 
the fact that this difficulty has endured over the centuries, and reveals an essential 
attribute of spatiality and our understanding of it. This thesis observes that the 
apparent non-existence of a specific word for space in ancient Greece, and the 
consequent difficulties that Plato encountered, and contemporary scholars have, over 
what the concept of khora conveys (in its relationship with spatiality) illustrates the 
inaccessibility of space, its unattainability and unutterability. This heightens the 
ontological difficulties of the word ‘space’, particularly in reference to the 
relationship between physical, ‘real’, material space and abstract, conceptual, 
metaphysical space. 
Despite the fact that khora cannot be directly translated by the word ‘space’, 
its actual meaning in ancient Greek as country, territory, land, region or location, and 
often more precisely as the outskirts of a city-state – the land that lies between the city 
and the countryside (Kavanaugh, 2007; Derrida, [1993] 1995) – import a spatial 
dimension into the Timaeus that cannot be disregarded. The more concrete the 
meaning of khora, the more it hurls us back to the question that Socrates puts to his 
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guests at the beginning of the Timaeus regarding the active, concrete realisation of the 
ideal city(-state). According to McEwen (1993, p. 82), khora, as the land between the 
city and the countryside, had a very specific purpose: it provided shelter and 
sanctuary, and a site for rituals and celebrations. It was through these celebrations, out 
of the processional walking that connected the polis to the religious site, that the state 
itself was woven. McEwen (1993) tries to understand how the connections between 
the city, the polis and this space, khora, can realise or are reflections of political order 
and the making of political order. In so doing, what she reveals is the importance of 
the physical location of Athens in the creation (weaving) of the political model it 
followed. As a result, this demonstrates one of the dimensions of space: the 
interconnection of the physical and material realm with the abstract realm. McEwen 
shows that despite space (khora) being immaterial (not corporeal), it is still 
intrinsically connected with the materialities that emerged from the movement 
associated with the religious practices that helped consecrate and form the city-state. 
This dimension of space concurs with Kavanaugh’s observation: 
 
Space as chora is not physical/material, but primordial, allowing the sensual realm to 
come-to-be, including its topos, belonging to it as its proper place. The material 
existence is intrinsically conjoined with its place. (Kavanaugh, 2007, pp. 63-64) 
 
Another dimension that McEwen unleashes emerges when Rickert alerts us to 
the fact that in her account 
 
... an instability becomes apparent in the notion of the polis, suggesting that it is 
always bumping up against the limits or boundary it must exceed. While retaining 
a dependency that it wants to overcome, the movements beyond the city boundary 
proper marks the weaving of the city because they are necessary for the polis to 
thrive. (Rickert, 2007, p. 255) 
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Thus an understanding of spatiality begins to surface through the notions of ‘limit’ 
and ‘boundary’, which arise from movement and are necessary to a city if it is to 
thrive. Questioning limits is not just a matter of questioning the physicality of 
something, but of interrogating the constraints, of whatever kind, that contain what 
can be done, that limit the very act of doing. Therefore the concept of khora itself 
connects, both through its common use in ancient Greece and Plato’s displacement of 
it in his philosophical study, the actuality of a city and the abstract conceptualisation 
of the cosmos. The movement that McEwen (1993) identifies between the city and the 
places of worship in the countryside should not be ignored when considering Plato’s 
choice of the word khora as a name for the receptacle, as the dynamics and life that 
Plato wants to introduce into the ideal city are but a mirror on a micro level of the 
processes of the arche. Also, it is important to point out that this perspective clarifies 
how the notion of the ‘in-between’ has become embedded in the word khora. More 
precisely, it shows that khora provides a connection between two things (for example, 
between city and countryside), and in so doing, participates in the creation of those 
two things by enabling their constant actualisation. As with its presence within the 
arche, khora is something that, being neither city nor countryside, works alongside 
them in their constitution without directly partaking in it. As Rickert (2007, p. 258) 
says, “we could say that the choric city is where invention comes to life”. The 
nuances that arise from the word itself can then be extended to the discourse, if it is 
understood that Plato is merging an actual place with a potential space, and using it as 
a setting to explore a specific problem. What he is trying to achieve through the use of 
the word ‘khora’ in the Timaeus is precisely this integration of changes, the necessary 
movement of transformation, while keeping things – the world – balanced and 
ordered. 
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By understanding the interaction between the physical and metaphysical 
dimensions of khora/space it becomes possible to release it from the pressure of its 
own ambiguity, perceived incompatibilities and paradoxical nature. The alleviation 
provided by the merger of the metaphysical and physical dimensions is built on an 
acceptance of this very ambiguity, and is paradoxically a reflection and expression of 
a larger whole (space) that cannot be fully apprehended and can only be approached 
by using multiple perspectives. This positive acceptance means that khora/space can 
be conceived of as possessing a productive role in the process of the creation of order. 
Processes such as these, however, cannot be fully understood in a rational way as 
khora (space) works through a ‘bastard’ type of reasoning, outside of (but in 
combination with) the intelligible and sensible realms. McEwen’s intervention in 
particular has enabled the observation of this dimension of space through her analysis 
of the movements between and across the city and the countryside in ancient Greece, 
which made visible the participation of khora/space in the production of the city-
(state). It has also revealed the fact that this visibility is produced through the 
emergence of a type of questioning-through-engagement of notions such as ‘limit’ 
and ‘boundary’. The very act of questioning, reflecting on and performing the limits 
and boundaries of something is not only part of the process of understanding a 
physical realm, but also of constructing its ontology, of constructing the thing itself. 
Both these results give rise to the hypothesis that khora possesses another dimension: 
it may be implicated in the processes of creation. These processes, however, do not 
need to be constrained within a conventional framework of the genesis of the world, 
but instead participate in the physical, everyday realm of invention that itself 
constitutes an enacted cosmology, performed by multiple participating agents. This 
represents a ‘bastard’ ordering of the world. 
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Khora as a Methodological Device 
 
The first part of this chapter has established that the concept of khora is a notion that 
sheds light on the ambiguity of space. Through its intrinsic association with space, it 
not only reveals that space is ambiguous and indeterminate, but also that it may be 
impossible to reach a full understanding of it as a concept because it has manifold 
expressions and multiple facets. Nevertheless, khora/space participates in the enacted 
processes that create order. But even this activity has a sensuous, affective dimension, 
which opens up the possibility of thinking of khora/space as a creative device. This is 
the dimension now discussed in the second part of this chapter. It is in the context of 
this aspect of khora, as an asset for creative production, that the chapter turns to 
Rickert, who brings together the work of Derrida, Kristeva and Ulmer in order to 
discuss the use of khora as a methodological device (which is also an epistemological 
position) in the field of rhetoric. This approach to khora is further analysed through 
the aforementioned collaboration between Derrida and Eisenman.  
In Towards the Chora: Kristeva, Derrida, and Ulmer on Emplaced Invention 
(2007), Rickert argues for a rhetorical model that integrates the contemporary notion 
of mind as both located in the body and dispersed throughout the environment, and 
social and technological systems. This idea, according to Rickert, can be found in 
contemporary discussions of and approaches to the concept of khora by Kristeva, 
Derrida and Ulmer. In their work, khora is seen as something that “transforms our 
senses of beginning, creation, and invention by placing them concretely within 
material environments, informational spaces, and affective (or bodily) registers, and 
in the case of Derrida, also by displacing them” (Rickert, 2007, p. 252). As such, 
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khora enables a discourse that moves away from discussions based on notions of 
representation and rationality (Rickert, 2007, p. 252), allowing for the understanding 
of the “emplaced (and displaced), distributed, and bodily character of rhetorical 
activity” ( Rickert, 2007, p. 253). Furthermore, Rickert recognises, particularly in 
Derrida and Ulmer, a transformation of the insight that khora provides into rhetorical 
generation and practice. These authors develop inventive strategies that could be 
called ‘khoratic’, in opposition to those of a ‘topic’ nature, because agency in such 
strategies is attributed to non-human agents such as language, networks, environments 
and databases ( Rickert, 2007, p. 253). They give khora a methodological purchase. 
According to Rickert (2007, pp. 260-261), Kristeva’s notion of a ‘semiotic 
chora’, a pre-verbal (and pre-natal) realm of meaning-making, “includes emotions, 
sensations, and other marks and traces of psychical and material experience” by 
means of which she is able to discuss the creation of signs within a linguistic 
framework. Rickert (2007, p. 261), however, points out that because Kristeva’s 
invention exceeds its subject, language, it is not able to fully account for it as a 
process: how can we argue for the conceptualisation and emplacement of a rhetorical 
(linguistic) process that is itself prior to language? Nevertheless Rickert (2007, pp. 
262-263) argues that what “choric invention provides us with is a way to put 
invention itself back into question, not as a metaphysical problem but as an 
inventional problem” – as long as we do not harbour any preconceptions about what 
invention is. The bodily, performative, emotional, affective and pre-linguistic 
dimension of khora that Kristeva (and McEwen) suggest is then combined with 
Derrida’s and Ulmer’s perspective of khora as a rhetorical strategy which avoids 
“reducing invention to ideas, or perhaps more accurately, to understanding 
production and invention exclusively within the principle of representation” 
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(Rickert, 2007, p. 264.) This aspect of khora as a practice is therefore a fundamental 
one in the context of this thesis because it makes it possible to access strategies that 
are based on non-representational frameworks. Most importantly, it indicates how 
space itself – as khora – is an agent of the conceptualisation and emplacement of such 
strategies. 
According to Rickert (2007, p. 264), Derrida understands Plato’s khora as a 
type of invention because of its aporetic participation in the intelligible. This enables 
him to create a new discourse through which themes like beginning, naming, placing 
and inventing can be differently – khoratically – accessed and discussed. One of the 
things that both Derrida (and Sallis) argue is that khora is so deeply linked to the 
construction of the entire argument of Plato’s work that it cannot be separated out into 
the individual passages in which it is presented; the very construction of the work is a 
preparation for the necessary emergence of khora (Rickert, 2007, p. 256). 
Understanding the formation of khora through this perspective allows Derrida to 
analyse Plato’s use of the concept not simply as an element within his overall 
argument, but as part of the very structure that builds that argument, and as a 
consequence, he is able to consider the Timaeus rhetorically. According to Rickert, 
Derrida believes the rhetorical problematic this raises in the Timaeus is that khora  
 
... functions as a name for a referent the status of which is a matter of uneasy 
oppositions, aporia, and conjecture. Further, the question is complicated by its self-
reflexivity, which gives it a form like that of a snake eating its own tail. In asking 
about the possibility of giving place to something that seems to have no place, he is 
asking about the place of khōra, a word that itself refers to place (i.e., “what is the 
place of place?”). (Rickert, 2007, p. 264) 
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So the problem emerges of how to put in place a rhetorical strategy that addresses 
something that eludes discourse (Rickert, 2007, p. 265); that is, how to rhetorically 
allow for the emergence of this aporetic discourse when it is not accessible through 
rhetorical strategies. This question leads to the apparently impossible mise-en-abyme 
that, according to Rickert (2007, p. 265), is left in the realm of philosophical enquiry. 
Although Derrida approached variants of this question throughout his life, his analysis 
of Plato’s khora points to a way to deal with this problem using the khoratic strategy 
that is put forward throughout the entire Timaeus, but is particularly apparent in 
Socrates’ withdrawal from the dialogue (Rickert, 2007, pp. 265-266). This is a 
strategy of a continuous and recursive absence of discourse, manifest through the 
withdrawal of the speaker (Rickert, 2007, p. 265). Nonetheless, Rickert (2007, p. 266) 
believes that Derrida is trapped within a philosophical framework that does not allow 
him to fully explore khora as practice. This limitation is more clearly perceived in his 
contribution to a garden in the Parc de la Villette in Paris, which is discussed in more 
detail below. 
The problems that Derrida faces when attempting to put a khoratic rhetorical 
strategy into practice are, according to Rickert (2007, p. 267), more successfully 
addressed in the work of Ulmer. For Ulmer, such a strategy is one that is driven by 
self-reflexivity and allows the combination of information through associations that 
are “alternatives to the rationalistic methods developed for print culture” (Rickert, 
2007, p. 267). It is a strategy that is based not only on logic, but also on experiential 
and intuitive processes (Rickert, 2007, p. 268) – a mise-en-abyme creation, in which 
the thing that is being created is used to create itself. As such, Rickert (2007, p. 270) 
concludes, Ulmer’s work carries a positive tone: “What the chora allows Ulmer to 
do is theorize and practice how this seeming inconsistency or paradox is actually 
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productive.” In this thesis, this recursive process is seen as a necessarily spatial one, 
because it argues for the spatial nature of khora (see above). This opens the way for 
the exploration of a positive and productive framework, which will allow the 
conceptualisation of a strategy by which space can be used to investigate and 
construct itself.  
However, what is also clear is that Rickert does not fully take into 
consideration the spatial dimension of khora: space is restricted to an analogy that is 
used to develop the novel rhetorical strategy and is therefore viewed simply as a 
means for re-conceptualisation, limiting the strategy’s spatial implications to an 
abstract, conceptual dimension. As a consequence, and due to the inherent linguistic 
nature of rhetoric, khora is not fully conceptualised as a spatial device, but is instead 
understood as a linguistic one. The concept of khora as space is thus limited, 
constricted and trapped within the linguistic domain. This is particularly evident when 
we attempt to relocate the khoratic rhetorical strategy to other realms, such art and 
architecture, which require a materialisation that is not based on linguistic strategies. 
This failure is especially noticeable in Derrida’s and Eisenman’s collaboration for the 
Parc de la Villette. 
 
 
Chora L Works: the impossibility of materialisation 
 
In 1985 Bernard Tschumi, a renowned architect, invited philosopher Jacques Derrida 
and architect Peter Eisenman to collaborate on the design of a public garden for his 
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Parc de la Villette project in Paris.  A dialogue between the two ensued that was 
triggered by the diametrical relationship between presence and absence in Eisenman’s 
work, and on a broader spectrum, within architectural discourse. Derrida brought to 
the discussion an ‘odd’ Platonic concept he was working on: khora. According to 
Derrida (Kipnis and Leeser, 1997), this concept was particularly appropriate for the 
project because it seemed to reflect Eisenman’s own architectural concerns. It thus 
became the project’s theoretical program. In Derrida’s (cited in Kipnis and Leeser, 
1997, p.12) words, khora “is a space that cannot be represented, so it is a challenge to 
anything solid, to architecture as something built”. Hence, the project was infused 
with the idea of exploring this architectural challenge.  
The project was never built, but there remains a register of the process in the 
form of a book, Chora L Works (1997). The discussions, drawings and texts included 
in the work reveal the strain of the challenge – how to materialise something that 
cannot be represented. In the Parc de la Villette, this challenge was approached 
specifically through the concept of khora, and the strain was transferred to the 
question of how to render khora physical, how to materialise such an ambiguous 
entity: the project was specifically intended as an exercise in manifesting the concept 
of khora in a garden. However, throughout the discussions, and despite khora’s 
emergence as something that cannot be represented, its essential unrepresentability 
was never associated with space. Khora remained an entity with its own 
characteristics, and these characteristics were never perceived to be spatial ones. If 
they had been, then the problem that Derrida and Eisenman faced would have been 
transformed into a question of how to materialise space in architectural practice. 
Nevertheless, the discussions did bring to the surface the problems involved in putting 
space into practice, of actualising space. In order to grasp this concept and transform 
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it into a workable subject, Chora L Works initiated a deconstructive process that 
would help to forward the tangible associations.  
The foundations of the project, visible in the images and the text, reveal that 
Derrida and Eisenman applied two strategies to the process of materialisation. The 
first approach was to work through a particular idea that Derrida identified in the 
rhetorical strategy Plato used to present khora in the Timaeus: that of multiple 
beginnings. This approach not only addressed Plato’s strategy for dealing structurally 
with the concept of khora  – enacting and presenting the concept using multiple 
resources and different dimensions – but it also illustrated the absent or transitory 
nature of khora. The notion of multiple beginnings was explored in different instances 
in the project. 
As Kipnis and Leeser (1997) note, Tschumi’s Parc de la Villette was from the 
start reminiscent of an earlier Eisenman project for the Cannaregio district in Venice, 
particularly in its use of similar orthogonal grids. Despite pre-dating the Parc de la 
Villette, the Carnnaregio was manifestly similar to Tschumi’s project, triggering the 
subversion of beginnings. This coincidence, as well as the fact that the garden was to 
be built on the site of a demolished abattoir (just as Eisenman’s project for the 
Cannaregio was), led to the plan of forming an archaeology of the different edifices, 
enforcing ideas of displacement and misreading, and subverting ideas of authorship, 
chronology and space, creating a palimpsest (ibid.). This was consequently adopted as 
a working method, scaling and superimposing the different grids, which were 
explored and combined according to coincidences in the density of the grids, their 
elements and main axes. This created a partially real, partially fictional story of the 
two projects and the two abattoirs. This first approach was therefore formally worked 
through by playing with the grids of the two projects. The concept of beginnings was 
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explored through comparisons, replacements, simplifications, sub-sets, expansions – 
or more succinctly – through replacing one concept with another.  
 
Figure d – Sketch diagram of two Cannaregio grids, one five times larger than the other 
 
Figure e – Sketch of  site plan showing t h e  angular relationship between La Villette and 
Cannaregio grids 
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Figure f – A+U drawings 
 
The second approach that Derrida and Eisenman adopted in order to convey 
and materialise khora was the direct use of the metaphors Plato employed to describe 
khora in the Timaeus. In dealing with such an ungraspable concept, the project drew 
from the material side of these metaphors in order to fix khora as something concrete. 
This was done either through further metaphorical construction or by using the 
metaphor’s symbolic elements. In this way, they constructed a semiotic fabric through 
which to materialise the concept in the form of a garden.  
For example, the idea of using water in the garden, conveying ideas of erasure 
and transience through shadows and reflections (Kipnis and Leeser, 1997, p. 34), 
originated in Plato’s idea of an ‘imprint bearer’, which retains nothing of what it 
holds. However, the plan to use water was abandoned and the presence of the 
impermanent nature of khora was to be manifest instead in the conceptual movement 
of stones between the three places that made the garden. The stones taken from the 
quarry (the first place) were to be left in the labyrinth (the third place), informing its 
nature, while leaving a trace of their passage in the palimpsest of the park (the second 
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place) (ibid., p. 46). This idea is present in the parallelepipedic forms that at times 
would either raise or open holes in the ground, giving form to grids of these different 
times and places (ibid.). Also, each of the three places would formally carry the 
absence of the other two, creating a memory of absences, thus allowing the visitor the 
possibility of anticipation (ibid.). But the physical danger posed by the holes had to be 
overcome at the same time as avoiding any contradiction with the manifestation of 
khora – forbidding access to the area where the holes were would transform that part 
of the garden into an object (ibid., pp. 90-92). The solution Derrida and Eisenman 
found was to deny surface access but to allow penetration from underneath. This 
option would make this part of the garden, as Jeffrey Kipnis (ibid., p. 92) says, “the 
negative of itself in itself … ‘[i]t’ is neither the positive nor the negative, yet at the 
same time both”. The project was finalised with the introduction of a last metaphor, 
the lyre, an element that emerged from the logic of the project and which 
simultaneously referred to khora in two ways: first through its sieve-like appearance, 
and secondly by its reference to music/sound (ibid.). 
These were the strategies the project followed in the attempt to make the 
concept of khora tangible and workable. This thesis argues, however, that they relied 
on the creation of a scheme of linguistic representation: the materialisation of the 
garden was conceived through a strategy of translations. The reliance on language can 
be seen in both approaches to the challenge of materialising khora. The first tackled 
the problem through adopting the rhetorical approach of the Timaeus, building on the 
idea of a lack of authorship and translating this into practice through the interplay 
between the two projects. The second approached the problem through the direct use 
of metaphors, not only adopting Plato’s metaphors but also using his strategy to 
inform the whole project – that is, by conceiving metaphors as tropes that can be 
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represented and materialised. However, a semiotic structure is a profoundly 
inadequate basis for artistic practice because it does not directly confront the physical 
and material forces behind a project (in this case, khora) through experience. The 
project was driven by acts of translation rather than the enaction of khora. In other 
words, it rationalised khora through discussions based on the representation of the 
concept instead of letting it emerge through the active and experiential process of 
artistic creation, which is not limited to logical, rational and linguistic processes but is 
also guided by unmediated affective, sensory, emotional and experiential acts; a 
process of confrontation with matter and physical forces. In this project, the artistic 
act was not guided by a deep, active engagement with its driving forces, but 
comprised only detached, intellectual work. It was based on the ontology of 
architecture, in which elements are either in consonance or in contrast with each 
other, constructing a materialisation through the conscious displacement of 
materialities by a scheme of symbols.  
Derrida and Eisenman’s approach comprised, to some degree, the application 
of theory to practice. This was in tune with the theoretical position in art history and 
theory in which works of art are understood according to their socio-historical 
meaning. However, as Paul Crowther (2009, p. 12) says in Phenomenology of the 
Visual Arts (Even the Frame), such reductionist approaches to art, informed in the 
main by poststructuralism and based on an understanding that meaning in the visual 
arts arises solely from the socio-historical context in which the work of art is created 
and received, reduce it to “its informational content and persuasive effects, and to the 
social and other circumstantial elements which enable these”. Crowther (2009, p. 13) 
associates this reductionism with another, a ‘semiotic reductionism’ – that is, the 
understanding of a work of art based on linguistic models, in which the work is seen 
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as a text and read as such, without any discussion on what separates these mediums of 
artistic expression. Both these reductive approaches dismiss, in Crowther’s (2009, p. 
11) words, “the image’s intrinsic significance” or the materialities of the work of art; 
they negate an engagement with its experiential and affective dimension: 
 
[In] the very act of creating an image (irrespectively of one’s practical intentions and 
subsequent uses of the image) one literally acts upon the world, and in so doing, 
changes one’s cognitive relation to both the represented object and to oneself, and to 
existence in more general terms. (Crowther, 2009, p. 18)  
 
What Crowther identifies here is the persistence of a way of thinking that sees 
art works as representations that do not have a direct relationship with what is 
represented or with the world itself, and thus do not have agency in the world.  
Crowther believes that this representational position is related to a reliance on 
language. It is this relationship between representation and language – as an 
epistemological and ontological position – that this thesis argues underpinned the 
creation of the Parc de la Villette project by Derrida and Eisenman, not only guiding 
their approach, as seen above, but also imbuing how they conceived of and discussed 
the project. This position, based on the association between representation and 
language, can be seen in Derrida’s descriptions of the project in his essay ‘Why Peter 
Eisenman Writes Such Good Books’ (Derrida in Leach (ed), 2005). In his description 
everything turns the play of words: how they resemble one another; how they are 
multiply referential; how they become one another. This representational character is 
also seen in Derrida’s description of Eisenman’s working process, where he speaks of 
translation, transference and the transformation of motifs. The relevance given to 
words has its highest expression in the enthusiasm with which Derrida speaks of the 
title for the project: Chora L Works, which refers to the workings of khora: 
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 [T]he structure of our title obeys the same law, it has the same form of 
potentiality, the same power: the dynamics of an immanent invention. Everything is found 
inside but it is almost unforeseeable. (Derrida in Leach (ed), 2005, pp. 321-322) 
 
This position is further embedded when Derrida is called upon to act. At that moment 
he sees the challenge as if it were a written piece without words (ibid.), which is 
converted into the play of words and the formal resemblances between the idea of a 
sieve, one of Plato’s metaphors for khora (discussed above), and that of a web, a grill, 
a grid, or a stringed musical instrument (piano, harp, lyre or human vocal cords), 
referring back to the name of the project, Chora L.  
The reliance on words and linguistic structures is also present in Eisenman’s 
working processes, as Derrida explains: 
 
So what does Eisenman do? He interprets in his turn, actively and selectively. He 
translates, transposes, transforms and appropriates my letter, rewriting it in his 
language, in his languages … Among all the stringed instruments evoked in my 
letter (piano, harp, lyre) he chooses one, whose play he reinvents in his own 
language, English. And in inventing another architectural device, he transcribes 
this linguistic reinvention, one which is his, his own. (Derrida in Leach (ed), 2005, 
pp. 324-325) 
 
And again:  
 
Among errors, Eros and arrows, the transformation is endless, and the 
contamination at once inevitable and aleatory. None of Eisenman’s three projects 
presides at the meeting. They intersect like arrows, making a generative force out 
of misreadings, mis-spellings, mispronunciations, a force which speaks of pleasure 
at the same time as procuring it. (Derrida in Leach (ed), 2005, p. 326) 
 
The relationship between language and representation is one that extends 
beyond the domain of the arts and has led to a contemporary movement that not only 
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denounces this hegemonic relationship but also, primarily, attempts to rethink the 
notions of materiality and reality. This movement, called Agential Realism, argues for 
a model of discursive practices that is not representational but performative, 
acknowledging the dynamism and agency of matter. One of the driving forces behind 
this movement is Karen Barad. In Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007), where Barad 
presents her position, she recognises and discusses the presence and implications of 
the association between representation and language, stating that “language has been 
granted too much power”: 
 
The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it 
seems that every turn lately, every ‘thing’ – even materiality – is turned into matter 
of language or some other cultural representation. (Barad, 2007, p. 132) 
 
Barad (2007, p. 97) traces the relationship between language and 
representation back to the seventeenth century – as does Foucault in the Order of 
Things ([1966] 2002) – when the notion that there is a reality independent of our 
experience of it, a separation between object and subject, world and Man, came to be 
supported by the idea that “language is a transparent medium that transmits a 
homologous picture of reality to the knowing mind”. This had its counterpart in 
scientific theories, which believed that observation produced a faithful rendering of 
the world (as discussed in the first chapter). The association between representation 
and language consequently led to the position that language mirrors reality and, as 
such, is an uncorrupted way of accessing the world, of representing it. 
However, during the 20th century, as Barad (2007, pp. 194-195) highlights, 
this position came under scrutiny in the humanities, giving rise to a movement that 
came to be known as the ‘linguistic turn’, which questioned the possibility of 
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achieving knowledge about the world. It contended that language as such does not 
provide access to reality but, rather, to the human subject and the representations they 
create. Representations therefore become entities that are independent of the world 
and those things within it that can be known; language, in creating representations, 
becomes a mediating element between the subject and the world, providing models 
and structures through which to explain meaning and representation. However, this 
position also leads to the maintenance of the relationship between language and 
representation, as language provides the only means of understanding the 
representations it has created. Thus, although the linguistic turn questioned the notion 
of a direct relationship between the world and language, in discussing the relationship 
between the human subject and language, and the way our understanding of the world 
is shaped, it ended up reinforcing the presence of the relationship between language 
and representation in Western thought, while also making the notion of direct 
interaction with the world implausible.17 
Tilottama Rajan, in Deconstruction and the Remainders of Phenomenology 
(2002), subscribes to the same understanding of the persistence of the relationship 
between language and representation. Rajan describes the early French 
deconstructivism (of the 1960s) as a theoretical point between the advent of 
phenomenology and poststructuralism. In this discussion Rajan identifies 
poststructuralism with a return to Sausurre and linguistic models in philosophy. 
However, in contrast to poststructuralism, Rajan (2002, p. xiv) sees the emergence of 
early deconstructivism “as a continuation of the phenomenological project in a period 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This does not mean however that there are not other understandings of language, ones in which 
language is observed through its affective dimensions, as for instance in Fredric Jameson’s The 
Antinomies of Realism (2013). However, their existence only highlights the persistence of the 
representational position based on language, which still has a major influence in the creation of art and 
in art theory. 
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when philosophy in France was increasingly threatened by the human sciences as 
renewed and reconceived by structuralism”. As a continuation of phenomenology, 
deconstructivism separates itself from poststructuralism and is dismissive of a 
philosophy “concerned with consciousness, perception, and being [in order to move 
to] a discourse centered on representation and the sign” (Rajan, 2002, p. xi). Given 
this understanding of deconstruction (an approach that was closely identified with 
Derrida), Derrida appears to be in conflict with himself, or at least with his 
phenomenological side, in his intervention with Eisenman in the Parc de la Villette 
project; he seems to have been unable to step outside language and into the realm of 
matter and materialisation.  
Although he recognises that Eisenman works with a different kind of 
language, one beyond speech, Derrida still refers to it as ‘language’, and although he 
discusses Eisenman’s work from the perspective of a collaborative process, Derrida 
still talks about it linguistically, from a personal point of view, from his own given 
background, context and comfort zone. But is it not the case that such a perspective 
limited Derrida? Further, did not such a perspective also limit Eisenman’s approach to 
the project? And has not such a strategy deeply influenced and determined all artistic 
discourse and practice? 
It is therefore not surprising that friction emerged between Derrida and 
Eisenamn as the project ran its course, which resulted in it being left unfinished and 
led to a profound scission between the two men. Their discussions make evident the 
tensions between language and materiality, and between the distinct understandings of 
deconstruction from the perspective of each other’s disciplinary position. To some 
degree, this tension made visible the incompatibility of approaching art as translation, 
as a linguistic process, and of using its representational characteristics in the 
	   144	  
expectation of materialising a concept that cannot be represented. Derrida expressed 
his disappointment and frustration in a letter to Eisenman: 
 
Naturally this question concerns also your interpretation of chora [sic] in ‘our’ 
‘work’, if one can say in quotations our work ‘in common’, I am not sure that you 
have detheologized and deontologized chora in as radical a way as I would have 
wished (chora is neither the void, as you suggest sometimes, nor absence, nor 
invisibility, nor certainly the contrary from which there are, and this is what 
interests me, a large number of consequences). (Derrida, 1990, p. 8) 
 
Derrida directs this dissatisfaction toward Eisenman’s (and architectural 
theory’s) understanding of deconstruction, or what he means by the term. The friction 
between the two men thus arose out of the distance between their two practices and 
the misunderstanding and lack of knowledge of each other’s activity – even (or 
precisely) when both were seemingly addressing the same themes and rhetorical 
frameworks. 
Eisenman had to fight the materiality of architecture, because it required a 
different interplay or interaction between its elements: architecture, in the final 
analysis, does not exist in the same realm as language. In Post/El Cards: a Reply to 
Jacques Derrida (1990), Eisenman writes about the impossibility, or rather absurdity, 
of translation as a process of architectural materialisation. The absurdity, however, 
does not lie in the impossibility of the material(s) or, rather, it goes beyond it into the 
very ontology of creation: 
 
[Y]ou glaze over the fact that your conceptual play with the multifaceted term glas 
is not simply translatable into architectural glass. One understands that the 
assumption of the identity of the material glass and your ideas of glas, in their 
superficial resemblance of letters, is precisely the concern of literary 
deconstruction; but this becomes a problem when one turns to the event of 
building. (Eisenman, 1990, p. 15) 
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Eisenman then continues by revealing the impossibility of employing a linguistic 
strategy in a framework of physical materialisation: 
 
Yes, I am preoccupied by absence, but not in terms of this simple 
presence/absence dialectic, as you might think. For me as an architect, each 
concept, as well as each object, has all that it is not inscribed within it as traces. I 
am preoccupied with absence, not voids or glass, because architecture, unlike 
language, is dominated by presence, by the real existence of the signified. 
Architecture requires one to detach the signified not only from its signifier but also 
from its condition as presence. For example, a hole in a plane, or a vertical 
element, must be detached not only from its signifier – a window or a column – 
but also from its condition of presence – that is, as a sign of the possibility of light 
and air or of structure – without, at the same time, causing the room to be dark or 
the building to fall down. This is not the case in language where you and I can 
play with glas and post, gaze and glaze, precisely because of the traditional 
dialectic of presence and absence. (Eisenman, 1990, p. 15) 
 
As such, Eisenman uses Derrida’s provocation with the term ‘glass’ to expose 
the difference between language and architecture. While language can play with the 
terms transparency/opacity, for example, turning one into another, architecture cannot 
play in the same way (Eisenman, 1990, p. 16). In order to distinguish linguistic from 
architectural deconstruction, Eisenman states that while language can rely on 
dialectics, a two-way system, architecture needs a three-way system in order to be 
deconstructive (ibid.). He calls this third way in architecture ‘presentness’, which he 
describes as: 
 
… neither absence nor presence, form nor function, neither the particular use of a 
sign nor the crude existence of reality, but rather an excessive condition between 
sign and the Heideggerian notion of being: the formation and ordering of the 
discursive event that is architecture. (Eisenman, 1990, p. 16) 
 
The dispute between Derrida and Eisenman in relation to deconstructivism is 
discussed by John Macarthur in Experiencing Absence: Eisenman and Derrida, 
	   146	  
Benjamin and Schwitters (1993). In describing deconstructive architecture as being 
about the ‘pleasures of absence’, Macarthur argues that this has become reduced to a 
simple formalisation of absence and the materialisation of experience. In criticising 
architectural deconstructivism, he is particularly referring to the goal of building the 
‘palpable experience’ of the absence of the human subject (ibid., p. 103). Macarthur 
(ibid., p. 104) says that, for Eisenman, deconstructivism meant the building of 
emptiness: that is, only when we become indifferent towards the dichotomies that 
have informed architecture, “can [we] begin an exploration of the ‘between’ of these 
categories”. At the core of his critique of Eisenman is the idea of experience, which 
Macarthur (ibid.) believes is not fully realised in Eisenman’s architecture: 
“Experience is demonstrably reduced, and “theory” elevated to the category of an 
object of experience.” For Macarthur, when experience or the construction of an 
experience through the use of architectural dichotomies is completely ruled out, then 
architecture stops being intelligible to those experiencing it. 
Macarthur highlights the discrepancies between Derrida and Eisenman, 
alerting us to the fact that although Derrida speaks of absences, the absences he refers 
to point towards the fact that what are perceived as opposing terms in fact comprise 
two connected paths to one and the same thing. It is necessary to have multiple, or 
even distant, ways of accessing the same thing due to the surplus that each 
oppositional term constructs around itself (ibid., p. 102). Therefore presence and 
absence are not merely opposing concepts in which the deficit of one highlights the 
presence of the other, but the pair in fact address the same thing, and the existence of 
the two terms is but a by-product of our inability to express or attain that single thing 
at the same time as recognising each terms’ individual autonomy and power. Using 
this particular understanding of Derrida, Macarthur (1993) argues for a non-separation 
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of thought and experience, criticising deconstructivism in architecture for only caring 
about one side of the opposition instead of accepting both opposing sides as necessary 
parts of the same thing. 
As such, despite the importance of language within deconstructivism, the 
thesis argues that linguist models and strategies should not have guided the project, 
because on the one hand they reduce artistic creation and theory to semiotics, negating 
the experiential and affective dimensions of artistic practices and theories, and on the 
other, they dismiss the discussion of matter. This is because underlying the use of 
linguistic models is the idea that materiality/matter has no agency or historicity – it is 
passive, inert and subject to human agency (Barad, 2007, p. 132), and thus belongs to 
an independent, separate realm of reality which human beings can only discover or 
access in representational form through the mediation of language.  
In order to overcome this representational epistemology, Barad (2007, p. 49) 
suggests a performative epistemology, in which knowledge emerges through a “direct 
material engagement with the world”. Barad observes that, in contrast to 
representation, performativity is a belief that places human beings not outside and/or 
above the world but inside it, as part of the world in which human beings exist 
through practices of engagement. Neither language nor observation or theory exist 
independently of this world. Therefore, “…performativity is precisely a contestation 
of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real” (Barad, 2007, p. 
133). This position is consonant with Ingold’s, discussed in Chapter One, and his 
notion of the meshwork. 
In the context of Crowther’s critique of the reductionist understanding of art, 
Barad’s discussion of language, materiality and representation, and Rajan’s insights 
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into deconstruction and poststructuralism, and given the descriptions of the creative 
process behind Derrida’s and Eisenman’s project for the Parc de la Villette, this thesis 
suggests that the project was approached through the perspective of how to speak of 
khora, rather than how to experience it and its affective dimensions. This raises the 
question of the materiality of khora (space). Through the linguistic strategies used in 
the project and the support of a ‘reductive’ semiotic art theory, khora came to be 
represented through language. What is meant by the notion in this context is that 1) 
when a work of art is either understood or created (as in the case of the Parc de la 
Villette) with an underlying representational theory supporting the idea that language 
is a mediating element between the world and human beings, or between experience 
and reality (even if this mediating element is recognised as far from free of failure), it 
results in the embedding of the reduction of what the work of art is or can be, negating 
its active and direct intervention in the world, its agency; and 2) when a semiotic 
strategy is applied to the creation of a work of art, even to a practice, they are equally 
deprived of their experiential and affective dimensions and only come to exist or be 
understood through language.  
This has profound implications for a discussion of khora (space). It brings to 
the fore the idea that khora needs to be represented in order to be known and that 
language provides the best (if not the only) way to represent it. However, this idea has 
a profound dissonance with khora, as well as space, as these are concepts that escape 
representation – an idea that also supported, and was of the utmost importance for, 
Derrida’s theory of deconstruction.  
Eisenman’s and Derrida’s project for the Parc de la Villette, and their 
consequent discussions during and after the project, highlight not only the difficulty 
of bridging different disciplinary discourses, but also 1) the problem of relying on 
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linguistic practices in artistic processes of materialisation and 2) how this reliance 
reinforces the persistence of a representational model, particularly when ambiguous 
and fugitive concepts like khora and space are at issue. As such, this thesis argues that 
a performative, enactive, epistemological and ontological model – instead of a 
representational one – is vital for a discussion of the ontology and productivity of 
space (khora), particularly when such productivity is approached and achieved 
through an artistic perspective (as in the second part of the thesis). To materialise does 
not equate to representing, as the process of engagement, interaction and mutual 
formation of human beings and things can be generatively materialised. This, 
however, does not imply that experience(s) can be constructed, only that a different 
ontology of matter might be necessary. In terms of this thesis, such an epistemological 
move could be fundamental to considering the ontology of ambiguous, even 
impossible concepts like khora and space. However, as Rickert points out so lucidly, 
it is difficult to escape Derrida’s problematic of realising the impossible: 
 
Derrida as a philosopher is certainly interested in beginnings, creation, and 
invention, but he confronts a limit with productive arts such as rhetoric and 
architecture. In part, this is because he is interested in inventing the impossible. 
The chora for Derrida is precisely such an impossibility, and the conflicts that 
emerge with Eisenman stem from Derrida’s attempt to realize this impossibility 
leavened with an intuition that it cannot be realized – that it remains impossible. 
Derrida’s chora inhabits an impossible place, one that governs, in a manner nearly 
meta-metaphysical. (Rickert, 2007, p. 266) 
 
Is the realisation of space therefore an impossibility? We are constantly 
confronted by this question concerning the impossibility of accessing space or its 
materiality, and the impossibility of presenting khora. This problem will be 
specifically discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Conclusion 
 
The analysis of khora has allowed us to find a locus from which to deepen the 
discussion in Chapter One (concerning the ambiguity and the lack of a unified 
understanding of the concept of space) and to tackle the difficulty of its ontology. The 
extent of this difficulty is evident in the arduous task scholars recognise that Plato 
faced in his attempt to account for the concept of khora, illustrated by his evasive 
descriptions of it. It is also evident in the way contemporary approaches to the 
concept are enveloped in confusion, evincing conflicting ideas about, and distinct and 
sometimes opposing positions on, its meaning – which at times lead to the dismissal 
of the very idea of khora as space. However, this thesis argues that this is due to the 
difficulty of understanding space itself and not something that is only characteristic of 
khora. Indeed, the analysis of khora reveals the panoply of understandings of space. 
Therefore, instead of defining space through a single position, it is more productive to 
assume that all conceptualisations of space are related. In this respect, contrary to 
Algra’s argument, if khora is conceived of as a coherent approach to space, space in 
turn can be analysed not only through multiple positions but, more importantly, all 
these positions represent potentially different dimensions and expressions (or facets) 
of the same phenomenon – which, however, remains unidentifiable as a single entity. 
Furthermore, the study of khora reveals the possibility that the concept of space, 
despite the many different approaches towards and understandings of it, might at 
some level of its constitution carry traces of all these understandings; that is, space 
might not only have an historical, contingent and provisional dimension, but also a 
primordial one. 
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Also, in relation to the ontology of space, the analysis of khora reveals the 
persistence into contemporary times of the idea of the separation and incompatibility 
between the physical and metaphysical realms as far as the conceptualisation of space 
is concerned (as discussed in the first chapter). However, through the work of 
contemporary scholars and their use of the notion of khora it is possible to realise 
ways in which these two dimensions come together. McEwen, Kristeva and 
Kananaugh overcome the division by acknowledging the presence – and importance – 
of the physical, ‘real’, everyday realm alongside a primordial and sensuous one in the 
performative and changing process of order-making. Also, in the context of the 
separation between the physical and metaphysical dimensions of space, it is important 
to highlight how, through Plato’s description of khora and the work of Derrida, khora 
emerges as something ‘other’ – a third element. This disrupts binary logic, and even 
the very construction of knowledge itself, with its persistence in distinguishing 
between mythos and logos, between the sensible and the intelligible. Due to the 
intrinsic relationship between khora and space, these contemporary discussions of and 
attitudes to khora can thus be situated in a discussion about space itself, opening up 
the notion that space is something that is not only ambiguous and not fully attainable, 
but also productive precisely because of its unattainability. It channels the desire to 
approach the unknown (while keeping it ambiguous and unreachable) through a 
sensuous, affective dimension that is produced out of the processes of transformation 
and change between the physical and metaphysical realms. 
The productivity of space is first perceived in the work of Plato, who used the 
concept of khora to facilitate his discussion on the arche (the origin of the world) and 
the interactive process of generation between forms and instances, Being and 
Becoming, the sensible and the intelligible, in the framework of an indeterminate 
	   152	  
genesis without beginnings. Khora plays a hierarchically equal role in this process, 
alongside Being and Becoming, by enabling this process of transformation. However, 
in a second instance, placing khora within a discussion about beginnings means it 
emerges as something that is constantly falling into itself, Derrida’s mise-en-abyme. If 
Brague observes that the sky has become the locus of the unknown (as noted earlier), 
in Plato’s cosmological work the sky is transformed into khora (space) through the 
creation of an ambiguous ‘bastard’ element in the arche. Space becomes the locus 
(locos) of the unknown. Khora thus becomes not only a means to discuss beginnings, 
or the lack of beginnings recognised by contemporary scholars, but also a discussion 
about the unknown, or how to approach the unknowable (space). Nonetheless, instead 
of making khora – and space – expendable and sterile, this perspective has led to its 
emergence as a productive concept in contemporary discourses on methodologies and 
approaches to knowledge, particularly as a creative strategy in rhetorical frameworks. 
The discussions on khora as a rhetorical strategy have opened a way to read 
the discussions in the first part of the chapter as providing the foundational elements 
needed to think of space productively. However, situating khora, and space, within a 
language-oriented discourse and framework denies the experiential, physical, ‘real’, 
everyday dimension of space as well as its sensuous, affective dimension, and this not 
only diminishes the potential of space as a methodological tool, but also the very 
conception of space itself. This thesis argues, therefore, that if the experiential, 
sensuous and affective dimensions are taken into consideration, this can allow a 
different take on space as a methodological device, achieving a novel epistemological 
impact. Despite the fact that Derrida and Eisenman never acknowledged khora as 
space throughout their collaboration on the Parc de la Villette garden, the project itself 
reveals important findings in the context of accessing space and conceiving of it as a 
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methodological device. In using khora as the project’s theme, Derrida and Eisenman 
set themselves the challenge of materialising an ambiguous and evasive concept. The 
failure of the project indicates the difficulty, if not impossibility, of such a task. This 
might have to do with the methodology they used, particularly its reliance on 
linguistic strategies, which, instead of liberating the project, constrained it in a 
representational practice, thus revealing that such a methodology is profoundly 
inadequate for the task of undertaking an in-depth discussion on khora or space. 
Thus the second part of the chapter has revealed that while there is a positive 
possibility of thinking of space as a methodological device (as seen in the work of 
Rickert), it also emerges – at a certain level – as impossible. Is then the only way to 
materialise space through the possibility that exists in the attempt (as Rickert declares) 
but which can never be fully actualised? This seems to be the case, especially if the 
challenge is taken literally, as it very easily falls into linguistic processes of 
representation. This thesis argues that if a different approach is adopted, using artistic 
practice to investigate space and its productivity, it might be possible to reach a 
different result. This would involve a shift in epistemological models, from language-
based meaning-making to the exploration of both the experiential, physical, ‘real’, 
everyday dimension of space and its sensuous, affective dimension. However, it might 
be the case that to access space (or to address it) it is necessary to constantly avoid it, 
to make a detour around it, to construct a ‘corral’, a mise-en-abyme or a ‘bastard’ kind 
of order – as with Plato’s enaction of khora in the Timaeus. 
In addition, through partaking in the constitution of the cosmos – of the arche 
– khora becomes inevitably cosmological, an element in the creation of the order of 
the world. This dimension (when used in combination with a productive 
methodological framework, which particularly addresses the absence of an origin or a 
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beginning, and a recursive and ‘bastard’ epistemology that defies binary logic) 
provides the thesis with a framework through which to approach space as a 
methodologically productive device in the conceptualisation of ‘bastard’ performative 
systems of order. Despite its ontological indeterminacy, khora presents itself as a 
potentiality – the potentiality of transformation, of moving between different realms 
or dimensions – and while doing so it transforms whatever it comes into contact with, 
all that it brings together from multiple realms and which it transforms. As such, 
khora as space is not itself a structure, a matrix, but a concept that allows the act of 
constituting and experiencing order. Hence, the analysis of khora has opened a path to 
an ontological discussion of space through its interplay with structures that are 
enacted materialisations of performed, experiential archaeological genealogies (or 
formations) of order-making that are yet without an origin or beginning18. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This discussion is undertaken in the second part of this thesis 
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Chapter Three 
The Past as an Analogy of Space: Unveiling Strategies on How to 
Approach Ambiguous Entities 
 
The first two chapters of this thesis have approached the discussion of the ontology of 
space directly. First, they considered contemporary concepts of space and revealed 
their underlying problematic: space has an ontology that is intrinsically ambiguous, 
evasive and indeterminate, defying representation. Secondly, they explored the notion 
of khora, a specific understanding of space that embraces its ambiguity, 
unrepresentability, unknowability, and even impossibility. In the process they 
revealed that, despite its ambiguity, space can be understood positively: it has 
productive potential. By building on these discussions, Chapter Three brings the two 
previous chapters into a single framework – that of a methodological discussion on 
how to research ontologically ambiguous entities by displacing the problematic of 
space to the past; thus informing a corral around space (idea presented in the 
introduction). 
The first chapter revealed the importance of the notion of structure for 
discussions on space and, in relation to this notion, how non-linear and non-
representational frameworks are fundamental to the constitution of open and dynamic 
structures that can be used in research practices. The second chapter, concerning the 
unattainability and unknowability of space, revealed both the importance of the 
presence of space in discussions about the possibility of genesis without a determined, 
single origin and the limits of linguistic approaches and models in accessing non-
representational, ambiguous entities. These findings (and ideas), which inform the 
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conceptualisation of the ontology of space as ambiguous, evasive and non-
representational, are also present in discussions concerning the ontology of the past 
and can be found in historiographical enquiries that challenge the traditional historical 
methodologies.  
Non-linearity, the absence of origins, non-representationality and non-
narrativity are central themes in contemporary historiographical debate, particularly in 
discussions about the ontology of the past and how history constructs its own research 
object. In questioning the relationship between the past, history, the writing of the past 
and the role of the historian, historiography has prompted an awareness of the 
subjectivity of the historian, the representational paradigms present in language, the 
strategies of narration and conscious and unconscious structures, and most 
importantly, an awareness of the ambiguity of the past itself. This is because 
something that no longer exists provokes different understandings of what it means to 
exist (or no longer exist) and this opens the way to multiple, distinct understandings 
of the past and how it can be accessed and researched – if it can be at all. 
Consequently, the past has become an ambiguous entity, and this dimension of 
historical enquiry has engaged historiographical researchers and thinkers as they seek 
to reconcile the ambiguity of the past in a productive fashion with the enquiry itself. 
Thus, the historiographical explorations of the ontology of the past and how to 
research it have enabled this chapter to establish an analogy between the past and 
space. As such, historiography provides the basis on which the two previous chapters 
converge, helping inform the discussion on how to research ambiguous entities.  
The analogous relationship between space and the past raises challenging 
questions about the object of research, such as: if the historical object is a 
construction, where can its origin be located? Is there a single origin that can be 
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located in time or does it have a distributed, non-linear history, in which the past is no 
longer that which existed previously? How can the past be accessed if it no longer 
exists as a given? How can we access a past that goes deeper than history – further 
back where no written sources exist and further beyond, into the future, the place that 
shelters expectations and desires? However, it is important to highlight that such 
analogy does not have the purpose of addressing any historical implications of space, 
or of its research. The intention is also neither to understand how space can or has 
been researched and understood historically. Of importance to this thesis is how the 
analysis of the discussion of the past itself, and its research, reveals the presence or 
traces of the present within the making of history and consequently how this 
revelation has been crucial to develop research methodologies that concern the 
present (and future) – such as media archaeology. As such, in asking how ambiguous 
entities can be researched by establishing an analogy between past and space, this 
chapter also seeks strategies on how research outside of a purely historical enquiry (as 
the case of this thesis research on the ontology of space) can also be undertaken 
through history; using not only its objects, notions, knowledge, ideas, but also 
methodological debates. 
Within this context and contributing to it, historiography has developed a 
series of productive frameworks that are based on 1) the notions of non-linearity and 
non-causality, questioning teleological accounts and exploring the notion of multiple 
and alternative histories (Manuel De Landa, Michel Foucault); 2) using 
archaeological and genealogical frameworks to challenge the idea of a singular and 
determinate origin for an event, idea, paradigm, object or thing (Foucault, media 
archaeology); and 3) analysing the role narrative plays in historical accounts in order 
to explore unconscious structures and the non-representational – but performative and 
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affective– dimensions of making history (Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit, Alun 
Munslow). These frameworks reveal a plurality of points of view; further, by 
revealing the plurality of existences they open the way to observing ontologically 
ambiguous entities, such as the past and space, without the need to first dismantle or 
deny their ambiguity. As such, these historiographic frameworks are fundamental to 
this chapter because they indicate the sort of methodologies that could form a point of 
departure for research into the ontology of space in the framework provided by the 
first two chapters. Crucially, displacing the discussion of the ontology of space onto 
that of the past, and examining it though historiography, reveals another important 
implication for this thesis: the possibility that space has a methodological purchase. 
Because of the interaction between space and notions such as structure, non-
linearity, non-causality, absence of origins and non-representationality (as discussed 
in the first two chapters), and given the importance of such notions when reflecting on 
and developing epistemological frameworks and methodological approaches 
(discussed here through historiography), this chapter finds that space has a productive 
potential in the methodological context. This shift, however, leads into a mise-en-
abyme, in which space embraces itself, constructs itself – a suggestion that will be 
explored in the second part of this thesis. 
The relationship between the methodological purchase of space and 
historiographical strategies is further developed and discussed in the second part of 
this chapter through a speculative reading of an excerpt of Marguerite Yourcenar’s 
Memoirs of Hadrian ([1951] 2000) – a fictionalised history of the life of the Roman 
emperor Hadrian – alongside descriptions of Yourcenar’s writing processes. The 
exploration of this excerpt and the descriptions of how the author wrote it should be 
seen as an example of an historiographical discussion about the multiple dimensions 
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of the past and its ambiguity rather than a literary analysis of either Yourcenar’s 
overall oeuvre or this specific work. The speculative exploration of this excerpt is 
intended to reveal how the multiple dimensions of historical methodologies, used as 
means to approach an ambiguous past, cohere and coexist in reflections on the past 
(both in thinking about how to access the past and express it through writing fiction, 
as well as in the fiction Memoirs of Hadrian itself). This exploration begins from the 
perspective that if the barriers between history and fiction have been broken (as the 
‘narrative turn’ suggests), then it is possible to use fiction to ask questions about how 
the past is constructed and exists in such stories.  
Of particular importance to this thesis is the fact that the speculative 
exploration of this specific excerpt of Yourcenar’s work and her descriptions of the 
process of writing also reveals the participation of space in the conceptualisation and 
exploration of the multiple existences of the past and in the process of accessing it. As 
such, it shows how space can be active and productive in methodological frameworks 
– as the analogy between space and the past established by means of historiography 
and its epistemological and methodological discussions suggests. In this speculative 
exploration, space is seen as methodologically productive in two instances: firstly, in 
Yourcenar’s description of the process of accessing the past in order to inform her 
historical account, even if it is a fictional one; and secondly, in the fact that space is 
also seen as methodologically productive in the novel, where different dimensions and 
understandings of space are used to access and describe temporal historical 
experience. Both these instances highlight the need for a performative and enactive 
epistemology (as discussed in the previous two chapters), which places the 
experiential and affective dimension at its foundation in order to explore ambiguous 
entities without constraining or limiting them. As such, this analysis explores 
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strategies for accessing the past that do not rely merely on language.  
Through her description of the process by which she wrote Memoirs of 
Hadrian, Yourcenar shows the importance of not only actively engaging with material 
sources (most specifically, artistic ones) but also of visiting and experiencing 
historical places. This experiential and affect-based research informs the excerpt (the 
subject of the analysis) through the construction of a historical space in which the past 
is interrogated. As such, this speculative exploration presents a reflection on the past 
that is researched through space and presented through space. The framework of 
research is implemented through the methodological purchase of space, and the 
outcome of the research is presented through the constitution of a space. Most 
importantly for this thesis, these spaces are not only abstract and conceptual (that is, 
the construction of structures of categorisation and order-making), they are also 
physical, ‘real’, experiential, affective and performed. As a result, the various 
dimensions of space coexist, interacting and informing each other, revealing space to 
be both multiply agential and a methodological device. 
 
 
The Analogy: the Past as Ontologically Ambiguous 
 
The second chapter raised questions regarding the participation of space in the 
understanding of origins, and this raised further questions about the sort of processes, 
rhetoric and methodologies that might be used to approach an origin without a 
beginning. Such questions resonate with the debates among historians and 
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philosophers of history concerning the ontology of the past and the making of history. 
As such, these enquiries into the ontology of the past and the study of history (in the 
context of constantly shifting ideas about what constitutes the past) provide a 
framework in which to take the debate on the ontology of space further, particularly 
regarding the question of how space can be researched. First, however, it is necessary 
to draw an analogy between space and the past by revealing the past’s ambiguous 
ontology, observing how approaches to it have differed, and how the past itself has 
different degrees of existence and many different shades according to where it is 
placed and how the historian has tried to reach or access it. This chapter therefore will 
now turn to illustrating some of these many understandings of the past. 
Alun Munslow (2007, p. 4) describes the practice of history as “the 
representation of something in the past”. Despite the transformation of its purpose, 
function, methods and beliefs over time, it can generally be described as the practice 
of writing down the past in the form of a narrative (or presentation) (ibid., p. 1). The 
fact is, however, that not all historians agree on what is it that they, as historians, 
should be doing, how they should do it and what its purpose should be. The 
disagreements spring from deep epistemological differences not only concerning how 
the historian understands the past and the knowledge that is generated by their 
engagement with it, but also how this knowledge should be presented, as well as what 
is presented. If historical knowledge is a representation, this comes in the form of a 
narrative, and most of the time, as a text. But how many narratives of the past can 
exist? And to what degree do they ‘speak for’ the past, and are they speaking for or 
about the past? Is the past something that can be known? Is it a single reality or a 
multiple reality? Is the past even real? What then is the relationship between 
representation, narrative and the past, or between the past and history? For Munslow 
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(2007, p. 5), “while the past defined as a period of time during which many things 
happened is not invented, history, on the other hand, is a constructed narrative 
representation (a narration) of it or, to be more precise, about it”. 
However, if the past is a period of time, when does it finish and the present 
begin? What are the limits of the past, how are they informed, and who or what 
informs them? According to Munslow (2007, p. 5), Paul Ricoeur argues that it is not 
possible to engage with the past but only with ‘temporality’, which includes past, 
present and future, and it is only possible to engage with temporality in the form of 
narrative; however, if in order to engage with temporality the researcher needs 
sources (because history is a story that is the product of historical sources), it follows 
that knowing the past is impossible. The impossibility of knowing the past is, 
according to Munslow, the idea that informed Nietzsche’s genealogies. The relevance 
of this is the fact that Nietzsche inspired not only Foucault’s own genealogies, but 
also Warburg’s methodological approach – two approaches to history that will later be 
revealed as fundamental to the development of the belief that space has a 
methodological purchase. 
Munslow (2007, pp. 10-11) concurs with Ricoeur and argues that three 
approaches resulted from the movement against a modernist epistemology. 
Modernism regarded knowledge as existing independently of the intervention of the 
subject, making it possible to arrive at a true knowledge of phenomena and of the 
world itself as such knowledge represents them fully. The linguistic turn (Munslow 
designates its historical variant as the ‘narrative turn’ due to its role in questioning the 
historical narrative) produced three main positions on how the text produced by the 
historian represents the past. Historians have always been concerned with clarifying 
their role in the writing of historical texts and in debating the ontological nature of the 
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past and history, but the linguistic turn and postmodernism raised new concerns. 
Historians could no longer ignore the multiple layers involved in a text, some of 
which, arguably, the historian does not control. As such, according to Budd (2009, p. 
344), postmodernism has invited historians – but on a wider scale other scholars too – 
to interrogate the “very notion of ‘the past’ by questioning the terms by which we 
have thought about ‘history’ as a concept and as practice”. However, alongside these 
concerns, new ideas and understandings of history and how it should be approached 
started to emerge. 
In the first approach, the past is accessed through the ability of the historian to 
empathise with its events. This is possible if the past is observed as containing 
elements that are familiar to those living in the present (Budd, 2009, p. 349). For this 
reason, the past is understood as being the ‘same’ as the present (Ricoeur, [1984] 
2009). The past, although gone, can still be known because the affective and agential 
human dimension of the past can be re-created – in Ricoeur’s words, ‘re-enacted’, and 
in Munslow’s, ‘reconstructed’. An example of a scholar who took this kind of 
approach was the early twentieth century historian R. G. Collingwood. He believed 
that historians have an “emotional and intellectual ability … to experience elements 
of the past and to communicate effectively the insights that sensibility provides” 
(Budd, 2009, p. 349). As such, when the historian writes about the past he/she is 
giving a true account of it, or the best account, because it is also their own. The 
historian assumes that by means of language and the historical text it is possible to 
‘speak’ the past, and this can be done by reconstructing it with the help of their 
imagination and experience of familiar events in combination with a rigorous 
interpretation of sources, according to a relationship of cause and effect. The 
historical narrative therefore presents an actual trace of the past, and in this way it 
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replaces the past as “description equals history and history equals the past” (Munslow, 
2007, p. 12).  
However, because the narrative is thought to present the past, it follows that it 
is not subject to any influences or biases from the present, including those of the 
historian. One of the problems with this approach is that it fails to recognise that the 
historical text is a representation of the past and not the past itself. Also, 
Collingwood’s idea that the past can be re-enacted presents a problem as 
“representation through re-enactment only uses those parts of the trace that are 
available for interpretation: this distorts the past by ignoring those parts of it that 
cannot be interpreted” (Budd, 2009, p. 349). This approach, according to Ricoeur 
([1984] 2009), destroys the distance between past and present, nullifying the 
difference or ‘otherness’ of a past that can never be the present. It is based on the 
claim that there is a single past reality that the historian can reach through an 
objective reading of the historical sources (Munslow, 2007, p. 11). 
In the second approach, the past is seen as inaccessible and can never be fully 
retrieved (Budd, 2009, p. 349). The past is therefore distinct and separate from the 
present; it is something ‘other’ (Ricoeur [1984] 2009) that can only be represented 
through careful analytical conceptualisation. Although still recognising the 
importance of empirical studies, this approach argues that knowledge is also 
analytical or theoretical (Munslow, 2007). The historian thus plays an active role in 
the writing of the historical account because he/she is the one structuring or 
constructing the past in order to make sense of the present (ibid.). The intention is that 
while presenting a truthful account of the past the historian also takes into 
consideration the influences they are subject to. As a consequence, this approach 
recognises that the account might contain the historian’s own biases.  
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However, for Ricoeur ([1984] 2009), this conception of the past makes it 
difficult to comprehend the presence of its traces, because without an understanding 
of what a trace meant in the past, the historian cannot understand what it means in the 
present. According to Ricoeur ([1984] 2009), the historian Wilhelm Dilthey 
exemplified this approach. Although distinct from the first position, the second 
approach still supports the idea of the existence of a single reality, external to the 
historian, and consequently the presupposition of a representational relationship 
between this reality and the historian’s account (Munslow, 2007, p. 13). According to 
Munslow (2007, p. 14), this second approach has been very efficient and diligent in 
introducing innovative methods by which to understand historical evidence and in 
constructing frameworks that reveal and explain the evidence according to 
overarching theoretical structures. 
In contrast, the third approach, according to Munslow (2007), does not believe 
there is a correspondence between a past reality and the historian’s account because 
there is no single past reality to be accounted for, and as such, the historian is 
constructing not an explanation of reality but a narrative in written form. This does 
not constitute an account of the past but an account of the present knowledge of the 
past. As a result, such an account is a relativistic one, and in being so, it allows for 
“radical and experimental history practice” (ibid., p. 14). In the third approach 
therefore the past is an analogue, as the historian is able to access the past but only 
through the transformation of metaphorical associations; the past is metamorphosed 
into a familiar experience (Budd, 2009, p. 346). The past is represented, but only 
through allusion (ibid., p. 349). Ricoeur ([1984] 2009) points to Hayden White as an 
example of a historian who takes this third position. Accounting for the relationship 
between the historical text and the past, White ([1978] 2009, p. 358) says that “the 
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historical narrative does not image the things it indicates; it calls to mind images of 
the things it indicates, in the same way that a metaphor does”. By interpreting 
historical texts, the historian can discover the metaphorical constructions that were 
used and thus uncover the past through an understanding of language. However, in 
this conception of the past, its traces only exist within language, and for Ricoeur, this 
eliminates the possibility of the historian’s agency (Budd, 2009, p. 349). This notion 
is underlined by the belief that “meaning is generated through symbolic 
representation” (ibid., p. 348). 
 
 
The ambiguity of the past: problematics and strategies 
 
In order to understand the implications of these three positions in relation to the past 
as ambiguous and the making of history (to its writing), we need to understand their 
interaction with language, through such notions as text, narration, tropes and fiction – 
subjects that the linguistic turn of the twentieth century explored. Within this context 
discussions about the historical approach of historicism reveal to be crucial given the 
interplay that historicism prompts between the past, textual interpretation, historical 
writing and the present, that is implicated by the presence of the historian. However, 
and as a result of the differences emerging from the interplay, this approach is a 
multifaceted one and multiple understandings of its meaning exist. 
For Paul Hamilton ([1996] 2005, p. 2), historicism is “a critical movement 
insisting on the prime importance of historical context to the interpretation of texts of 
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all kinds”. Hamilton believes that historicism, although not new, is not the way 
history has always been done, and it emerges out of a critique of those practices that 
derive from the idea that there are a-priori principles ruling the lives of human beings. 
As a consequence, historicism developed most prominently as a criticism of idealist 
and evolutionist conceptions of the world that were informed by the emergence of the 
scientific paradigm in the seventeenth century, in which the world was seen as being 
structured according to an underlying set of rules, norms and laws. Historicism was a 
paradigm that became particularly important to Romanticism as it supported the idea 
that there was something greater in human beings that was both unreachable and 
immeasurable (Hamilton, [1996] 2005, p. 2). Consequently, history concerned the 
immeasurable in humanity, which nonetheless could still be accounted for through 
truth claims. However, with historicism, this meant that what surpassed the physical 
and measurable in humanity could only be found in textual accounts. 
Munslow ([2000] 2006) agrees with Hamilton’s position regarding 
historicism’s opposition to the scientific paradigm; for him, historicism defended the 
absence of a single reality, a universal structure that could be observed. According to 
Munslow ([2000] 2006, p, 140), historicism is the “act of perceiving historical periods 
in their own terms rather than any imposed by the historian”. This means that the 
historian should observe the evidence in its own context without imposing his/her 
own framework and context. This position then led to the understanding that each 
period informs its own system of knowledge and truth, and therefore there are 
multiple systems of knowledge production and truth, as otherwise they would be 
universal or transcendental.  
Frank Ankersmit, although agreeing with the notion that historicism opposes 
transcendentalism and the belief in universal truths, analyses it from a slightly 
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different position. For Ankersmit (2012, p. 1), “[h]istoricism ... is the view that the 
nature of a thing lies in its history”. As such, Ankersmit’s historicism is one in which 
the object of historical attention is generated throughout time, being the origin that is 
nevertheless always present in the object itself. Consequently, the time and process of 
this generation is present in the object as its ‘real’ nature, and history tells/presents 
this nature. This means that “phenomena are defined by their place in a process of 
development or change” (ibid., p. 10). 
 However, according to Ankersmit (2012, p. 10), the notion that things change 
throughout time has been radicalised in historicism to the point where there is not any 
longer a referent for what constitutes an object. The end result is an impossibility of 
delimitation, of setting its origins, of closure. As such, the identity of the historical 
object can only exist as an a-posteriori example through its recognition in the 
historical narration of its past. Thus, its history cannot be separated from the present, 
daily experiences of the historian (ibid., p. 2). This means there are no universal 
truths, as nothing can exist independently of its past and therefore of its formation. 
Thus, historicism is opposed to transcendentalism as things do not have a fixed and a-
priori ‘nature’, but there is also no correspondence between how we understand the 
world (or our knowledge of it) and the world itself.  
The idea that the history of something cannot be separated from the historian 
and his or her own daily experiences, according to Hamilton ([1996] 2005, p. 3), has 
led to a double suspicion of truth. Historicism is not only concerned with placing the 
object of research in context, but also in how the researcher’s understanding of it is 
dependent on the context in which they are working, hence the necessity for them to 
be aware of and to question how the research itself is biased. In addition, as Hamilton 
([1996] 2005, p. 3) points out, historicism has a double suspicion of presuppositions 
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and determining paradigms because it believes that not only does the research object 
lie in the text but also, because it does, the past needs to be understood and interpreted 
as text. Consequently, the role of the historian is to point out the places in which 
interpretation has consciously or unconsciously changed the meaning of the text, 
whether at the time of production or during other periods’ readings of it, including 
present-day ones (ibid.).  
Questioning historicism, Hamilton ([1996] 2005, p. 4) asks whether in fact this 
hermeneutical process is not a cyclical one, and therefore if historicism, in 
recognising this, is able to break the cycle and reach a “real meaning, unclouded by 
that original audience’s or any subsequent period’s ideology”. This problem is also 
raised by Munslow ([2000] 2006, p. 141) when he claims, “[w]hat is at issue with 
historicism is the question of epistemological relativism: how accurately can we 
represent the-past-as-history through our words and concepts in the here and 
now?” For Hamilton, historicism, particularly nowadays, seems to believe that these 
methods are able to break with ideology, exposing its true face, because they are 
informed by a postmodern suspicion of modernity’s faith that the ‘new’ can overcome 
the ‘old’. Nevertheless, this still does not address the problem of how to break the 
cycle of double suspicion, because even when the researcher recognises that he/she 
has their own assumptions, this does not prevent these assumptions from appearing in 
their work. Therefore, it is still necessary to find solutions that are able to show what 
is different in the researcher’s work in order to break out of the cycle. 
Agreeing with Hamilton, Munslow ([2000] 2006, p. 142) argues that the 
implication of assuming that it is not possible to give an accurate representation of the 
past is that history can become hostage to a linguistic understanding of meaning-
making and more about the multiple meanings to be found in the ‘text’. In such a 
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framework, “the essence of history is hermeneutic not factual, linguistic not empirical, 
fictive not real”, and as such it becomes impossible to fully access the past because 
“history is conceived in the historian’s mind, history is literature, and history is 
generated in here and now” (ibid.). 
According to Munslow, the ‘narrative turn’ (history’s version of the linguistic 
turn) has raised two questions that directly address the problematic that historicism 
raises. The first is whether the past constitutes a story that can be discovered (and 
therefore told); the second is whether the sequence of historical methodological 
operations – reference, explanation, meaning and its narrative presentation in prose – 
constitute all that is possible in terms of historical methodologies (Munslow, 2007, p. 
3). This has implications for the understanding of what a story and narration are in 
relation to the practice of history: “[a] story is the recounting of a sequence of events. 
This is what is told. Narration, on the other hand, refers to the manner in which a story 
is told” (ibid., p. 4), and this is an important distinction because how something is told 
or narrated is as important as what is being told.  
In his systematic enquiry into the relationship between history, story and 
narration, Hayden White makes a fundamental contribution to this discussion. As 
Budd (2009, p. 343) puts it, White is one of the most influential thinkers associated 
with the linguistic turn as he argues that historical writings are better understood 
through an artistic lens than a scientific one because history is pre-science. White 
states that “in refusing the real (which can only be symbolised, never represented) 
history refuses the possible, as it is precisely this refusal that prohibited history from 
becoming a modern science” (White, 2005, p. 147). Along with historicism, White 
asserts that it is not possible to omit the writer, the historian, when observing an 
historical text: the historian, in the process of research and writing, subjects the text to 
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interpretation and explanation because it is not transparent and needs to be understood 
in light of its linguistic structures (Budd, 2009, p. 344).  
For White history is a type of consciousness, and as such, the historian needs 
to be aware of how this consciousness is informed, how it is structured by the 
interventions made by all its contributors through their interpretations and subsequent 
writings (Budd, 2009, p. 344). Historical consciousness is thus the creation of a 
constructive cycle of interpretation and presentation (reading and writing). The 
historical text is subject to imagination and to the kind of construction of reality that 
literary tropes allow. However, Budd (2009, p. 344) alerts us to the fact that White did 
not think that historians were not able to uncover the past or that what they wrote was 
fiction; rather, because they convey their findings through writing, their work should 
also be considered as an imaginative and creative endeavour. Munslow (2007, p. 5) 
shares Budd’s perspective on White’s intervention. He believes that White does not 
argue that history is fiction; indeed, they cannot be equated as history respects the 
facts of the past. 
For White, therefore, interpretation is not just a question of comprehending the 
meaning, even a meaning, but is also the unconscious subjugation to structural 
linguistic and narrative norms. These norms are present not only when writing the 
historical text but also when reading (interpreting) historical documents. However, by 
using those same structures, the historian is also creating them. Consequently, 
historical narratives are partially invented and partially found (Budd, 2009, p. 345). 
As such, there is no generalisable and unchanging truth to be found in historical 
narratives. This position in relation to the historical text supports White’s claim that 
history is provisional and contingent.  
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For White the problem with not recognising the influence of linguistic and 
narrative structures is that the past comes to be seen as a narrative in itself (Budd, 
2009, p. 346). The constructed narrative of the historian is taken for the thing that it is 
trying to convey and thus the past is transformed into a linear and logical sequence of 
events and consequences. In order to avoid this, historians need to recognise the kind 
of construction used, and this has been the contribution of the linguistic turn: it 
provides a recognition of the rhetoric contained in a text (ibid., p. 347). Moreover, 
historians in their double role as both readers and writers excel in narrative strategies, 
and they are able to recognise a society’s episteme through the meta-narratives that 
support it, as the narrative strategies are widely known and embedded in a particular 
society’s fluency in narrative/storytelling/language (ibid.). The kind of stories told and 
their rhetoric has been rehearsed over and over throughout history. As such, the 
historical understanding and comprehension is not of the historical event itself but of 
its narratives. Because the practice of history is normally conducted through writing 
and reading, those histories that do not have linguistic foundations need to be 
‘completed’ through language or linguistic structures (ibid.). As such, White sees the 
linguistic turn as challenging “authoritative claims of historians both to understand 
and to communicate knowledge through language: it also leads us to reconsider the 
linguistic nature of our own historical understanding” (Budd, 2009, p. 345). 
However, it also reveals an inability to understand and generate historical accounts of 
the non-linguistic in the past, and this becomes reflected in social consciousness both 
at an epistemological and an ontological level. 
The visible parallels between historical narrative and fictional narrative expose 
the porous nature of these ontological categories, a fact that will be further explored in 
the second part of this chapter through the work of Yourcenar. Furthermore, the 
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investigation into the boundaries and interactions between past, history, 
representation, narrative and language has revealed the existence of a resistance to 
approaching history through means that are not textual or linguistic. In order to 
discuss how the past can also be accessed by means other than language, involving 
the study of materials in their own terms, we need to turn to the field of ‘media 
archaeology’. While accepting the general epistemological framework of the new 
historicism, media archaeology goes beyond the notion that artefacts can be read, and 
thus beyond historical analysis based on textual and linguistic strategies.  
In What is Media Archaeology?, Jussi Parikka (2012, p. 2) introduces the 
discipline as “a way to investigate the new media cultures through insights from past 
new media, often with an emphasis on the forgotten, the quirky, the non-obvious 
apparatuses, practices and inventions”.  Because of its use of digital media and 
technology – as well as its desire to have an active impact on contemporary media 
practices and culture – media archaeology is not only a theory but also a methodology 
(ibid., p. 5). However, despite its focus on digital media culture, media archaeology 
particularly studies the nineteenth century, as it regards this period as the “foundation 
stone of modernity in terms of science, technology and the birth of media capitalism” 
(ibid., p. 2). 
However, before discussing further the implications of media archaeology as a 
theory and a methodology, it is necessary to turn to the work of Michel Foucault. 
Arnold I. Davidson argues that Foucault’s methodology is grounded in the Anglo-
American tradition of analytic philosophy, which Foucault (cited in Davidson, 1997, 
p. 3) describes as a philosophy that “does not give itself the task of considering the 
being of or the deep structures of language; it considers the everyday use that one 
makes of language in different types of discourse”. Foucault then transposes this 
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understanding of analytic philosophy into one that can analyse the everyday 
interactions of society’s power players (ibid.). This philosophy, which is concerned 
with relationships and resists making statements about the ontology of language, 
comes from a position in which language is the element through which we 
understand, perceive and become conscious of the world. Davidson (1997) also points 
out that Foucault speaks of, discusses and uses the idea of structure, of being 
analytical, but without being a structuralist (highlighting his French influences); 
Foucault saw structuralism as a philosophy that was crystallised in the term ‘analytic 
reason’, and which he opposed to humanism, anthropology and dialectical thought. As 
such, Foucault (cited in Davidson, 1997, p. 7) tries to reveal the structures (the laws 
and determinations) that exist below the conscious level. Importantly for this thesis is 
the fact that Foucault, as Davidson (1997) shows, assumes that a structure from one 
epistemological framework can be transposed into another because they possess an 
underlying core of reality. 
In discussing Foucault’s position on structuralism, Roger Paden (1986) 
presents the Order of Things as a work with an overarching structure rather than a 
disconnected one, a structure that Foucault uses to criticise structuralism. According 
to Paden (1986), Foucault starts with an analysis of Velázquez’ Las Meninas in order 
to set up a discussion about representation as the modernist subject per se. Over the 
course of the book, he discusses the three sciences using a structuralist approach to 
construct these synchronic objects, and establishes a distinction between the classical 
age and modernism. This discussion reveals how, in the modern age, a problem with 
representation emerged that had not previously existed. Through Las Meninas, 
Foucault shows how the classical period recognised the different levels of 
representation, although they were not addressed directly, but indicated through 
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absence and “thus, the activity of representing, which makes knowledge possible, is 
not represented” (Paden, 1986, p. 23). However, if it was recognised during the 
classical age that the production of knowledge also carries invisibilities, in the modern 
period, which takes representation as its core subject, the activity of representation is 
no longer be seen as inaccessible (ibid.). Foucault, following an analogical strategy, 
argues that “if modern structuralism is similar to those sciences which were based on 
the classical episteme, and if it was impossible to represent the activity of 
representation within that structuralist episteme, then it might also be impossible for 
modern structuralism to represent this activity” (ibid.). As a consequence, the attempt 
to create a universal structure that would reveal the origin of a given object is 
condemned to failure (ibid.).  
Agamben (2010) situates the search for origins as an epistemological issue in 
Kant’s concept of an ‘archaeology’ of knowledge. Kant sought to construct a 
philosophical history of philosophy. However, according to Agamben (2010), he 
created a paradox by attempting to look to the past to trace such a history: it is not 
possible to find a first cause or origin in the past when the issue is the emergence of a 
thought or idea (philosophy), because reason cannot be situated historically. There is a 
constant present-ness in the role of the philosopher that cannot be historical. As such, 
for Agamben (2010), this is the source of Foucault’s problem with the issue of 
origins: how can we find this present-ness in the past? In terms of the history of ideas, 
how can we construct the historical object if it does not have an origin? 
According to Agamben (2010), Overbeck suggests that although we can look 
into history, there is also a pre-history. This is not something that is necessarily prior 
to history; rather, it is a set of conditions out of which the historical events arise 
(ibid.). Thus, it is possible to observe a displacement of origins into the idea of an 
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emergence of something, and how this emergence is constructed. As such, in 
discussing genealogies, Agamben (2010) makes a detour into psychoanalysis and 
Freud in order to discuss a subject that appears to engage all those who think about 
origins: what can this pre-history of history be? In other words, what is the conscious 
and the unconscious of history? Events happen at certain moments and may later be 
forgotten, but they still continue to play an active role in history and the making of 
history (ibid.). Thus Agamben (2010) alerts the historian to the presence of an 
unconscious in history; history is in a constant process of construction because 
everything is constantly being remembered and forgotten; history is a synchronicity of 
the unconscious and the conscious.  
Agambem (2010) goes on to say that archaeology is concerned with bringing 
this unconscious to the surface: archaeology is not about looking for an underlying 
universal structure that gives origin to both the continuous and the discontinuous, but 
instead is a process of observing how this unconscious is constantly present. 
Traditionally, archaeology has been seen as a process that looks for disruptions and 
creates discrete, isolated objects. This is generally thought to also be the Foucauldian 
method, but Agamben (2010) shows that Foucault may actually be criticising not only 
the continuous, the teleological, but also the discontinuous, the disruption model. He 
is seeking an integrated system and not observing either model in isolation. As such, 
the historian neither looks for disruptions nor a continuous narrative of cause and 
effect, but rather seeks to understand through the idea of the conscious and the 
unconscious how ruptures and continuities occur simultaneously.  
Foucault has therefore had a major influence on media archaeology because 
his work provides a methodology with which to research the multiple paths of 
existence that a discourse, idea, object or media takes (Parikka, 2012, p. 6). Another 
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important influence is that of Friedrich Kittler who, as Parikka (2012, p. 6) observes, 
applied Foucault’s method of researching written documents to investigating the 
emergence and persistence of media and material objects. Kittler also introduced the 
genealogical dimension of Foucault’s work into media archaeology, as the conditions 
of emergence of hidden or unconscious origins. This has led to the writing of 
alternative histories that run counter to the dominant narrative: media archaeology is 
able to use Foucault’s genealogical method to question the notion of a single origin 
and the idea of a teleological history (ibid., p. 13). The work of Walter Benjamin has 
also been highly influential in this field. His discussions on modernity have inspired 
several media archaeology studies considering what it means to be modern: 
questioning modernity’s paradigms, exploring the reasons for their persistence, and 
investigating their impact on cultures and ways of perceiving the world, particularly 
in the postmodern era (ibid., p. 7). The main areas of research using Benjamin’s 
framework have been nineteenth and early twentieth century technologies.      
As an important technology of modernity, film and cinema (and more recently 
television) has also been a key subject of research in media archaeology, particularly 
in the context of the discourse on non-narrativity and non-linearity. This is because 
the work in film studies, particularly since the 1990s, has highlighted the presence of 
unconscious dimensions in technology, and hence the presence of the past in the 
present (ibid., p. 5). As such, cinema (and its techniques) has proven a productive 
field in which to explore the multiplicity of media and multidimensionality of 
technologies in relation to the image and perception in more general terms. 
Building on these influences, media archaeology strives for new ways of 
understanding media and technology that diverge from the path of a linear 
understanding of history in which old technologies are seen as a part of the past that 
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has been overtaken by the new; instead, media archaeology looks at the old and the 
new as following parallel tracks (lines) (ibid., pp. 1-2). As such, it also has no interest 
in discovering a universal explanation or a grand theory about media; it is more 
interested in what falls outside the norm, the mainstream, and in ‘excavating’ paths 
previously unconsidered (ibid.). In order to excavate such paths through history, 
media archaeology conceives of time not as straight but in folds, sometimes leading to 
an overlap between past and present as the old is discovered and seen as new while 
the new is sometimes perceived as obsolete and old (ibid., p. 3). Thus, media 
archaeology questions the boundaries between past and present, old and new, to the 
point where the difference between old and new media and technologies becomes 
indistinct.  
To achieve this position, according to Parikka (2012), media archaeologists 
should position themselves in the middle, neither working as an historian nor 
observing only the new and emergent technologies and media, but instead seeing the 
interaction and dynamics between old and new as a complex system, and embracing 
it. Consequently, media archaeologists are not only interested in the past but also in 
the present and future, and in the multiple histories of the present. This concern with 
the present is part of the influence of Foucault who claimed that “all archaeological 
excavations into the past are meant to elaborate our current situation” (Parikka, 2012, 
p. 6) by asking such questions as “[w]hat is our present moment in its objects, 
discourses and practices, and how did it come to be perceived as reality?” (ibid., 
p.10). As such, the narratives that media archaeology writes are not only historical 
ones but also composite narratives, developed by researching the wider networks of 
influence behind the formation of technologies (ibid., p.11) and by using historical 
apparatuses to question the new and the present as well as the multiple histories of the 
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past. 
However, despite these general guidelines and positions, media archaeology 
does not have a uniform approach; it is not a single-voiced discipline. Rather, it is a 
set of practices developed by researchers with distinct disciplinary backgrounds using 
different paths and varied approaches. As such, it is a heterogeneous discipline in 
which media archaeologists define their own positions and approaches, develop their 
own methodologies – for instance, Siegfried Zielinski, who named his approach 
variantology. Zielinsky uses variantology to focus on the exploration of the deeper, 
more experiential, bodily and material dimensions of media, a position that, as a 
result, also embraces perspectives on how past and present media and technology is 
used in creative practices, particularly by artists (ibid., p. 12). With the inclusion of 
the arts, media archaeologists take the discussion of media and technology beyond the 
purely theoretical into a search for its applications, questioning what it means to 
create the ‘new’ (ibid.). As such, media archaeology is an approach and a 
methodology that is used not only by theoreticians but also by artists who “have been 
able to use themes, ideas and inspiration from the past media too” (ibid., p. 2). 
The fact that media archaeology is such an all-embracing field, encompassing 
so many researchers and practitioners from different fields and disciplines, means that 
its enquiries and the answers they reach lie outside a single disciplinary framework. 
This, however, does not mean that it rejects any of these disciplines; rather, it grounds 
its research in a multidisciplinary knowledge (ibid.). As such, media archaeology, 
according to Parikka (2012), situates itself in-between disciplines, as it draws from 
multiple fields in a transdisciplinary mode. Nonetheless, Parikka (2012, p. 15) argues 
that media archaeology is still a discipline in itself, albeit a ‘traveling’ one, as its 
themes are not located in any one specific place but in multiple places. 
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The Historical Novel: Memoirs of Hadrian and the Agency of Space 
 
The tension between historical fiction, fictional history and historical reality discussed 
by White (in the first section of this chapter) is exemplified by the work of Belgian-
French novelist and essayist Marguerite Yourcenar, specifically in her Memoirs of 
Hadrian ([1951] 2000). This book, which falls into the category of historical fiction, 
exposes the ambiguity of the past and shows how writing about history is always a 
process of engagement that reaches beyond the past to become a multidimensional 
enquiry, because – even if it does so unconsciously – it also performs the present. As 
such, Yourcenar exemplifies the flow and interaction between history and 
historiography, the challenge of understanding an event in its own context 
(historicism) and of writing as if living in the past. Memoirs of Hadrian provides a 
good example of such flow and interaction – and therefore of the multidimensional 
nature of history – from the point of view of historical fiction rather than that of 
history. This is because 1) the work starts from the historical sources; 2) the author 
embeds herself historically, as Yourcenar documents; 3) the work reflects upon the 
relationship between human beings and the past through its theme (the life-story of an 
emperor in his own words); and 4) the story, the idea, lingered with the author as a 
continuous, intimate presence over the thirty years it took to write, reflecting her own 
life/time/past and, in a way, becoming a book about Yourcenar herself. This history-
story therefore combines multiple dimensions of the ontology of the past and of 
history. As Yourcenar says: 
 
Those who put the historical novel in a category apart are forgetting that what 
every novelist does is only to interpret, by means of the techniques which his 
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period affords, a certain number of past events; his memories, whether consciously 
or unconsciously recalled, whether personal or impersonal, are all woven of the 
same stuff as History itself. (Yourcenar, [1951] 2000, p. 275) 
 
As such, Yourcenar ( [1951] 2000, p. 273) believed that to write historical fiction the 
author must “[d]o from within, the same work of reconstruction which the 
nineteenth-century archaeologists have done from without”. 
After a period of writing spanning almost thirty years, Memoirs of Hadrian 
was finally published in France in 1951. While it takes historical documents such as 
the Historia Augusta and Cassius Dio’s Historia Romana as its starting point, the 
book is a fictionalised biography of the Roman emperor Hadrian. The novel takes the 
form of a letter that Hadrian, who lived between 76 and 138 AD, is in the process of 
writing at the end of his life to his successor, Marcus Aurelius. As a work of historical 
reflection, this book is not only placed in a certain historical period – the end of 
Hadrian’s reign as emperor – but also takes as its starting point a particular historical 
idea: that there was a particular time when man ‘stood alone’, apart from the gods or 
from God. The understanding of this historical period lies at the core of the book, 
alongside the historical figure of Hadrian. But beyond Hadrian the historical person 
was Hadrian the man. As such, Yourcenar uses a temporal trick – playing with the 
notions of history, past, memory, historical character and individual being – by 
reducing the temporal span of her contact with the man to almost an instant (that is, 
the time it takes for Hadrian to inscribe his memories in a letter), while at the same 
time describing the historical time-line of an entire life. To show how she 
accomplished this, she explains her working methods: 
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Take a life that is known and complete, recorded and fixed by History (as much as 
lives ever can be fixed), so that its entire course may be seen at a single glance; 
more important still, choose the moment when the man who lived that existence 
weighs and examines it, and is, for the briefest span, capable of judging it. Try to 
manage so that he stands before his own life in much the same position as we 
stand when we look at it … (Yourcenar, [1951] 2000, p. 270) 
 
However, the difficulty of such a task is reflected in the author’s relationship 
with the book: she continually postponed its writing until she finally felt that she was 
old enough to attempt it. However, as Yourcenar ( [1951] 2000, p. 271) states, “[i]t 
took me years to learn how to calculate exactly the distances between the emperor 
and myself”. In the same way as Hadrian does, Yourcenar also grew older, and 
experienced both war and peace, and the diminishing gap between the two informed 
the character of Yourcenar’s Hadrian as he slowly developed over the years. 
Yourcenar ([1951] 2000, p. 269) accounts for the difficulties of his formation by 
saying, “I was not succeeding in my attempt to reconstruct that world as seen and 
heard by one man”. As a consequence, she felt the need to pursue a method that did 
not depend on the historical sources alone, developing a process that consisted of 
experiencing as much as possible of the traces his life. She describes spending the 
mornings … 
 
... at the Villa Adriana; innumerable evenings passed in small cafés around the 
Olympieion, the constant back and forth over Greek seas, [and the] roads of Asia 
Minor. In order to make full use of these memories of mine they had first to recede 
as far from me as is the Second Century. (Yourcenar, [1951] 2000, p. 270) 
 
As part of this process of ‘being’ (with) Hadrian, Yourcenar took with her into 
exile in the United States not only her notes for her reading at Yale and a map of the 
Roman empire at the time of Trajan’s death, but also a photograph of a statue of 
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Hadrian’s lover, Antinous. When distressed, she also found comfort in a Canaletto 
painting of Rome (ibid., p. 271). As if trying to retrieve lost memories out of a state of 
amnesia, Yourcenar supported the writing process by gazing at cherished works of art 
that carried multiple traces of or connections with Hadrian’s life. One example was a 
Piranesi engraving of Hadrian’s villa, which not only shows the villa itself, but 
through its depiction of Canopus’ chapel also refers to Hadrian’s relationship with 
Antinous, as this was the place where the statues of his lover, carved in the Egyptian 
style, once rested. Speaking of the engraving, Yourcenar declares: 
 
Piranesi, almost mediumistic, has truly caught the element of hallucination here: 
he has sensed the long-continued rituals of mourning, the tragic architecture of an 
inner world. For several years I looked at this drawing almost daily, without a 
thought for my former enterprise. (Yourcenar, [1951] 2000, p. 272)  
 
Yourcenar thus grew close to Hadrian through a process of embedding herself in his 
life, conflating their lives through a series of performative acts. As she says, “since 
one of the best ways to reconstruct a man’s thinking is to rebuild his library, I had 
actually been working for years, without knowing it, to refurbish the bookshelves 
at Tibur in advance” (ibid., p. 273). 
This represented a sort of appropriation of Hadrian’s life, but one in which the 
traces of Hadrian – of either the real or the fictitious man – appropriated Yourcenar in 
turn. The process that Yourcenar developed in order to get close to Hadrian and to 
write about him is one that not only goes beyond the historical sources, but also 
beyond representation – it is a performed process, one that works through affect, 
emotion and the body. This process – the search for a state of production beyond the 
factual and rational – is one that can also be seen in Warburg’s work (discussed in the 
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preamble to the second part of the thesis), and is fundamental to a concept of space in 
which its multidimensionality can be expressed in a methodological device. 
Yourcenar describes such a process in the following way: 
 
[A]kin to controlled delirium … and yet this term delirium smacks too much of 
romanticism; let us say, rather, a constant participation, as intensely aware as 
possible, in that which has been … one foot in scholarship, the other in [the] 
magic arts, or more accurately and without metaphor, absorption in that 
sympathetic magic which operates when one transports oneself, in thought, into 
another’s body and soul. (Yourcenar, [1951] 2000, p. 275) 
 








Text [(Yourcenar, [1951] p. has been removed due to 
Copyright restrictions 	  
	   185	  
For Yourcenar, it is possible to shorten the distance that separates the 
centuries. She understands, in the process of telling Hadrian’s story, that it registers 
the same losses as does her own biography: Hadrian’s lapses of memory mimic those 
of Yourcenar. How is the author to speak of her own life without transferring the 
same faults and losses when relating someone else’s, regardless of the time that 
separates them? What does the author know about herself, about those she has spent 
her life with and those whom she only knows through history and the appropriation of 
their historical traces? How is the author to delimit, to trace a separating line between 
all these lives, to know their origins, their genesis? To shorten the historical distance, 
Yourcenar discovered she needed to merge with the life of Hadrian – a process that 
goes beyond the rational or conscious and becomes performative and affective, deeply 
engrained in the body. Hadrian becomes one of her acquaintances, even one of her 
relatives; the letters and documents that Yourcenar receives, organises and destroys 
are not only those relating to her own life, but also to Hadrian’s. Amongst the letters 
from her friends and relatives is the letter that Hadrian wrote, or that she is re-writing 
for Hadrian (that is, the book).  
This is an intimate process, one of introspection. Yourcenar describes a 
process in which the writer of history is present in the history/story, as the past is 
‘time recaptured’ by the writer in his/her ‘inner world’ (ibid., p. 276). Time is no 
longer a limiting determinant, separating people – it stops being a matter of time, as 
the temporal distance is transformed simply into distance, a malleable line that can be 
twisted, curved and cut at will. Thus, accessing the past is no longer a process of 
walking along the straight line of time, but one of drawing a line – whether linear, 
non-linear, continuous or discontinuous – which constitutes itself in the interaction 
and exchanges between the writer and what is being written/researched. And drawing 
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a line, as seen in Chapter One, is a spatial process. 
By accepting the freedom from truth and fact that fiction bestows, Yourcenar 
– although aiming for historical authenticity – was able to work through the small 
details that ornament a life, gaining the leverage to infuse Hadrian with life. This life 
is not necessarily Hadrian’s, or not only his, but also the lives of the many other 
people Yourcenar has experienced her life with or through. In such a process (one that 
is not so much about placing yourself in the past or travelling to the past but one in 
which past and present cease to be the opposite end-points of a straight line), to what 
degree does Hadrian, the character, become closer to a ‘truer’ unravelling of the real 
life of someone long dead? ‘Truer’, that is, not just in terms of portraying the life of 
Hadrian, about which few written documents survive (allowing room for other 
documents beyond the written one, other strategies of enquiry), but also 
historiographically ‘truer’, because it recognises and expresses this very interaction, 
creating a meshwork of lives. As it is a novel, this account is open about the presence 
of the writer, alerting the reader to the fact that this is possibly not the life of Hadrian, 
but a life of Hadrian. However, in disclosing the presence of the writer, who 
permeates and blends with the life of the historical person, the work puts forward the 
idea that history may not be about tracing the origin of a past event: there are shared 
dimensions of existence that cut through the past, allowing the notions of past and 
present to dissolve into each other seamlessly. 
The interaction between and malleability of past and present through the 
dissolution of the limits of time opens the way for space to work alongside 
imagination, creating a ‘bastard’ order and epistemology that merges different times, 
experiences and beings. To explore this further, the chapter turns to an excerpt from 
the fourth chapter of Memoirs of Hadrian, ‘Saeculum Aureum’, which demonstrates 
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Yourcenar’s approach to the writing of historical fiction. This thesis proposes that 
Yourcenar makes Hadrian mimic the process she follows when constructing his 
character: she allows him to trespass across time to be with other historical figures 
from earlier eras. This process requires a concept of space that sees it as not only 
multidimensional, but also possessed of agency – that is, as alive and productive. 
This extract is composed of two paragraphs, each of which (this chapter 
argues) corresponds to a distinct kind of physical, ‘real’ space. Both of these spaces 
are understood to inform our notions of place and site, as discussed earlier in Chapter 
One, but although they are close to each other, they are always separate, sitting side 
by side, in the same way as the statues of the Colossus in the excerpt. However, just 
as the Colossus is one monument, so these two spaces are the same: they exist in 
exactly the same location. One is the historical site, the site of the monument (the 
formal inscribed word), and the other is the place of quotidian practices, the place of 
the ephemeral (the anonymous scribbled word). 
The excerpt is preceded by the arrival of the emperor, his wife and their suite 
at the Colossus of Memnon in Thebes, Egypt. The monument was built around 1350 
BC and carried the legend that at each dawn a sound would emanate from one of its 
two statues: 
 
Text [(Yourcenar, [1951] 2000, pp. has been removed due to 
Copyright restrictions	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In the first paragraph, the visitor arrives at the site, passes through, and leaves 
after the visit. During the visit they can see the formal written words, even hear about 
the people to whom these names belonged, their kingdoms and deeds; however, one 
visitor – in this case the emperor – feels alienated from these inscribed lives. There is 
no living person behind the name, even if something is known about that person; the 
word has lost its meaning, its potential to be affective, mimicking the statues that do 
not move or breathe and whose blood does not flow. However, the cause of the 
emperor’s emotionless state might not be the apparently disembodied facades of the 
elements that comprise the site, but more the framework in which they exist. Thus, it 
is not so much the fact that they are discrete entities (with the names A, B or C or site 
X or Y) that causes alienation as the fact that they are only seen as pieces of a past 
with a beginning and an end, a past with no relation to the present. 
At the same time, this is not a strange subversion of knowledge in which the 
historical site stops having historical meaning and of being active in the present. 
There are still priests there, who continue the practices related to the site and who 
perform the rituals in which the emperor engages. However, possibly because he is 
aware that too much is unknown or forgotten, the little that is known about these 
historical figures does not seem to match the importance and weight of their names. It 
is not possible to reconcile the social, political and religious past of the site with the 
present social, political and religious practices. The existence of the site is thus 
conflicted: as a historical site it has become devoid of life, even though it has parallel 
lives running alongside it. It is dead while still alive. Somehow, this place is too full 
of meaning, yet this renders it void. 
The second paragraph, however, brings a lightness to the place – because it is 
a place of the quotidian where the present needs to exist, it is lightened by 
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disinvesting it of history. Whatever happens in the historical place becomes present or 
meaningful, affective. Objects that were previously inert become activated, or at least 
they are affected by a different kind of activation. The past becomes not present or 
visible but immanent through a process by which the multiple categories of life, 
being, monument, memory, past and present are suspended. They are exposed as 
existing on the same plane, and the emperor inhabits the same space as those whose 
names are written on the Colossus. 
This could be discussed through analysing the different effects, for instance, of 
printed versus handwritten inscriptions; however, the focus here is how the same 
location becomes open to imagination through the conflict, conflation and dissolution 
of spatial dimensions – that is, through the existence of a potential physical dimension 
of space that activates the process whereby the historical site becomes a historical 
place. It is not only the awareness that others have lived and constructed monuments 
here, but that the owners of the names in the inscriptions have been on that very same 
location. This gives the visitor the thrill of materiality, a materiality that has crossed 
history and that bears its traces. Behind and beyond, past and present coexist. There is 
no longer an inside and an outside as these categories have dissolved.  
Although this suspension of categories is represented in the novel by the 
emperor pausing to rest, this is not a temporal suspension. The site/place becomes a 
space, and through his imagination Hadrian is freed of temporal barriers and is able to 
connect with different times. It therefore becomes meaningful that Hadrian himself 
eschews immortality by avoiding the practice of inscribing his name on new 
monuments: by avoiding the imprint of his name he is bypassing the process that 
leads a gesture or practice in the present to become a monument in an historical site. 
In this way, he anticipates that others in the future will be able to know him without 
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having access to written documents – or even to his name. The emperor will continue 
to live through his anonymous presence in the imaginary space created by his moment 
of rest. This is an anonymous immortality that can only be unlocked through affect 
and performance, in the way that Yourcenar does in writing her novel. Most 
importantly for this thesis, this unlocking has occurred in multiple dimensions, 
activated by a spatial agency – an activity that will be explored in the second part of 





By putting in place the idea of the corral as a strategy to approach space that takes it 
outside the framework of disciplines traditionally seen to have has their object of 
research space, as well as existing contexts of discussion of space, it was possible to 
deepen the understanding on space by better understanding its productive potential 
within a methodological context. 
Displacing the problematic of space to a discussion of the ontology of the past 
as an ambiguous entity, to observe how history, or more specifically historiography, 
has reconciled such ambiguity with its own research processes and making revealed 
how the ambiguity of an entity does not need to be simplified or dismantled. It is 
possible to inform a research framework that instead embraces such ambiguity when 
the entity being researched is observed in its complexity; as something with a multi-
dimensional existence that is contingently informed through non-linear temporal 
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interactions in a process of co-constitution with the environment in which is present at 
each moment. In order to research this complexity notions as the non-linearity and 
discontinuity of existence and therefore of the history of the entity need to be 
included, leading to non-teleological approaches. Within this context the object of 
research can be observed as not having a single and determined origin — a beginning 
without beginning — being its existence always contingent and provisional, while at 
the same time constituting a single entity.  
This framework opens a path for this thesis to continue the research into the 
ontology of space without placing it historically — without observing and 
contextualizing the changes and fluctuations of meaning throughout time, or to have a 
specific periodization. While putting forward a framework of research that does not 
situate its object historically, and yet not making it a-historical and universal, this 
chapter has also shown that such research can be done through historical artefacts and 
materials themselves, because they are still alive in the present. Media archaeology 
draws from this perspective as discussed previously, but most vividly, the agency of 
historical artefacts, places, ideas and even imaginaries has been revealed through the 
speculative exploration of Yourcenar’s work and her descriptions of it. Through this 
speculative exploration it was possible to observe the presence of affective, 
imaginative and even emotional dimensions at work within a research context; 
further, their importance to more fully access the object of enquiry, particularly when 
at stake is an ambiguous entity. As such, this speculative exploration calls upon a 
framework of research that is informed by a non-representational epistemology and 
ontology that while being based on performativity, affect and experience; necessarily 
including the subjective dimension of the enquirer, is still conceptually rigorous, and 
inclusive of abstract and metaphysical concerns. A framework that maintains a 
	   192	  
perverse attitude towards knowledge systems: a bastard epistemology as discussed in 
Chapter Two. An epistemology that accepts and travels through the multiple 
dimensions of an object of research integrating them by making them interact and 
interplay, as historical fiction can do, but that (and in addiction) can also work outside 
narrative, or through multiple narratives. 
While this chapter has presented frameworks and strategies to research an 
ambiguous entity, that of space, through an analogy with the past, it has also revealed 
crucial dimensions of space that are fundamental to understand and activate the 
productive potential of space. The speculative exploration of Yourcenar’s Memoirs of 
Hadrian brought to surface how space is multiply implicated in historical research 
and accounts, as understandings and conceptualisations of space are necessary to 
inform a research framework through its affective and experiential dimension, a 
dimension that McEwen and Kristeva had already pointed to though their work with 
khora. Therefore, space emerges as having methodological purchase, not only through 
an abstract, conceptual, dimension, as that seen on Chapter One while informing 
research structures (topologies). As such, space is multiply implicated in the 
constitution of research methodologies; further, that space not only has 
methodological purchase but is also agential in the constitution of understandings and 
experiences, emotions and abstractions of an human interaction with the world. The 
consequence of this multiple methodological purchase is that space can recursively 
research itself, informing a mise-en-abyme as discussed on chapter two. 
Chapter Three therefore makes the bridge between the first two chapters and 
the second part of this thesis in which the mise-en-abyme of space, or the notion that 
space as a methodological device can also construct itself in its ontological debate and 
investigation. Through this chapter it has been shown how space not only is already 
	   193	  
emplaced within research methodologies through the constitution of frameworks, 
structures, of research, as those developed to approach the past in the formation of 
historical accounts, but also how space has methodological purchase when 
researching through non-representational contexts, thus in accessing through 
experience and affect, enacting objects of research. This realisation is particularly 
important to allow the mise-en-abyme to take place, as the mise-en-abyme needs to 
work through the multiple existences and complexity of space, traveling through the 
multiple dimension and understandings of space and maintaining and exploring its 
ambiguity in order not to become tautological but recursive. This strategy therefore 
emerges as fundamental to access and enquire an entity that being ambiguous is also 
unrepresentable and inaccessible through description or linguistic models and 
strategies as discussed on Chapter Two. A path is therefore opened for the second part 
of this thesis to explore the ontology of space by using a spatially informed strategy 
that is not linguistically based, but visually and aesthetically driven; to research space 
through the diagram. 
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Preamble to Part Two 
 
The second half of this thesis develops another side of the argument by enlarging on 
the question raised in Chapter Three: how is it possible to research the ontology of 
space if space is presented, and to some extent presents itself, as an ambiguous, 
unrepresentable conundrum? Proceeding from the third chapter, the second part of the 
thesis addresses the tension of the rarefied boundaries between history and fiction, 
particularly the point at which some of these boundaries, such as linearity, causality 
and the necessity of the idea of an origin, are broken. If all these limits are removed 
what is there for us to research through history or its archaeological artefacts? What 
questions can we investigate in the potentiality of its traces and what can be 
constructed from them? What are the multiple histories or narratives that can be told?  
Chapters Four and Five therefore comprise the final discussion of the thesis, 
answering the questions posed by the first part. However, the discussion in the first 
chapters also suggested the need to approach the question of space through practice – 
that is, from a performative and enacted point of view – particularly in order to 
explore the notion of the diagram in greater depth, investigating the materiality or 
levels of existence of space through the affective materiality of visual materials. This 
second part is therefore separated from the first as it goes beyond a discussion of how 
to research space and puts into practice and experiments with a method (or way of 
doing) that could be described as a multi-faceted artistic research practice. If the first 
part has shown that space needs to be researched in a different way, the second part 
puts forward a way of approaching space that explores its ontology as a productive 
device. As such, the following final two chapters constitute the second part of a piece 
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of experimental research, using images and text to explore the ontology of space and 
to observe how a research practice can be challenged by moving into a spatially 
oriented epistemology.  
The visual and textual work presented here results from an investigation that 
deals dialectically and heuristically with visual resources, textual academic production 
and a visual and theoretical reflection on structures through the notion of the diagram. 
This practice, however, should not be seen as an ‘art work’, but as the result of the 
application of artistic research methods to the questions raised in this thesis. As such, 
it is not only the continuation of the enquiry into the ontology of space, but also a 
continuation of the question of how space can be used productively through the 
application of visual methods that are intimately related with artistic practice and 
experimentation – the area in which the specific expertise of the author of this thesis 
lies. This question rests on the hypothesis that space can be also considered as a 
methodological device.  
Despite the unity and integrity of the visual and textual work, the discussion 
and presentation of this research experimentation is extended over the next two 
chapters, with each making a distinct contribution to the overall argument. The reason 
for this division is to clarify the discussion of the visual work by separating out two of 
its dimensions: each comprises a version of the multiplicity of ways in which this 
visual work explores the questions of the thesis. Chapter Four addresses the concept 
of the diagram and how, as a methodological device, it can be regarded as a 
constituent part of space, while Chapter Five attempts to use this methodological 
device to research the ontology of space. As such, these last two chapters present the 
moment in which space as a methodological device is revealed and put into practice; 
in other words, it is where the work of the thesis is completed and its questions 
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explored through an enactive epistemology This experimental research reveals how 
space constructs itself, how a recursive ontology exists in which space, in both its 
physical and conceptual aspects, constructs what it is or can be at any given moment. 
It reveals space as a mise-en-abyme and a ‘bastard’ entity. 
In developing the research experiment presented in the following chapters in 
answer to the questions posed in the first part of the thesis, this section – in particular 
the creation of the visual work – draws inspiration from the last work of the art 
historian Aby Warburg: the Mnemosyne Atlas. Through the Mnemosyne Atlas, 
Warburg found a way of exploring his own questions and anxieties concerning 
contemporary practices of research in history and art history. As such, this preamble 
connects the first and second parts of the thesis – particularly as a continuation of the 
discussions held in the third chapter – by drawing attention to Warburg’s specific 
approach to the study of the art and visual materials of the past. The thesis therefore 
now turns to an analysis of Warburg’s ‘method’ and his Mnemosyne Atlas, 




The Art Historian Aby Warburg and the Mnemosyne Atlas 
 
Aby Warburg was an historian of art at the turn of the 20th century. However, as 
Woodfield (2001, p. 260) highlights, an historian of art is differs from an art historian. 
For the former, art is not necessarily the subject of investigation but a means to 
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research an historical, social or cultural event or idea, a notion that better suits 
Warburg as he was more interested in other dimensions of culture and the past than in 
the artistic one alone (ibid.). In addition, he also believed that works of art could not 
explain themselves. In order to reach them, it was necessary to navigate a web of 
knowledge and theories; it was necessary to resort to multiple disciplines (ibid., p. 
261). For Warburg, art as such was not simply a subject for research, but it was also a 
means, a resource to be explored as part of the process of answering questions related 
to the historical, social and cultural dimensions of being, particularly its psychological 
dimensions. Warburg was especially interested in the psychology behind the artistic 
process and not in the study of art per se (Ostrow, 2001, p. 2). 
Warburg researched the psychological dimension of different modes of 
thought and culture, but he directed most of his intellectual energy towards exploring 
the persistence of pagan reasoning in Western society (Woodfield, 2001, p. 260). As 
Gombrich says: 
 
By ‘paganism’ as we know, Warburg meant a psychological state, the state of 
surrender to impulses of frenzy and of fear. It was this fateful heritage he meant to 
study, and in this quest he freely identified the life of the individual and that of the 
collective mind. The drama of the revival of these impulses that had been dormant in 
the collective memory is mainly played out on the stage of the Renaissance. 
(Gombrich, [1970] 1986, p. 308) 
 
As a consequence, Warburg’s research reveals the psychological aspects of art and the 
conditions underlying its emergence, and is not concerned with the mapping of a 
linear evolution of modes of representation or analysis of the conventions controlling 
artistic production in a specific period (Woodfield, 2001, p. 278) – subjects that had 
exclusively engaged art historians up till then. By contrast, according to Gombrich 
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([1970] 1986, p. 185), Warburg defended that multiple styles could be found within a 
single period, the product of different psychological states. As a result, Warburg was 
not interested in the past per se, or in the reconstruction of an historical period; he 
distanced himself from historicism and the notion of the ‘spirit of an age’ (Rampley, 
2001, p. 305). Instead, he investigated the interaction between past and present, and 
both the synchronic and the diachronic (Ostrow, 2001, p. 4). 
However, such an interest in the psychological dimension of artistic creation 
should not be understood as standing in opposition to the study of a society’s culture 
in a certain historical period. The aim was not to understand and explain an artist’s 
individual psychological motivations; rather, it was to understand the oppositional 
forces that drove the civilisation the artist emerged from, because, as Rampley (2001, 
p. 317) notes, Warburg conflated the genesis of the individual with that of the group, 
as he recognised these as part of the same process. For Warburg, a civilisation was the 
product of the distance but also the interplay between the primal experiences and 
compulsions that guided the world (‘paganism’) and human reason. At times, reason 
was confronted with the resurfacing of these primal drives (ibid., p. 313), drives that 
Warburg thought were particularly visible within artistic works, due to the fact that 
the thinking behind his aesthetic understanding was a combination of theories of 
empathy and collective psychology (ibid., p. 315). He believed that civilisation is 
therefore built on the construction of the distance, or interval, between the mimetic 
impulse and its differentiation from (or negation by) the driving forces behind it. An 
awareness of the existence of a past contributes to the creation of such a gap (ibid., p. 
316). As Ostrow (2001, p. 3) states, Warburg thought it was possible to find the 
polarities that exist between the individual and the society in which the individual 
lives in the space between the symbolic representation and the actual event.  
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In the artistic domain, such an understanding of civilisation was converted into 
a search for the interval between a system of forces that included the preservation of 
the past through mimetic or symbolic representation – or the negation of the past 
through transformation or semiotic representation – and the subjectivities of both 
artist and spectator (Rampley, 2001, p. 306). In order to understand this system of 
forces, Warburg paid special attention to the detail within works of art as the place of 
the encounter between the rational and the irrational, the conscious and the 
unconscious, or the place where it was possible to understand and observe culture as a 
dynamic process in which associations exist not only in cultures of the same epoch 
but across different epochs (ibid.). For Warburg, the detail in a work of art could thus 
be understood as the element that allowed him to ‘measure’ the distance between 
these polarities and through analogy to observe their symbolic transformation over 
time and space (Vidal, 2009, p. 11). Warburg called the observation of this system of 
forces through the study of works of art the ‘iconology of the interval’, and this is 
commonly understood as his method, despite both Gombrich’s and Bing’s resistance 
to the use of such term (Woodfield, 2001, p. 260). However, this implies that 
Warburg retained an underlying belief in representation, which despite being an 
energised one, was still driven by the notion of duplication/representation and not by 
the processes of enaction and performance – which this thesis argues are essential 
prerequisites. 
In order to develop his research, Warburg had to look on the image not as a 
product of art but as an archive of the collective memory of the past, and – as with an 
archive – although the things placed in it are accessible, this does not imply they 
possess a continuity or a universality of meaning. Instead, for Warburg, this archive 
was a changing one that nonetheless sustained a connection with its original meaning 
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(Ostrow, 2001, p. 2) or with the emergence of meaning in bodily expression and 
affectivity by means of the symbol. As Rampley states:  
 
The heart of his theory rests on the notion that visual symbols function as archives of 
the mental state of the producer. Hence a whole range of cognitive and emotional 
states somehow imprint themselves on the visual symbol, in the form of ‘pathos 
formula’, the term he used to denote representation of the bodily expression of human 
affectivity. (Rampley, 2001, p. 319)  
 
According to Rampley (2001), as Warburg believed the symbol to be connected to a 
state of primal fear, to its pagan roots, exposure to it would open the viewer up to the 
kind of affective experience that led to its emergence. The continued presence of its 
pagan roots would allow a person (that is, an art historian), through the relationships 
that exist between an image and the context of its existence, to perceive the primal 
reasoning in both the individual creator and their society (Ostrow, 2001, p. 4). 
However, as Vidal (2009, p. 3) points out, Warburg’s ‘pathos formula’ is not a 
universal or archetype; instead, it is an event that can be localised in time and space as 
an emotional and artistic response, triggered by the confrontation with a similar 
human experience that has been passed down from generation to generation, with 
different levels of intensity and transformation. As such, Warburg was not searching 
for the universal in human action and expression, but for the patterns and systems that 
inform them, exploring how this becomes part of the collective consciousness through 
images – in other words, he was searching for the conscious and unconscious 
treatment that artistic depiction gives to a past era, which, although it informs the 
depiction, does not carry the same meaning (Rampley, 2001, p. 306). Such an 
understanding of images and symbols was to have great consequences for art history 
as it meant that Warburg saw any kind of image as relevant to his research. 
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Furthermore, he believed that the importance of an image or symbol did not lie in its 
artistic value, which a connoisseur could determine, but in …  
 
… the manner in which it continued to enact, or reproduce (or reference) its earlier 
content (world view) via the complex network of relationships that over time had 
come to be encoded in its form. In other words, the image world as formulated by 
Warburg consists of rhetorical devices that are combined and recombined in manners 
that both indicate changing mindsets as well as passing fashions. (Ostrow, 2001, pp. 
4-5) 
 
Warburg’s understanding of psychology and culture led him to understand the 
image and the symbol in a very particular way (as discussed above), which had 
important repercussions not only on his views of and attitudes towards art, but also on 
his research practices. This set of practices, although possibly not developed with the 
intention of creating a method, nevertheless came to be known as the ‘Warburg 
method’ by later generations – not without dispute, however, as seen above. This 
method generally took the name of ‘iconology’. However, and maybe because 
Warburg never presented it as a method, iconology was subject to misunderstanding – 
it was frequently conflated with ‘iconography’, mainly due to the work of Warburg’s 
disciple Erwin Panofsky, who developed iconography. According to Panofsky (cited 
in Woodfield, 2001, p. 263), iconography was the study of the general reasoning of an 
epoch, expressed in the symbols of a given historical period, as distinct from 
iconology, which comprised the search for the original ‘image’ that led to later 
transformations or “the interaction of forms and contents in the clash of traditions” 
(Gombrich, [1970] 1986, p. 313). Rampley (2001, p. 304) therefore alerts us to the 
fact that Warburg’s and Panofsky’s methods differ from each other at the level of the 
formation of meaning: “While iconology analyses the unconscious assumption of 
symbolic codes and meanings, [iconography] tend[s] to focus on the conscious artistic 
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use of symbols and conventions”. The difference in the treatment and understanding 
of the symbolic lies at the level of its agency: for Warburg, symbols were not lifeless 
abstractions but the result of primal human experience (Woodfield, 2001, p. 267), part 
of a continuum of exchanges with the world, giving them vitality, because symbols 
are always active in the process of transformation in a given civilisation. 
Consequently, for Warburg, the viewer of a symbolic representation stands in the 
presence of the tensions between the individual and their society, and between the 
irrational and the rational, while for Panofsky, the viewer is in the presence of an ‘a-
historical embodiment’ (ibid. p. 263). 
The ontological differences in Warburg’s and Panofsky’s understanding of the 
symbol were reflected in their research practice, particularly in the way they each saw 
the interaction of image and text. Woodfield (2001, p. 263) says that, with Panofsky’s 
iconography, the emphasis was on the transformation of the artistic motifs, and thus 
on how an image informs the text through its interaction with it. However, Warburg 
was more interested in an approach that proceeded from the text to the image. The 
difference in his understanding of the ontology of image and symbol, in combination 
with his epistemological approach to the image, led Warburg to search for novel ways 
in which to conduct research through the image, ultimately culminating in his last 
project: the Mnemosyne Atlas.  
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Figure g – Warburg’s Library with the Mnemosyne Atlas 
 
The Mnemosyne Atlas was left unfinished at the time of Warburg’s death in 
1929. In its last form, the Atlas is composed of sixty-three panels, each containing a 
set of images. The panels can be divided into two sets according to their labels: three 
have alphabetic labels (namely, a, b and c) and sixty have numerical ones. As such, 
the three alphabetically labelled panels can be taken as an introduction to or 
presentation of the subject of the research (Gombrich, [1970] 1986, p. 292), and the 
other panels as the exploration of the subject. According to Gombrich ([1970] 1986, 
p. 283), the subject comprised the interconnections between the two main themes of 
Warburg’s interests, “the vicissitudes of the Olympian gods in the astrological 
tradition and the role of the ancient pathos formulae in post-mediaeval art and 
civilization”. The panels were made of wood, measuring approximately 150cm x 
200cm, and were covered with black cloth, allowing Warburg to arrange and 
rearrange black and white photographs of works of art, maps, manuscripts, 
contemporary images drawn from newspapers and magazines, and cosmographic 
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images (Johnson, 2013) by pinning them to the wooden boards. This method of 
working with images gave Warburg the possibility of constantly developing new 
combinations (Gombrich, [1970] 1986, p. 284), helping him think through and 
structure the argument carried by each individual panel, as well as the overall 
argument. Gombrich ([1970] 1986, p. 284) puts the need for this development in 
Warburg’s research down to his growing dissatisfaction and sense of disquiet with the 
linearity of the narrative in his presentations, because as far as Warburg was 
concerned, the complexity of the subject needed to be researched both synchronically 
and diachronically (as discussed above). Even in his earlier research, Warburg would 
use notes to “[map] out these complex relationships in diagrammatic form” (ibid.). In 
this context, the panels were primarily used as the basis for his investigations and to 
support his presentations and lectures; however, he also planned to publish the 
Mnemosyne Atlas. In fact, Johnson (2013) notes, “he planned to supplement a volume 
of plates with two volumes of text, containing historical and interpretive material. 
However, as he left the Atlas at the time of his death, the balance of word and image 
is decidedly tilted toward the latter.”   
Nonetheless – and despite the text that accompanied the panels – the emphasis 
was on the images and their interrelations, using these as a trigger for the viewer to 
experience the “same intensity to the images of passion or of suffering, of mental 
confusion or of serenity, as he had done in his work” (Gombrich, [1970] 1986, pp. 
287-288), thus emplacing his notion of the image, the symbol and the ‘pathos 
formula’. The idea of emplacing his theories through the process of working with the 
panels in the formation of the Mnemosyne Atlas can also be observed in the 
interaction between the title of Warburg’s project, his theories and the overall subject 
of the Mnemosyne Atlas. ‘Mnemosyne’ directly refers to the way in which the notion 
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of memory could be materialised in the archive of images (as discussed above). 
However, two references can be found in the word ‘atlas’, each of them related to the 
two co-existing uses of the word.  
The first use of the word ‘atlas’ denotes a collection of maps, intended to order 
the geographic, political, social, economic and cultural knowledge of a certain period, 
informing and presenting a particular understanding of the world. Through the use of 
the word ‘atlas’ Warburg pointed towards the formal aspect of his project, using the 
term to indicate the multiplicity of plates (panels), each of them – as a collection of 
images – mapping a specific sub-theme but all addressing the same subject through 
their interrelationships. In addition, he drew attention to the relevance of the map – 
which is not only used as a resource in some of the panels, but also as an indication of 
spatial (and temporal) exchanges – as well as to the activity of mapping itself 
(‘diagramming’) as a research strategy. ‘Atlas’, however, is also the name of the titan 
in Greek mythology who was forced to carry the heavens on his shoulders as a 
punishment. From this perspective, the word functions as a placeholder for the 
combination of myth, gods, the heavens and astrology (that is, the mythical) with a 
logical understanding of the heavens in the form of astronomy. As Gombrich states 
when presenting panels b and c:  
 
[t]he idea of cosmic harmony was to be carried forward on the next plate in visual 
reminders of the debasement of this profound thought in fortune-telling, and of its 
exaltation and triumph in Kepler’s speculations which led to man’s understanding of 
the laws of the heavens. (Gombrich, [1970] 1986, p. 292) 
 
Consequently, the word ‘atlas’ not only carried forward the main subject of the 
project, but also pointed towards the notion of polarity that Warburg used to indicate 
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the multiple opposing forces present in a symbol or image. As such, what initially 
may seem unrelated – the two notions of ‘atlas’ – come together as each of the 
denotations reveal and unfold a dual understanding and practice of the cosmological. 
To conclude, the Mnemosyne Atlas is a mapping of associations and 
interactions at the level of the image and at the level of the sub-themes presented in 
each panel, which constitute the whole argument. This is an argument that Warburg 
continued to develop throughout his life and so it comes as no surprise that some of 
his early papers and presentations are also part of the Mnemosyne Atlas (Gombrich, 
[1970] 1986, p. 299). However, because he understood the drive behind his lifelong 
research concerns as a complex system of forces, this complexity also led Warburg to 
regard his questions as far from self-evident – they could only have attempted 
answers – and therefore he emphasised the necessity of proposing a series of 
hypotheses and solutions to be tested against a background of social interactions 
(Gombrich, [1970] 1986). This notion of a working process that is not finished and 
definite, but open and constantly in transformation, as described by Spyros 
Papapetros’ (2012), is the construction of a mosaic through accessories, or details, 
“fragmentary compilations of philological ‘addenda’ whose perpetual accumulation 
maintains the textual fabric in a perennial form of incompletion, yet constantly in 
motion, and anxiously alive” (p. xiii); a process of research that the Mnemosyne Atlas 
shows and emplaces. 
The Mnemosyne Atlas is therefore the application of an integrated system of 
research methods, with an ontological and epistemological position regarding the 
concepts of civilisation, individual and collective psychology, images, symbols and 
the ‘pathos formula’ – or Warburg’s cosmology. This thesis then proposes that the 
notion of the Mnemosyne Atlas as an integrated system when seen in relation with the 
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previous discussion about Warburg’s method, and the resistance to call it a method, 
suggests that at stake in Warburg’s work is not so much the development of a method, 
as a specific procedure to answer a problem, but a methodology as the system, or 
discourse, that allows the integration of methods within an ontological and 
epistemological framework, providing therefore the basis for the coherence, adequacy 
and pertinence of the chosen methods. A methodology is thus a research cosmology 
and also, from this perspective the Mnemosyne Atlas is a methodological device, a 
system that can be used, performed, and that reveals, or (re)produces a methodology. 
Framing the Mnemosyne Atlas within this perspective provides inspiration for this 
thesis as a path to follow in searching for performative and productive methodological 
devices that put in action transdisciplinarity.  
Approaching the Mnemosyne Atlas as the opening of a path for this thesis is 
supported by the scenery of contemporary research on Warburg. Warburgian scholars 
have had to rely upon a few finished pieces of writing that Warburg left, in contrast 
with the vast amount of written notes, through which there is a strong sense of 
uncertainty and openness towards Warburg’s ideas and thoughts. This openness 
towards the understanding of Warburg’s work in combination with his research 
approaches have led contemporary researchers within art history (Didi-Huberman) 
and architecture (Papapetros) to approach Warburg’s legacy not only with the 
intention to research his work, but also as an inspirational source within their own 
researches, sustaining the life of Warburg’s process of research,. As Silvina Vidal 
(2009) points out, Warburg’s ideas have provided contemporary researchers across a 
number of disciplines with a strategy to combine detailed information, localised 
phenomena and short period events with a wider understandings of historical change, 
but also a way of doing so in which the historical writing of explicative models can be 
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supported by empirical research, particularly the use of visual materials (2009, p. 1). 
Following these examples, this thesis takes on-board this openness as an invite to look 
into the Mnemosyne Atlas as an inspirational element to reflect on the importance of 
the usage of visual materials when researching and to devise a hands on approach that 
uses visual materials in research, instead of trying to interpret and analyse the 
Mnemosyne Atlas, or to use Warburg’s distinctive iconological methodology. 
 
 
The Mnemosyne Atlas and The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body: 
Distances 
 
The result of the interaction with Warburg and the Mnemosyne Atlas is the work that 
is presented and discussed in the following chapters: The Mouth of the Monster and 
the Hollow Body. As the end of Chapter Three discussed it is crucial to research the 
ontology of space through a framework that is non-representational, but that instead 
works through an enactive and performative epistemology, driven by experience, 
affect and aesthetics and not based on linguistic models of approaching the visual; or 
in synthesis to research space through the diagram. Warburg’s approach embodied 
within the Mnemosyne Atlas have provided this thesis a point of departure to explore 
visually the question of how to research a non-existing object, as space. However, as 
there are points of contact between the project of the Mnemosyne Atlas and the 
research experiment that guides the following chapters, The Mouth of the Monster and 
the Hollow Body, there are also important differences between the two, both formally 
and methodologically (in terms of its epistemology, questions, intentions and working 
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approach) 
As Matthew Rampley (2001) points out, Warburg – as Foucault later – 
gleaned inspiration from Nietzsche when looking into the past, also following a path 
of genealogy in which a search for origins is replaced by an analysis of the interplay 
between continuities and discontinuities (p. 312), giving the formal similarities place 
to transformations of meaning. Within the context of this thesis it is crucial such 
interplay between continuities and discontinuities as to inform the possibility of 
bringing together synchronic and diachronic dimensions; to explore multiple lines of 
connection between the elements brought together, making jumps and pursue 
connections that are not limited by territory, time periods or cultures. However, The 
Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body is not intended as a strategy to research a 
subject throughout an historical context, or to place the object of research historically 
as it is neither the intension of this thesis of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body to make an intervention within history, art history, or the history of art. 
Consequently the disciplinary framework is different from the one guiding this thesis, 
which is not driven by disciplinary context, questions or boundaries in developing 
theoretical frameworks and research methods – instead guided by transdisciplinarity 
as presented in the introduction. As such, while Warburg is interested in analysing 
works of art for what they may say about a certain society through the wider 
connections — networks that run under when informing the creation of such works — 
this thesis through The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body is interested in 
using the potential of images to create new ideas, suggestions and concerns. 
Consequently, if, as the scholarship surrounding Warburg suggests, Warburg was 
interested in through the image to trace the gestures, movements, the unconscious 
animation of the body as primal responses to stimuli being therefore the image subject 
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of analysis a way to observe the interval between the individual and the collective 
psychology (the ‘pathos formula’ through symbolic transformation); within this 
thesis, the image is something that is active, that has a suggestive and affective 
potential that can be used to prompt thought experiments, triggering associations 
through not only its historical and cultural connections with wider networks, but also 
in the fact that an image itself has multiple meanings (and these are expressed through 
an affective, aesthetic dimension; or its very materiality). 
The purpose and intensions of the research undertaken within this thesis are 
distinct from those of Warburg, as the intention of The Mouth of the Monster and the 
Hollow Body is to continue to make a corral around space, this time displacing it to 
the notion of the monster in order to 1) explore the productivity of space as a 
methodological device through the diagram as a an enactive and performative 
epistemology, driven by experience, affect and aesthetic dimensions and 2) through 
the interactions between the images used to allow the emergence, in a speculative 
way, of an ontological discussion about multiple existences of a single entity, a theme 
that is neither historical, nor that the images themselves address – in order to research 
the ontology of space as an ambiguous entity. Summarising, the two following 
chapters are part the result of a transdisciplinary methodology informed by a bastard 
epistemology through a recursive approach that became performed and materialised 
through the exploration of the diagram in The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body to research the ontology of space as a productive device; or more simply put: the 
mise-en-abyme of space. 
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Chapter Four 
The Encyclopedia of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body 
and Space as a Methodological Device Through the Diagram 
 
This chapter introduces the part of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body 
that comprises the captions explaining its images. The captions are driven, on the one 
hand, by an attempt to pin down the materiality of the constantly dislocated images, 
which unfold in medium after medium, intervention after intervention, in a process of 
shared authorship.  In order to do this, the chapter either documents elements such as 
the title, author, date and location, or uses the caption to explain what the image is. On 
the other hand, in the face of the impossibility of condensing these images into 
captions, the captions themselves open up to reveal the wider reasons for the presence 
of each image in the whole – that is, in the The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body. 
The facet of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body that the chapter 
explores, however, goes beyond the composition of the captions and becomes part of 
an encyclopaedia, in which each image has its own entry. As in an encyclopaedia 
there are images, text, numbers, diagrams and above all the possibility of reading the 
information at random, without following a linear progression from the beginning 
through to the end. Instead, it provides a framework for reading in a disjointed, 
disarticulated fashion, allowing stated or perceived connections and relationships to 
act as the driving force behind the creation of knowledge. This gives the beholder a 
shared control (the ‘beholder’ becomes the ‘maker’) over The Mouth of the Monster 
and the Hollow Body, in order to incite – and stress the importance of – associations 
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and interactions between the unity and the interval, the flow and the break, the 
foreground and the background. But, most importantly, it situates the core of the 
discussion in the images themselves, both individually and as part of the whole that 
comprises The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body. In doing so, it becomes a 
diagram that is drawn from the potentiality of each image to make visible aspects of 
space that, as a whole, exist in relation to a discussion of structures. 
As a result, the facet of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body under 
discussion is the encounter between the diagram and the encyclopaedia. This chapter 
argues that the challenge produced by visually (and artistically) working through 
structures is crucial to exposing the interactions, folds, coalescence and evanescence 
of conceptualisations of space. Furthermore, the encounter between the diagram and 
the encyclopaedia, as structures, provides a relevant framework in which to actively 
explore how space can be thought of productively. From this point on, three 
commentaries that take the form of notes reveal the considerations that initially drove 
the conception of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body as a diagrammatic 
structure that exposes and reflects upon the productivity of different 
conceptualisations of space. After these commentaries, it is left to the beholder to take 
up the task of fabricating the encounter between the diagram and the encyclopaedia. 
 
 
Structures and Space 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, using the work of Massey, the modernist concept of 
space became close to being structural. However, during this period the emphasis was 
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on the association of space with a static container where time is kept on hold. The 
later battle the structuralists waged against notions like causality and the linear 
progression of history and culture encompassed the exploration of the association 
between space and structures. However, in investigating this association, they further 
enlarged the scission between space and time as they regarded space as a-temporal, 
leading to the conceptualisation of structures as static grids or tables, without change 
or movement. This understanding was then translated into the idea of structures as 
closed systems, with the relationships between their elements locked in binary 
oppositions. The problems highlighted by Massey ([2005] 2010) in relation to the 
structuralist perspective began to be unravelled in the work of the poststructuralists. 
Nonetheless, the tradition of a structure as a closed system can still be observed in 
contemporary approaches, and this has led Ingold to distinguish between the notions 
of the ‘network’ and the ‘meshwork’. 
A meshwork opens up the notion of structure to change, as the connections 
binding and distances separating the elements are seen as “entangled lines of life, 
growth and movement” (Ingold, 2011, p. 63), in which “[e]very such line describes a 
flow of material substance in a space that is topologically fluid” (ibid, p. 64). In this 
sense, there is no distinction between a connection and an element, they are both part 
of the same process that is guided by animating life forces. The notion of a fluid 
topology was further explored in the work of Mol and Law (1994) (introduced in the 
first chapter). In their study, structures were analysed using the concept of topology. 
In doing so, a panoply of approaches emerged, enabling the conceptualisation of 
novel structures, such as that of a fluid topology. As seen in Chapter One, a fluid 
space is a structure guided by “variation without boundaries and transformation 
without discontinuity” (Mol and Law, 1994, p. 658), in which the connections and 
	   216	  
distances within the structure are not fixed and do not always exist between the same 
elements, as any one of these elements or connections could be excluded. A fluid 
topology, therefore, is characterised by the malleability of its boundaries and the 
multiplicity of its possible mixtures, giving rise to a robust whole. Nonetheless, and 
most importantly in the context of this thesis, there are no hierarchies between 
structures in the work of Mol and Law; each structure represents a valid approach, as 
it is an aspect of a multifaceted and complex whole. 
The assumption that there are multiple kinds of structures, all presenting facets 
of a larger whole, has profound implications for this thesis and its enquiry into the 
ontology of space and its conceptualisation as a productive medium. The first chapter 
introduced Algra’s three possible understandings of space, which can be most 
succinctly described as the ‘container’, the ‘contained’ and the ‘relation’. The 
argument followed in Chapters One and Two proposed that a vast majority of 
understandings until recently fell inside the conceptual category of space as a 
container, while contemporary thinking privileges the conceptualisation of space as a 
relation or a mediator. However, as a result of this approach, which perceives 
structures as possessing non-hierarchical, multiple existences, it is possible to think of 
them not simply as associated with a type of space, but as active and productive 
elements existing in the spatial realm. As such, structures not only enable the 
exploration of different concepts of space, but through their active productivity they 
can also be used to explore other spatial dimensions. Space can be seen as a 
multiplicity without a conceptual hierarchy, which can be explored through the 
interactions of these multiple conceptualisations. This is a recursive or mise-en-abyme 
(see Chapter Two) method of analysis, in which space, through its conceptualisations 
and agencies, constructs itself as a productive device. 
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Taking as its point of departure the suggestion in the first chapter (and also in 
this author’s previous work, listed in the Appendix), structures will be understood in 
this chapter as constituents of enacted order, and space will be envisioned in its 
relational capacity as the infinite set of experiences that make up such an order, even 
if it is a ‘bastard’ or khoratic one. In order to observe structures from this perspective, 
the encounter between the encyclopaedia and the diagram in The Mouth of the 
Monster and the Hollow Body will be understood as a material expression of multiple 
structures where all three types of conceptualisations of space exist on the same level 
and at the same time. This does not, however, imply a synchronicity but a concurrent 
coexistence, not only because it is not a matter of time (chronos), as chronology is in 
opposition to temporality, but also because they do not move at the same rhythm. In 
particular, the dichotomy between container and contained is dissolved because the 
boundaries between them become rarefied as the two dimensions inform each other. 
This allows not only for the presence of the two dimensions of space  – container and 
content – but also for the physical/‘real’ and the abstract/conceptual dimensions of 
space to come together in a non-reductive, creative mode, while taking into account 
non-linearity, breaks and discontinuities. 
In this way, this chapter presents the work, The Mouth of the Monster and the 
Hollow Body, as a compound of the structures that space fabricates in its multiple 
dimensions. These are made up of the interactions, folds, coalescence and 
evanescence of the three types of conceptualisations of space, and are driven by an 
enacted perspective. Through The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body it is 
argued that a structure, particularly when worked on and explored through visual 
materials (but also artistic practice), can be used as an active methodological device to 
explore the ontology of space by means of a thought experiment. In this way, it 
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produces a ‘khoratic ontology’ in which space constructs itself. 
 
 
The Encyclopaedia, the Narrative and Non-linearity 
	  
Starting with the idea of the caption as comprising such elements as title, author, date 
and location to introduce each image in The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body, and then confronting this notion with the actual visual material, this chapter has 
arrived at the idea of the encyclopaedic entry. The tension over the composition of the 
caption grew from questioning the materiality of the image – that is, asking whether 
the caption should reflect: 1) the initial work from which an image was made; 2) the 
specific digital image chosen; 3) the transformations applied to the image as they are 
presented in The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body, with each multi-
coloured image modified by transforming it into monotone and then attributing a hue 
to the monotone; 4) what is being seen, and therefore a description of the image, 
which in turn leads to the fact that what is being seen cannot be divorced from the 
reason why it is being seen; 5) the reason behind the choice of the image. However, 
the reason behind the choice of the image I driven itself by a multiplicity as there is 6) 
the aesthetic and affective dimensions guiding that choice; 7) what the image is 
addressing, which again provokes a set of questions concerning the thing or things 
that the image accounts for; 8) the multiple meanings of each image 9) and the set of 
constructed categories (monsters, demons, fear, hell, mouth, eating, speaking, 
screaming, body, blood, urine, excrement, food, medicine, illness, astrology, 
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metamorphosis, reincarnation, resurrection, heaven) that drive the multiple narratives 
present in The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body. 
In addition, all these aspects then reveal a multiplicity of authors: from the 
person who initially makes the work to the extended context of its creation, those who 
make interventions over time on what is seen, the owners of the image and the context 
of its fruition. As such, there are multiples images or traces (materialities) present in 
every image that is observed; a meshwork of forces constituting and transforming it at 
every moment. The image keeps unfolding in multiple directions, in an infinite 
process. As a result, the impossibility of containing the image in the caption impels 
the creation of the encyclopaedia.  
Each entry in the encyclopaedia is therefore built from the reason for the 
inclusion of the image in The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body as well as 
from scholarly textual knowledge, caption references and various sorts of literary 
information regarding the presence of mythological figures. Presenting all these 
elements combined in a single entry creates friction as they rub against each other. 
This is particularly triggered by the inclusion of the caption at the same level as the 
other elements, as a caption is usually presented side by side with the image and read 
in a separate moment and place to the body of the text in order not to disturb the flow 
of the main (apparently more important) narrative. An ambiguity is thus created over 
what a caption is: a description of an image, an informed piece of writing on each 
image or the construction of an argument? Eliminating the hierarchical subservience 
of the caption to the main body of a piece of writing and introducing it as a foreign 
element into the textual narrative(s) creates ambiguity and instability. The 
encyclopaedic entry is metamorphosed into a monster (one of the main elements 
informing The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body). How then is this monster, 
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the out-of-order, ‘bastard’ element to be dealt with when reading the entry? Is it 
superseded, surpassed, forgotten or eliminated, hated for its disturbing presence? The 
impossibility of this element introduced by the visual work makes it an excellent 
device for working through this question; it does not hide, but on the contrary, makes 
explicit what could be called a ‘bastard’, khoratic, and therefore spatial epistemology. 
Through its encyclopaedic form, The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body intends to dethrone the notion that images can be read. It seeks to show that this 
is a reductive venture not only because the images do not constitute a single narrative, 
but also because they are not text: they do not exist on a linguistic level (or not only 
on a linguistic level). Discussing the images through their association with the 
encyclopaedic form propels 1) the idea that there is no single narrative contained 
within each image, just as there is no single narrative in the collected set of images, 
thus 2) the beholder is solicited to actively engage in the formation of multiple 
narratives, both present and potential. Consequently, The Mouth of the Monster and 
the Hollow Body assumes a non-linear and non-representational form, revealing its 
dialogic nature. This is reached through the interaction between the beholder and each 
image and between the images as a whole (via cross-references); the presence of 
multiple images in the aforementioned categories; and the presence of multiple 
individual and overall narratives19 about their concurrent coexistence in The Mouth of 
the Monster and the Hollow Body. As such, the encyclopaedic form dismisses 
intentionality as its creation is distributed over several contributors, and as a result, 
the structural aspect of the work is actively emplaced. How then are the encyclopaedic 
entries organised? The strategy is to sequence the entries as if the circle were being 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The overall dimension of the narratives is presented in Chapter Five. 
	   221	  
read from left to right, top to bottom. But even such an apparently simple task 
becomes complicated because The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body is not 
an orthogonal grid. The search for such a grid, and the impossibility of constructing 
one, forces the encyclopaedic form to interact with the diagrammatic form. 
 
 
The Circle, the Square, Squaring the Circle and the Diagram 
 
In the Timaeus, Plato selected the circle as the perfect form because every point on its 
perimeter is the same distance from its centre. This ‘perfect’ geometry guarantees a 
positive outcome. In a circle, there are no privileged positions, no hierarchies, no 
categorical dominance and even the centre is a reproduction of the circle itself. This 
aspect of the circle reveals its importance when creating a structure that does not 
privilege a particular beginning but can start anywhere, that does not go to a specific 
place and that has no end. The lack of a stipulated beginning opens up the possibility 
for the co-existence of multiple (non-linear) narratives: interlaced stories that inform 
each other, that share the same elements. However, in The Mouth of the Monster and 
the Hollow Body it is not possible to define the circle precisely – to draw a delimiting 
border with an inside and an outside. Although we can sense the line that encircles all 
the images, it is only present through its perceived absence. The presence of the 
encircling line is at the same time absent due to the limits of its visual composition, 
which is informed by the distance and shape of the gaps between the individual 
images that constitute the overall work. As a result, the line’s visibility (and its degree 
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of physical existence) oscillates at times between a state of crescendo, visibility or 
presence and a state of dimming or fading away. Squares/rectangles (the format of the 
selected images) strive to fully constitute a circle, but one that is only apparent and 
can never be actualised. Faced with this quixotic demand, squares/rectangles open up 
gaps between the images, forcing them to interact with each other. 
As a result, a new dimension is created – not only that of the relations, 
sympathetic energies and flows, but also that of the breaks, disconnections and 
tensions within the whole that is The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body. The 
never-to-be-actualised circle creates instability and tension, in which background 
competes with foreground, but it also encourages an interaction that can be explored. 
However, even squares/rectangles are not always present: the instability, tension and 
interaction between foreground and background is thus augmented in some images by 
the absence of a geometrical framing. The removal of the square/rectangle lets the 
image, bereft of its own background, merge with the circle. The visual tension of 
circle and square/rectangle that permeates The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body performs and informs the tensions between different conceptualisations of 
space, while the geometric impossibility of squaring the circle makes visible and 
tangible the impossibility of speaking of space (its ‘unutterability’) and of fully 
understanding its existence. The sense of constantly falling into itself – the mise-en-
abyme discussed above – is mirrored in the diagram as it explores the infinitude of the 
image by creating a further image out of the multiple visual materials. Not only is 
each single image a repository of multiple narratives, each infinite in itself, but their 
conjugation also produces another bigger infinity – a facet of the diagram that echoes 
the ‘Russian doll’ image of space introduced in the first chapter. Space is therefore an 
infinite series of spaces existing successively one inside the other, and all these spaces 
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are themselves infinite.  
This larger infinity is particularly enhanced by the fact that the images in The 
Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body have not been created in the same context 
or framework. Thus other systems of relations besides those of region and historical 
period need to be put in place, systems that even lie beyond the network formed by 
the connections between the words ‘mouth’, ‘monster’ and ‘hollow body’ and their 
adjacent categories (presented above). Each image, because it is decontextualised, is 
an archaeological artefact, an orphan-image whose origin cannot be traced but only 
imagined in all its possibilities. This process is performed through 1) the abstract, 
conceptual, imaginative and immaterial dimensions of the images; 2) their physical, 
‘real’ materialities and the interaction between these dimensions in the act of drawing  
(enacting) the diagram that constitutes the whole; and 3) the extension of the diagram 
beyond itself, exerting its agency through the animation of the energies and 
imagination of those who come into contact with it and who further inform The Mouth 
of the Monster and the Hollow Body and are informed by it. 
Several different topologies are activated through engagement with The Mouth 
of the Monster and the Hollow Body: the fluid blood, the gaseous cloud, the 
interaction between multiple types of regions and locations, and the networks of 
influences, institutions, technologies and actors. Nevertheless, The Mouth of the 
Monster and the Hollow Body surpasses the collection of all these combinations of 
structures because it is a consistent, homogeneous and affective whole that yet 
follows a ‘bastard’, khoratic, spatial order. This, it is argued, is due to the 
impossibility of constricting aesthetic experience (in this case, the experience of 
visual materials) in the domain of language. Visual materials cannot be reduced to a 
descriptive act, whether it speaks for a part or for the totality, as they cross 
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dimensions that cannot be factored into such a description. Consequently, The Mouth 
of the Monster and the Hollow Body works through multiple facets of space, some of 
them unutterable, even unknowable, and in this way it enacts the paradoxical nature 
of space, in which opposing conceptualisations cease to struggle among themselves 
but instead work together, constituting each other. 
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Figure h – The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body (catalogue of images) 
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1 – A diagram in the form of an arrow: but to what does it signal? Does it point towards the beginning? 
Is it the beginning of the world? The signs or beings that constitute the circle of the zodiac – the path 
along which the earthly year is reflected in the sky – take the form of the human body: some crawl 
along, others just stand by, while yet others become inscribed in the body. Who does it welcome with 
open arms? Or is this body rising to the skies or to that other sky – heaven – with the force of an 
arrow? Maybe this arrow is just opening up room for the body to exist and breathe amongst the text 
that frames it. But is the man releasing the arrow to frame the text or is the arrow framing the man? 
The tightness in the page of the text, arrow, body and zodiac signs allows for a duality in the reading, 
in which the essence that controls and guides the form of each element can be inverted. The opposing 
or counter-actions that inform the page – the text, the arrow, the body and the zodiac signs – are 
caught in a meshwork of entangled forces. Such interplay can be extended to the point at which there 
is no direction to the reading of what informs what or where it started to take form – the conditions, 
limitations, axioms that shaped the context for this convergence or unity to exist. The place in which 
the man opens up a space for himself, and for us to follow him, is an ambiguous one. This place – the 
background – is a delimited shape in which a grid of vertical and horizontal lines are lightened by 
light-coloured dots at each intersection of lines. The tip of the arrow is vertically divided in two 
through the use of different colours, which are inverted on the bottom of the arrow, creating an 
heraldic background. However, looking at the tip of the arrow, where the grid is most expressive, the 
left, darker side resembles the sky bright with stars, a space that opens up endlessly; the right, lighter 
side almost becomes an earthly brick wall or a flattened geometric pattern that makes the arrow an 
arrow instead of an opening into another space, another dimension. Thus Zodiac Man, with the signs 
of the zodiac associated with various parts of his body, is portrayed on an arrow-shaped, parti-
coloured ground with text on either side. ‘Zodiac Man’ in (late 14th century) treatise on medicine and 
the zodiac. The Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Oxford, MS Ashmole 391, part V, f. 9r, illus.    
 
2 – At night, running through the high reeds – highly contrasted black and white reeds – a demon with 
white horns and long black hair emerges. With his arms wide open, his body (dressed in a white 
garment) takes the shape of a cross. Pitch-black and dazzle-white alternate and become the negatives 
of each other. The negation of the welcoming, wide-open arms is the barrier of unspeakable fear that 
only leaves room for a wide-open mouth that screams at the confrontation with the fearsome, the 
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unknown, the barrier that prevents the continuation of the path. Onibaba (still) (1964). Directed by 
Kaneto Shindô [Film]. 
 
3 – The separation between demon and human becomes blurred, and the way is open for human to 
become demon. The demon turns into a woman with a mask, maybe an evil woman with a mask; 
however, when the mask is taken off it does not reveal the woman but a new demon. The separation 
between demon and woman, however, does not only lie in the thickness of a mask that limits the 
extension into either side (the human side or the opposing demonic side): in order for the woman to 
become a demon, she needs to fuse with the demonic (as materialised in the mask) because, despite 
the potential for evil in the woman, it is still not enough to make her a demon. Becoming a demon not 
only involves making visible what has been invisible until now or in a person’s transformation: that 
person needs to cross the limits of being human, the place which humans inhabit, a journey that can 
only be made through contact with a powerful being. As for the human being observing this process, 
witnessing the ‘becoming’ of the demon and knowing the process that transformed the woman into 
the demon is enough to enable them to articulate the experience in speech. In this new confrontation 
with the demon, the mouth no longer screams but speaks. Onibaba (still) (1964). Directed by Kaneto 
Shindô [Film]. 
 
4 – Food has not always – if it has ever – been just about nourishing the body. During medieval times in 
the West food was part of a complex system of interrelations that supported medical practice. As a 
consequence, a dietary system drawn up in accordance with a person’s general complexion was a 
fundamental asset (Siraisi, 1990, p.120). For instance, Siraisi (1990, p. 121) states: “[Although] [t]he 
individuality is somewhat illusionary, since much of the advice comes from Avicenna (indeed, some 
of the dietary recommendations can be traced back to Hippocrates); but the learned medical author 
[Savonarola] was careful to introduce distinctions between foods suitable for nobles such as Borso 
and their courtiers and those appropriate for lesser mortals. Increased variety and refinement of foods 
and methods of food preparation available to the wealthy in later medieval and renaissance Europe 
may have fostered interest outside the medical profession in ancient medical theories about the 
relation between food and physical health.” In order to follow such dietary requirements, treatises 
	   228	  
that compiled lists of ingredients and dispensed instructions on how to use them medicinally became 
common items for European princes (Siraisi, 1990). Revealing the complexity and intricacy of 
medieval medicine, these treatises also discussed the air and the atmosphere, movement and rest, 
sleep and wakefulness, secretions and excretions, states of mind, hygiene and sexual intercourse 
(ibid). The idea of opposing states of being or ‘natures’ appeared to rule the system, creating a 
geometrical and rectilinear grid; however, the combination of opposing states with other states 
required the grid to be open enough to include the multiplicity of changes arising from these 
combinations. ‘Pork Butcher’ in School of Giovannino de’ Grassi (after Ububehasym Baldach o Ibn 
Butlan) (14th century) Theatrum Sanitatis. Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome, MS 4182, illus. 
 
5 – One of the foods that played a major role in medicine was the mandragora or mandrake root, whose 
soporific (but also hallucinogenic) effects meant that it was prized as an anaesthetic (Dixon, 2003, 
pp.188-189).  In this scientific illustration from the seventeenth century, the mandragora is deprived 
of its magical and alchemical dimensions. However, the naturalistic illustration still betrays, in the 
careful organisation of its leaves, a belief in the earlier interpretations – they frame the white flowers 
in the shape of an arch and are displayed in such a way that the root can also be perfectly observed. 
With its gallant head, the root has the shape of a human body with its legs interlaced and is 
reminiscent of the tradition in which it derives its powers from the ‘death’ of the miniaturised human 
being it embodies. This is an illustration that stands between the truth-to-nature archetype of 
Linnaeus, as Daston and Galison observe in Objectivity ([2007] 2009), and the singularity of the 
monstrous thing in which nature reveals itself in a different dimension or layer. ‘Mandragora 
Faemina’ in Bry, Johannes Theodorus de (1641) Florilegium Renovatum et Auctum: variorum 
maximeque rariorum germinum, forum ac plantarum. Frankfurt: M. Merian, illus. 
 
6 – For the Daoists, the spirits that inhabit the body distilled its juices, transforming matter into the 
essential vapours that constitute the breath, “the special site of this celestial transmutation being the 
internal organs, whose number, five, signals their central position” (Levi, 1989, p. 115), but which 
also correspond to a cosmic element and its movement, to a colour, a space and a cardinal direction. 
Thus the organs need to be supplied with the cosmic and primordial breath (ibid). It was the value of 
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breath and its role in the wellbeing not only of the body but also of the cosmos that made these 
breathing exercises fundamental to Daoist philosophy (ibid). “Baduan jin 八段錦 or Eight Lengths of 
Brocade Method collected in the Taoist Canon, a thirteenth century Qi Gong technique was 
illustrated with text ascribed to the immortal Zhongli Quan” (YeYoung Culture Studies, no date). 
 
7 – A metope was a relief panel that ornamented the outside of the Parthenon. This particular metope 
comes from a set from the south side of the exterior Doric frieze and it depicts the battle between the 
Lapiths (aided by the Athenian king Theseus) and the Centaurs (Perseus Digital Library, no date). In 
the metope, as in the battle, the Centaurs, mythical creatures, are shown as inhabiting the same plane 
as the human beings; both share the same space, the same reality. In ancient Greece, the distance 
between mythical creatures and humans, in terms of their cosmological status, was substantial 
because they were believed to exist on different ontological levels; physically, however, they were 
extremely close. The physical proximity was not only related to the spatial distance separating them – 
the Centaur is depicted within the reach of the man’s hand – but also to their bodily resemblance. 
One half of the Centaur is human and there are no anatomical differences in this part of his body with 
the body of the man. They are both made of flesh – flesh that structures and gives solidity to their 
shape. According to Kuriyama ([2002] 2006), for classical Greece, a full and compact shape moulded 
by the flesh was the ‘anatomical answer’ for the desired attributes of solidity, stability, permanence 
and ultimately immortality. Kalamis (attributed to) (447- 432 BC) Centaur and Lapith in Combat 
[High relief]. Parthenon Gallery, British Museum, London. 
 
8 – As a consequence of the Greek aspiration to possess the solid body of more perfect beings – the body 
of the hero or the god – their sculptures display extremely well-defined bodies. But at times this 
desire to convey the solidity that comes with the conflation of the body with supernatural forces is 
revealed in the exaggerated portrayal of bulging flesh (Kuriyama, [2002] 2006). Despite the 
immediate suggestion of an extremely well-muscled body, these lumps of flesh, according to 
Kuriyama ([2002] 2006), do not necessarily portray anatomical muscles; rather, they reveal the desire 
for perfection – a desire that was still present in Hellenistic sculptures even though anatomical 
dissection had become common practice. Glykon (3rd century AD) Farnese Hercules (also known as 
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Weary Hercules) [Sculpture]. Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples. [Roman copy after a 4th-
century BC bronze original by Lysippos]. 
 
9 – Associated with the description of bodily perfection is the idea of articulation: a healthy, strong body 
is one that is well-articulated, with a structure that supports itself and prompts action, like the body of 
an athlete. The importance of the idea of articulation is also present in language (Kuriyama, [2002] 
2006, p. 136). This can be seen firstly in the understanding that the Greeks had of speech itself: the 
articulation of the voice by means of the tongue (ibid), and secondly (as mentioned above) in the 
introduction into Greek grammar of a new element, the article, which enabled the transformation of 
an adjective into a noun (Vernant, 1983, p. 347). In this way, the mouth returns to prominence. It is 
the mouth that utters articulated speech, but it is also the mouth that names things and hence is able to 
categorise beings such as the Centaur. ‘An athlete tying a band around his head after a victory in an 
athletic contest’ (Norris, 2000, p. 127) – Diadumenos. Roman copy in marble from around first 
century BC found in Delos. The original was a bronze statue probably from Polykleitos (or 
Polyclitus).  
 
10 – “In the ninth image, since the meri or esophagus (which is the same thing) through which food and 
drink pass from the mouth to the entry of the stomach cannot be demonstrated, because it is covered 
by the trachea or pipe of the lungs (which is the same thing) as well as by the lungs, and because the 
meri or esophagus is positioned on top of the spinal cord or vertebrae of the neck and shoulders, right 
down to the entrance of the stomach (which meri at the entrance to the stomach is called the ‘mouth’ 
of the stomach), I have made an effort to represent the meri alone in a single image. For it is highly 
necessary that this member, the meri, be actually demonstrated, because plasters are necessary for 
this meri and ‘mouth of the stomach,’ and it will be necessary to apply [the plaster] on the back, since 
the way to the meri is shorter from the back than from the front, given that the chest and lungs are on 
top of it” (Vigevano [trs. by Wallis], [1345] 2010, p. 245). ‘Esophagus and Digestive Tract’ [Vellum] 
in Vigevano, Guido of (1345) Liber notabilium Philippi Septimi, francorum regis, a libris Galieni 
extractus (The Book of Notable Matters, dedicated to the French king Philip VII). Musée Condé, 
France, MS 334/569, f. 9, illus. 
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11 – “[This chart] deals with poultry. Item no. 110, reading across from left to right, informs us that 
roosters are dry and hot, that they have these qualities in the second degree, that the best kind to eat 
are those that crow temperately, that their meat is specially good for patients suffering from colic, 
that it may cause irritation of the stomach that can be avoided if the birds are tired out before they are 
slaughtered, that it provides nourishment engendering the humor bile and is recommended for people 
of frigid complexion, in old age, in winter, and in northern regions” (Siraisi, 1990, p. 123). This is a 
table that is also a geometrical drawing: is this geometry an embellishment or part of a way of 
presenting the image, in which the graphic dimension of the text has as much importance as its 
content? ‘Table of Poultry’ [Velum] in Codex Fritz Paneth (a handbook on health based on an 
eleventh century Arabic version printed in Bologna), Harvey Cushing/John Hay Whitney Medical 
Library, Yale University Library, New Haven, MS 28, f. 718, illus. 
 
12 – The Griffon (or Griffin), according to Jorge Luis Borges ([1967] 2002, pp. 73-74), is a winged 
monster, partly eagle, partly lion, which during medieval times possessed a contradictory symbolism 
– sometimes it was portrayed as the Devil, and at other times as an emblem of Christ at the 
Resurrection. The Griffon thus exists both as an evil monster and as a figure that stands for the holy 
process of resurrection, binding together the two opposing realms of heaven and hell. Roman 
Byzantine mosaics from a peristyle court, possibly from the reign of the Byzantine emperor Justinian 
I (r. 527-565). Griffin Devouring a Lizard [Mosaic]. Great Palace Mosaic Museum, Istanbul. 
 
13 – “Licetus, writing in 1634, and Zahn, in 1696, give the accompanying picture of a monster born at 
Ravenna in 1511 or 1512. It had a horn on the top of its head, two wings, was without arms, and only 
one leg like that of a bird of prey. It had an eye in its knee, and was of both sexes. It had the face and 
body of a man, except in the lower part, which was covered with feathers” (Ashton, 1890, pp. 173-
74). Is this a more contemporary version of the Harpies, this time represented as a single presence, 
with its mythological genealogy replaced by the story of the ‘common’ birth of a freak? Ashton, John 
(1890) Curious Creatures in Zoology. London: John C. Nimmo, p. 174, illus. 
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14 – “[I]n the Aeneid (Book III), [the harpies] are vultures with a woman’s face, sharp curved claws and 
filthy underparts, and weak with a hunger they cannot appease. They swoop down from the 
mountains and plunder tables laid for feasts. They are invulnerable and emit an infectious smell; they 
gorge all they see, screeching the whole while and fouling everything with excrement” (Borges, 
[1967] 2002, pp. 77-78). The Harpies, monsters that devour only to excrete, how far are they from the 
Japanese Gaki (images 60 and 64)? Bulfinch, Thomas (1897) The Age of Fable: Or the Beauties of 
Mythology. Philadelphia: Henry Altemus Company, p. 321, illus. 
 
15 – Saturn, in the darkness, performs an act of ultimate despair, madness, survival or autophagy (eating 
his own flesh – his children): does this act make him a god, a man or a monster? Blood is briefly 
present, but not in his mouth, which opens back into the darkness that he inhabits. Is his son’s body 
going into Saturn’s stomach or into the darkness? And what is his body made of? The paint is clearly 
visible, moving between the dark tones, creating a disfigured body that does not seem made of flesh 
but of hard, rigid stone, a moving landscape that sometimes disappears, rarefied, into the darkness. 
Goya, F. (1819 - 1823) Saturn Devouring his Children [Oil on canvas]. Museo del Prado, Madrid. 
 
16 – “‘Internal topography’ (neijing) of the human body from the front and back view. The frontal view 
(on the right) shows the positions of the anterior internal organs: the throat (through which jing 
essence ascends and qi descends), the larynx, the lungs, the heart, the gall bladder, the spleen, the 
stomach, the huangmen ([the] ‘Vitals Portal’, between the heart and the diaphragm), the pylorus, the 
small intestine, the large intestine (the ‘nine coils’ of the large and small intestine), the guanmen 
([the] ‘Pass Portal’) and the bladder. The back view (on the left) shows the positions of the posterior 
internal organs: the stomach cavity (possibly an error), the lungs, the spleen, the stomach, the sub-
hepatic area, the [left] kidney, the ‘Portal of Life’ (mingmen, anatomically the right kidney), and the 
‘Portal of the Po Soul’ (pomen, the anus).” (Wellcome Library, no date a). These drawings merge 
into a compact structure, which combines a physiological depiction of the internal organs in the 
human thorax and abdomen with the strange appeal of an everyday floral bouquet or offering of fruit. 
Li Jiong, ‘Neijing’ (internal topography) [Woodblock] in Zhengtong daozang (Daoist canon 
compiled during the Zhengtong reign period (1436 -1449) of the Ming dynasty). Library of 
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Zhongguo zhongyi yanjiu yuan (China Academy for Traditional Chinese Medicine), Beijing. 
 
17 – “Indeed, food and medicine shaded into each other. Avicenna declared, in a passage frequently cited 
and discussed by Latin medieval writers, that the formal distinction between them was that food was 
assimilated by the body, whereas medicine assimilated the body to itself. But both food and medicine 
were complexionate and affected the complexion of the person who ingested them; in practice, not 
only spices but also various vegetables counted now as one and now as the other. Lettuce, for 
example, frequently crops up as an ingredient of cold complexion in medicinal recipes” (Siraisi, 
1990, p 121). This image shows a cabbage, another ingredient in the aforementioned medical treatises 
that had a multi-dimensional existence. The text that accompanies this drawing says: “Nature: Warm 
in the first degree, dry in the second. Optimum: The fresh and fleshy ones. Usefulness: They remove 
obstructions. Dangers: They are bad for the intestines. Neutralization of the Dangers: With much oil” 
(Matterer, 2000). “The plants illustrated in the Tacuinnum have the same general appearance as those 
in the Manfredus Herbal and the Historia Plantarum. The similarity between the Historia Plantarum 
and the Paris and Rome Tacuinnum manuscripts is particularly clear for images of the cherry and 
pine trees, squash, melons, marjoram, and turnips. In all three manuscripts, the plant is shown as a 
flattened silhouette. Little attention is paid to the correct proportional and spatial relationships among 
the parts, and leaves are not precisely shaped or naturalistically colored … larger-than-life pine 
needles and cones are grafted onto a diminutive tree” (Hoeniger, 2006, p. 67). For example, the use 
of close-ups, a common procedure in scientific illustrations and diagrams, indicates that the purpose 
was not to show a pine tree but to present the elements that would enable the recognition of a pine 
tree, differentiating it from similar trees. The focus is not on rendering ‘real’, observed nature, but to 
present a table of reference for the recognition of the tree. ‘Cabbage (Caules Onati)’ in (15th century) 
Tacuinum of Rouen. Bibliothèque Municipale, Rouen, MS Leber 1088, illus. 
 
18 – Illustration of neidan (the Daoist inner alchemy): there are points of contact between Daoism and 
the Timaeus in relation to the understanding of the body – both establish a micro-macro 
correspondence. However, for Daoism, the body was the universe, it contained the universe in its 
totality (Levi, 1989, p. 105), whereas for Plato this correspondence was a hierarchy of perfection and 
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the cosmos existed only in the soul, particularly in its divine part which was placed in the head; the 
rest of the body existed to support the soul (Cornford, [1937] 1997, p. 281). Thus Daoism had a 
different understanding of bodily secretions: “the crudest physiological substance assumes a heraldic 
value because its secretions are integrated into a symbolic system in which they correspond to divine 
effigies” (Levi, 1989, p. 123). 
 
19 –  
 Tarasque Tarascon. (Gordon, 2009). 
 
20 – As Borges states in The Book of Imaginary Beings, the Amphisbaena is a two-headed serpent that 
can bite with both of its heads. It was an ‘impossible’ being, according to seventeenth century 
polymath Sir Thomas Browne ([1967] 2002, pp. 16-17), who could not believe that such a being 
could exist as it would contradict the fact that all beings only have a bottom, a top, a front, a back, 
and a left and right side. The Amphisbaena has, however, been associated with the reptile doble 
andadora. “The Anphivena [sic] is shown with two heads, wings and claws. Amphisbaenae are in fact 
limbless lizards, wormlike creatures with rounded head and tail, [that] can move in two directions. 
This animal is pricked [sic] for pouncing” (Arnott, no date). ‘Anphivena’ (detail) in (c. 16th century) 
The Aberdeen Bestiary. Aberdeen University Library, Aberdeen, MS 24, f. 68v, illus. 
 
21 – Is this Satan, hell, or Saturn devouring his child? And what place is it that it inhabits, partially in the 
darkness of the subsoil, partially in the light of the heavens, the two opposites bridged by heavenly 
clouds or hellish burning smoke? ‘The Prince of Darkness: Dagol’ [German gouache] in (c. 1775) 
Compendium rarissimum totius Artis Magicae sistematisatae per celeberrimos Artis hujus Magistros. 
Wellcome Library, London, illus. 
 
Text has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 	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22 – A blue bird-like monster, sitting on a potty-chair throne (Dixon, 2003, p. 264), eats a human body 
while excreting other, previously eaten bodies. However, the bodies seem to go through the process 
without any harm, escaping digestion, as if the monster had a hollow body. A requirement of hell is 
that the body has to be preserved, always ready to undergo the fear and pain of being eaten alive and 
dying once more. In terms of this monster, does being eaten equate to dying, while being excreted 
equate to being reborn? It appears to be a constant process of transmutation that is aided by the egg-
shaped (the egg is an alchemical symbol), bluish excreting organ of the monster. As Dixon (2003, p. 
260) highlights, the egg was “considered [a] microcosm of the world, containing all the qualities of 
life, the four elements perfectly conjoined. A vessel shaped like an egg might, by its resemblance to 
the common object, aid transmutation of the substances within it.” Bosch, Hieronymus (c. 1480-
1505) The Garden of Earthly Delights (detail depicting the ‘Prince of Hell’ from the right panel of 
the triptych, Hell) [Oil on Oak]. Room 56, Museo del Prado, Madrid. 
 
23 – “This image illustrates the mouth of hell for the biblical text, the Apocalypse of John” (Xanthippos, 
2013). ‘Torment’ [Xylogravure block-book, hand-coloured] in (c. 1450) Apocalypsis Johannis. Il 
libro della fine del mondo. L’apocalisse. Biblioteca Estense Universitaria, Modena, alfa D.5.22, p. 
43, illus. 
 
24 – (12th century) Dragon devouring a man [Capital relief]. Church of St. Pierre, Chauvigny. 
 
25 – A dragon is eating a man, beginning with his face, but viewed at a distance it might seem that the 
man is eating the dragon, firmly holding his neck and swallowing the dragon’s mouth. A mouth 
inside another mouth, a mouth eating another mouth, leaving a lack, a void, in the absence of the 
mouth that can eat. The interior of the body no longer has a commanding door that open and closes, 
defining what comes in and out, and therefore the interior of the body is exposed and is no longer 
interior. An inside that encloses another inside, an interior space that contains another interior space, 
but the interior space no longer has an exterior, nothing else exists to make the separation between 
the exterior and the interior. When the materiality of the flesh disappears, does the hollow body 
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disappear too, or can it still be eaten? “Goltzius worked with the artist, Cornelius van Haarlem, at the 
‘Academy’ of Harlem, who made the painting (now at the National Gallery London) from which this 
engraving derives. Ripping claws, fangs gouging deep into flesh, scattered heads and shredded bodies 
provide a graphic portrayal of the fate met by the companions of Cadmus. The opposing forces of the 
upward thrust of the dying companion’s arm and the downward plunge of the dragon’s neck combine 
with the contorted male forms to create a sense of emotion in this depiction of an episode from 
Ovid’s ‘Metamorphosis’ III: 28-63” (The Barber Institute of Fine Arts, no date). Goltzius, Hendrick 
(1588) The Companions of Cadmus Devoured by the Dragon [Engraving]. The Barber Institute of 
Fine Arts, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston. 
 
26 – “Michelangelo heightened the naturalism of Schongauer’s demons by painting silvery scales onto 
the spiny, fishlike monster in the upper left. … The young artist introduced the element of fire, which 
does not appear in Schongauer’s print. A small fire appears in the crevice of the rocky outcrop, 
flames shoot from the mouth of the demon with squid-like wings at the lower right, and a wooden 
club wielded by the spiny, fishlike creature has been transformed into a firebrand” (Kimbell Art 
Museum, 2015). Michelangelo (?) Torment of Saint Anthony (detail) [Oil and tempera on panel]. 
Kimball Art Museum, Fort Worth. 
 
27 – “In German and Latin. On white, brown and grey-green paper. The title within an ornamental 
border in wash, with skulls, skeletons and cross-bones. Illustrated with 31 extraordinary water-colour 
drawings of demons, and three pages of magical and cabbalistic signs and sigils, etc. At the end the 
figures are in red, and part of the text is written in white on the grey-green paper” (Wellcome Library, 
no date b). (1775 ?) Compendium rarissimum totius Artis Magicae sistematisatae per celeberrimos 
Artis hujus Magistros. Anno 1057. Noli me tangere. Asmodai, MS 1766, f. 18, Wellcome Library, 
London. 
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28 – 
(The University of Iowa Libraries, 2009). ‘Rerum Naturalium’ in Reisch, Gregor (1504) Margarita 
Philosophica (Pearl of Wisdom). John Martin Rare Book Room, Hardin Library For Health Sciences, 
The University of Iowa, Iowa, AE3. R4 1504, f. vi, illus. 
 
29 – Bloodletting-zodiac man. “This famous illustration, combining the features of a bloodletting man 
with those of a zodiac man” (Harrison, 2012). The bowl is assumed to be catching the blood; 
however, the purpose of the distaff is unknown (Jones, [1984] 1998, p. 95). (1275-1540), in Harley 
MS 3719 (English manuscript with collection of astronomical, calendrical, medical and philosophical 
texts), ff. 158-159. British Library, London. 
 
30 – (3rd quarter of 12th century) Liber medicinae ex animalibus. British Library, London, Harley MS 
1585, f. 72v, illus. 
 
31 – “Aesculapius and Asclepius, supposedly the son and grandson of Apollo, are instructing others in 
the collection, preparation and dispensation of medicines” (Jones, [1984] 1998, p. 95). ‘Hippocrates 
(or Galen) is holding up a Jordan to the sun’ in Ardene, John of (2nd quarter of 15th century) Medical 
Treatise. British Library, London, Sloane MS 6, f. 175v, illus.  
 
32 – “Giovannino dei Grassi’s decision to show plants in the midst of landscapes in the Tacuinnum 
paintings, however, meant that he had to depart from the herbal tradition in significant ways. The 
configuration of the botanical subjects on the pages of the Historia Plantarum also produced by 
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Giovannino’s workshop was dependent on the ancient convention of the illustrated herbal: each plant 
was represented by a single archetypal specimen, extracted from the earth, either with a cut stem or 
with roots included. In the Tacuinnum paintings, by contrast, the individual herbal ‘portrait’ was 
repeated many times; the massed plants grow out of the soil to create a garden or field, and gardeners 
pluck leaves or fruit and fill baskets to overflowing” (Hoeniger, 2006, pp. 67-68). Hoeniger suggests 
that Giovannino may have been influenced, on the one hand, by the original Arabic work in which 
the focus is on the best way and time in which to cultivate and harvest a plant rather than on its 
identification (ibid). On the other hand, the ‘genre scenes’ accompanying the drawings of plants may 
have been influenced by the Tractatis de Herbis (ibid). He also displays the possible influence of the 
literature of courtly love, particularly in his depiction of human activities (ibid, p. 72). How much do 
these depictions resemble a Bosch painting, such that it could possibly be included within an 
alchemical, religious tradition? The effects of food on sexual activity or the way it affects social 
interactions are also represented as, for instance, the hot and moist nature of asparagus, which 
alongside alleviating constipation also enhances sexual union (ibid). “The effort taken to create 
scenes of labour in the fields with specific grains surely reflects the economic importance to the 
Visconti duchy of its agricultural lands. The value of agricultural land was a concern Giangaleazzo, 
of course, shared with other landowning aristocrats of the day” (ibid, p. 78). “The Tacuinnum 
illustrations portrayed the peaceful, orderly, bountiful world such a ruler would enjoy” (ibid, p. 80). 
In contrast to the Gaki, the Taicunnum does not portray the environment during the period of its 
making – a period devastated by hunger, caused not only by bad weather and ruined crops but also by 
the Black Death and war. ‘A pharmacist dispensing syropus acetosus in his shop’ in School of 
Giovannino de’ Grassi (after Ububehasym Baldach o Ibn Butlan) (14th century) Theatrum Sanitatis. 
Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome, MS 4182, f. 183, illus. 
 
33 – “Physical description: Lucifer, with three faces, stands centre devouring the wicked. At the base of 
his abdomen is another face, out of the mouth of which a devil is pulling the body of Simon Magus, 
whose name is inscribed in reverse. The devil holds two other men in his hands who are each being 
bitten by a serpent which twist around the devil’s arms. The rest of the engraving is split into four 
rows in which souls are being tormented in various manners” (Victoria and Albert Museum, 2013).  
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(Victoria and Albert Museum, 2013). This image summons up an immediate association with images 
22 and 42. On the one hand, the cycle of eating and excreting is also present in the blue monster of 
The Garden of Earthly Delights, as Dixon also shows. On the other, the seated position of Satan, with 
legs folded and open, supported by the resting hands on the knees, is mirrored in the seated position 
of the opened body of the man who is being bled to cure him of illness. (c. 1470) Hell [Engraving]. 
Victoria and Albert Museum, Prints & Drawings Study Room, level E, case I, shelf 2, box B. 
 
34 – “Formed of the maws of two hideous, gigantic monsters, it swirls with the chaotic figures of the 
damned, including kings and a queen wearing only their crowns, and a tonsured monk, as well as 
young and old, male and female. They are tortured by slimy, hairy demons, while an angel locks the 
door in the border with a large key, a feature seen in an 11th-century Anglo-Saxon picture of hell. 
Traditionally called the ‘St Swithun Psalter’ because it contains a prayer to the saint, this psalter’s 
origins can be placed at Winchester, probably at the Cathedral Priory, which is dedicated to him. It is 
beautifully illustrated with a series of full-page tinted drawings which probably reflect the tastes and 
high social status of Hugh of Blois, Bishop of Winchester (1129-1171)” (British Library, no date a). 
‘The Last Judgement’ [Vellum] in (1150) Winchester Psalter. British Library, London, Cotton MS. 
Nero C IV, f.39r, illus. 
 
35 – (c.1500-1520) Satan [Stained-glass window]. St Mary’s church, Fairford, Gloucestershire. 
 
36 – A hellish mouth or the insides of the body? Hell or a thermal bath – as depicted in image 47? ‘Belial 
and the Demons’ [Vellum] in Parmenchingen, Antonius Ruttel de (1450) Proces de Belial de J. de 
Therano. Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Beaux-Arts, Paris. 
 
 
Text has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 	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37 – ‘Urine Wheel’ in (16th century) Anonymi medicina illustrata. The Royal Library, Copenhagen, 
NKS 84 b, f. 5v. illus. 
 
38 – “The main picture appears to illustrate a cooperative arrangement of a type common in fourteenth 
and fifteenth-century northern Italy between a physician and an apothecary. On the right is the 
apothecary’s shop, with an assistant mixing a batch of medicine behind the counter. On the left, the 
physician holds consultations in or near the apothecary’s premises. The small pictures down the left-
hand edge and across the bottom of the page illustrate various forms of medical treatment, including 
medical baths” (Siraisi, 1990, p. 31). Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037) (first translated into Hebrew in 
1279) Canon of Medicine in Hebrew. Biblioteca Universitaria, Bologna, MS. 2197, f. 492, illus. 
 
39 – Heyden, Pieter van der (1556) The Temptation of St. Anthony (After Pieter Bruegel the Elder) 
[Engraving]. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
 
40 – “Parents: Thaumas & Electra. Connected to: Odyssey, Iliad, Aeneid, King Phineus, Argonauts, 
Zetes, Calais, Celaeno. Story: the Hounds of Zeus: Harpies were once sent by Zeus to plague King 
Phineus of Thrake as punishment for revealing the secrets of the gods. Whenever a plate of food was 
set before him, the Harpies would swoop down and snatch it away, befouling any scraps left behind. 
Jason took pity on the emaciated king and killed the Harpies when they returned; in other versions, 
Calais and Zetes chase the Harpies away. In return for this favor, Phineas revealed to Jason the 
location of Colchis and how to pass the Symplegades, or The Clashing Rocks, and then they parted. 
Aeneas encountered harpies on the Strophades as they repeatedly made off with the feast the Trojans 
were setting. Celaeno cursed them, saying the Trojans will be so hungry they will eat their tables 
before they reach the end of their journey. The Trojans fled in fear” (Cameron, 2012). Painter, 
Kleophrades (attributed) (c. 480 BC) Phineus defending himself from the Harpies [Attic red-figure 
hydria-kalpis]. The J. Paul Getty Museum, Getty Villa, Malibu. 
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41 – (c. 480 BC.) Jason disgorged by the dragon [Attic red figure kylix]. Gregorian Etruscan Museum, 
Vatican City, Room XIX. 
 
42 – Bloodletting man in (15th century) Wilhelmi, Walteri de Zirix see descriptio terre sancte.Broeder 
Gheraerts Naturkunde. Herzog August Library, Wolfenbüttel, MS Augustea, 18.2 Aug. 4, image 
00223, illus.  
 
43 – A bloodletting chart showing the points for bloodletting. ‘Bloodletting Man’ [Woodcut] in 
Gersdorff, Hans von (1517) (1st ed.) Feldtbüch der Wundartzney (Field-book of the Wound-doctor). 
Johannes Schott, Strassburg, illustrated by Hans Wechtlin. 
 
44 – An Encyclopaedia of the World. ‘Monster’ [Woodcut] in Münster, Sebastian (first published in 
1544) The Cosmographia.  
 
45 – ‘Zodiac Man’ [Pen-drawing] in (1353) Lectionary, with a calendar, and readings for Sundays and 
weekdays. British Library, London, MS Egerton 2188, f. 10, illus. 
 
46 – ‘Mandragora’ in (c. 1520) Arzneipflanzenbuch (medicinal herb book) published in Augsburg (?). 
Bavarian State Library, Munich. BSB Cod.icon. 26, f. 59r, illus. 
 
47 – Bathing scene illustrating the healing effects of the mineral waters of the springs in Pozzuoli, 
Southern Italy in Eboli, Pietro da (c.1220) De Balneis Puteolanis (The Baths of Pozzuoli). Biblioteca 
Angelica, Rome. MS 1474, f. 14, illus. 
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48 – “De Dissectione partium corporis humani, first published by Simon de Colines in 1545. Kerver’s 
issue includes three striking illustrations of a zodiac man by Mercure Jollat, previously unpublished 
in the Collines 1545 and 1546 editions and originally rejected by Estienne for being too astrological” 
(Huard and Gmek, 1965, cited in Christie’s, no date). ‘Zodiacal Man’ in Estienne, Charles (1575) Les 
figures et portraicts des parties du corps humain. Paris: Kerver. University Library Erlangen-
Nueremberg, H61/2 TREW.D 176, seite 6, illus. 
 
49 – Heyden, Pieter van der (c. 1561) The Descent of Christ Into Limbo (After Pieter Bruegel the Elder) 
(detail) [Engraving]. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
 
50 – ‘Schematic representations of female diseases’ in (15th century) Wellcome Apocalypse (German 
and Latin book). Wellcome Library, London, MS 49, illus. 
 
51 – Mandrake root from Surrey, bent into the shape of woman holding a child, acquired by Edward 
Lovett (1852-1933) an Edwardian collector of charms and magical items. (1870-1916) Woman 
Holding a Child [Carved Mandrake]. The Cuming Museum, London. 
 
52 – Signorelli, Luca (1499-1502) Resurrection of the Flesh (detail) [Fresco]. Chapel of San Brizio, 
Duomo, Orvieto. 
 
53 – The body becomes grounded and is no longer hollow. Instead, it is full, overwhelmingly full. 
Bursting out of the body, the intestines bridge the earth and the sky to become the clouds that house 
the astrological signs. Unknown Zodiac Man. 
 
54 – ‘Madragora-Alrun Fraw’ (mandrake woman) [Colored woodcut] in Kaub, Johann Wonnecke von 
(1485) Herbarius zu Teutsch (Hortus Sanitatis) published by P. Schoeffer, Mainz, illus. 
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55 – Alchemical treatise. ‘Demonstration of Perfection’ in De Alchimia Opuscula Complura Veterum 
Philosophorum (Rosarium Philosophorum). Illus. 
 
56  In the second century BC in China the body came to be perceived as a cosmogonic system, and the 
universe, through the elements that constitute it and their interrelations, was reproduced as if existing 
within the body (Levi, 1989, p. 106). As Levi (1989) shows, each body part is the representative of 
its elemental counterpart in the universe. For the Daoists, this theory assumed an extreme form: the 
universe existed in its totality in the body (ibid) – a macro-microcosm theory in which microcosm 
had exactly the same properties as the macrocosmic version, in distinction to the idea of it being a 
less perfect version as in Plato’s Timaeus, for example. In this system, the processes that lead to the 
formation and endurance of the universe are the same as those that give the human body life and 
powers of reproduction. Xiuzhen tu (Diagram of Cultivating Perfection). “diagram (tu) depicting the 
Daoist body in terms of alchemical and cosmological principles. Versions of this diagram have been 
found in Guangdong, on Wudang shan (Hubei), on Qingcheng shan (Sichuan), and in Daoist 
monasteries in Beijing and Shanghai. It contains inscriptions in textual form, symbols of paradises, 
alchemical symbolism and practice descriptions, lunar phases, names of the twenty-eight 
constellations, and elements relating to thunder rites (leifa)” (Zabel, no date a). 
 
57 – “At the bottom of the window the dead are raised from their graves by angels blowing trumpets. At 
Thornhill Church, West Yorkshire, the east window of the Savile chapel depicts The Resurrection of 
the Dead. The window was installed in 1493 after the chapel had been extended” (Allen, 2009). 
Burlison and Grylls (1890) Resurrection of the Dead [Tracings]. Victoria and Albert Museum 
Archives, London. 
 
58 – Neijing tu (Diagram of Internal Pathways). “It depicts a human torso from the side, with 
iconographic elements relating to Daoist subtle physiology. Textual components include passages 
from the Huangting jing (Scripture on the Yellow Court) and two poems attributed to Lü Dongbin” 
(Zabel, no date b). Attribute to Liu Chengyin (dated from 1886). Baiyun guan (White Cloud 
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Monastery), Daoist temple, Beijing. 
 
59 – “The tenth image will be only for the sake of showing the anatomy of the uterus, because many, 
many physicians are wrong about the situation and condition of the uterus, since they say that it rises 
up all the way to the diaphragm and presses on the spiritual members, and induces suffocation. This 
is false, as Galen says in his book On Affected Parts, for he says that the uterus does not rise up to the 
diaphragm, and not even to the stomach, since it has no ligaments above the navel. One should 
consult the book On Affected Parts and one will find plainly laid out Galen’s refutation of those who 
understand nothing about the movement of the uterus” (trs. by Wallis, 2010, p. 246). In depicting the 
uterus, the body is shown as hollow (as in image 10), an empty cavity filled with a void. Would 
showing the other organs distract the viewer/physician from the object of reference? Or would it 
make the body too realistic, too material, too fleshy, too human and thus deprive it of a soul and 
consequently those mysteries that will allow it to rise again after death? Have the other organs been 
removed or are they hidden by the processes made available through the act of drawing, of depiction? 
‘Anatomical figure of a Woman’ [Vellum] in Vigevano, Guido of (1345) Liber notabilium Philippi 
Septimi, francorum regis, a libris Galieni extractus (The Book of Notable Matters, dedicated to 
French king Philip VII). Musée Condé, France, MS 334/569, f 10, illus. 
 
60 – “Through words and pictures, this scroll tells one part of the seven-part story of the gaki, or hungry 
ghosts. The emaciated ghosts, with their skeleton-thin limbs and swollen bellies, are invisible to the 
human eye. They are in a state of perpetual thirst and lick the drops of spilled water in a temple 
cemetery. In contrast with the bustling variety of people conglomerated in front of the temple, the 
misery of the gaki is depicted in fluid brushwork and light touches of color” (Kyoto National 
Museum, no date).  (Heian-Kamakura period – 12th century) Gaki-Zoshi (Scroll of the Hungry 
Ghost) [Handscroll]. AK229, Kyoto National Museum, Kyoto.  
 
61 – “In addition to Planetary Man, many printed Horae included cuts illustrating the influence of the 
zodiac over different parts of the body. As seen here, Aries governs the head and face; Gemini, the 
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shoulders, arms, and hands; Leo, the stomach, heart, and back; Libra, the navel, groin, and buttocks; 
Sagittarius, the thighs; Aquarius, the legs from the knees to the heels and ankles; Pisces, the feet; 
Capricorn, the knees; Scorpio, the genitals; Virgo, the belly and entrails; Cancer, the breast, sides, 
and spleen; and Taurus, the neck and throat. This information, used in conjunction with that provided 
with charts of Planetary Man, was especially useful in times of disease or injury.  
Marcus Reinhard’s establishment in Kirchheim was his second press. Earlier he had been a printer 
in Lyon but had closed shop around 1482. Success seems to have eluded him in Alsace, however. He 
began around 1489-90, apparently with this Horae, but his presses stopped by the mid-1490s” (Les 
Enluminures, no date). ‘Zodiacal Man’ in (c. 1490) Horae, nostre domine ad usum Romanum (Book 
of Hours) printed by Marcus Reinhard. The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York, 32528.1 [ChL 
578], f. π2r, illus. 
 
62 – ‘Planetary influence on the body and four temperaments’ (possibly 1486). The Fitzwilliam 
Museum, Cambridge, 167, f.102r, illus. 
 
63 – “Recto: a multi-figure composition showing the resurrected Christ rising from his tomb, surrounded 
by several soldiers. Verso: studies of a shoulder” (Royal Collection Trust, 2014). Buonarroti, 
Michelangelo (1532) The Resurrection [Black chalk]. Royal Collection, Windsor Castle, London. 
 
64 – Defector gakis in a street scene. The gaki or ‘hungry ghosts’ are beings that are ontologically closer 
to hell; however, they are free to wander the world, always trying to satisfy their infinite hunger 
(Lafleur, 1989). As Lafleur (1989, p. 274) states, gaki were not simply hungry beings but were 
actually constituted by hunger, and this is shown in their bodies – they have a thin throat through 
which no food passes and a huge belly which is never full. (Heian-Kamakura period – 12th century) 
Gaki-Zoshi (Scroll of the Hungry Ghost) [Handscroll]. AK229, Kyoto National Museum, Kyoto.  
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65 – Lynn, Nicholas of (c. 1424) Lunar Volvelle (astronomical calendar). Bodleian Library, Oxford 
University, MS Ashmole 370, f. 025r, illus. 
 
66 – The dead rise from their graves, including a pope at the centre of the image. Detail of the Last 
Judgment or Doom in the Southwest corner of the chancel. Resurrection of the Dead (Hayes, 2010, 
http://www.sacred-destinations.com/england/chalgrove-church). Church of St. Mary, Chalgrove. 
Hayes, Holly (2007) Resurrection of the Dead [Photo]. 
 
67 – “Doctors often carried around special calendars (or almanacs) containing star charts. This enabled 
them to check the positions of the stars before making a diagnosis. Many of these almanacs included 
pictures, which helped explain complicated ideas to patients. … The diagram was intended to explain 
how the astrological formations (or star signs) rule over each part of the body. The man's pointing 
finger serves as a warning against the powerful forces of the stars” (British Library, no date b). An 
upside down arrow that mirrors the one on the top. A dividing line is created that separates the 
diagrammatic scheme in two. However, both arrows also point to the outside of the circle, but where 
is the outside of the circle? Where is the place that the arrows point towards? ‘Zodiac Man’ [Vellum] 
in Somer, John (1399) Kalendarium. British Library, London, MS Sloane 2250, f.12, illus. 
  
	   247	  
Chapter Five 	  
The Story of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body and the 
Multiple Existences of Space 
	  
As observed in Chapters One and Two, although there are many sophisticated 
discussions about physical and conceptual spaces, none of them clearly conceptualise 
the way in which these two dimensions constitute the same reality or construct each 
other. Recognising the difficulty inherent in such a conceptualisation – due to the 
ambiguity, multiplicity, evasiveness and indeterminacy of space, and the impossibility 
of fully understanding or conceptualising it – this thesis follows a ‘corral’ strategy in its 
approach to the ontology of space. Taking as its point of departure the idea (analysed in 
Chapter Two) that the ontology of space – as khora – cannot be approached directly, 
Chapter Three developed a strategy through establishing an analogy with the notion of 
the past and the construction of historical narrative. The underlying rationale is the fact 
that although the past is unclear, encompassing multiple definitions and approaches, and 
exhibiting an ambiguity similar to that of space, it is subject to the enquiry of 
historiography. As such, the question that is most salient for the analogy between space 
and the past is which methodological and epistemological framework best facilitates 
research into the past’s ontological ambiguity. Chapter Three revealed that there is a 
spatial dimension to the sort of research methodologies that can be used to approach and 
work positively with these subjects’ paradoxical nature and instability. Such 
methodologies forgo the demand for a single, determinate position and accept that a lack 
of an ‘origin’ – even the presence of discontinuity – is inherent to a non-linear 
formation. Thus Chapter Three found that space (as khora) could be used as a 
methodological tool to more fully investigate such ambiguous subjects. The following 
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chapter develops this idea by describing an ontology of space through 1) the 
displacement of its ambiguity to the figure of the monster and 2) the use of space as a 
methodological tool (as developed in The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body, 
discussed in Chapter Four) to research it. 
This chapter therefore approaches the ontology of space by means of an analogy 
with another subject that is ontologically ambiguous: it conducts an analysis of the 
ontology of monsters. A speculative exploration of monsters offers a different viewpoint 
from which to analyse the problematic of the ontology of space, as monsters allow us to 
conceive of a multitude of situations in which the physical, material, abstract, 
conceptual, imaginative, affective, experiential and aesthetic interact. A multiplicity of 
existences (or ways in which the physical and the conceptual inform each other in the 
form of the monster) emerges from the construction of speculative frameworks. This 
sort of framework does not constrain space to a single viewpoint or vision, but instead 
allows us to approach its ontology from the perspective of the multiple possibilities of 
existence and confrontation that are different expressions of a possible single entity. 
 
 
Two Ontological Narratives	  	  
	  
Through a continuation of the study of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body, 
this chapter presents a combination of two (out of all the possible) overall narratives that 
emerge through the interactions discussed in Chapter Four. These two narratives enable 
the thesis to encompass a thought experiment in which the ontology of space can be 
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discussed and explored. Both narratives are driven by the relationship that exists 
between understandings of monsters and the changing and historically contingent 
understandings of the human body, particularly those revealed through medicine. 
Although the discussion is mainly situated in ancient Greece and medieval Europe, it 
should not be understood solely in the context of a specific period or region as the 
sources are used to trigger a discussion, not to limit it. As such, materials from other 
contexts, such as Daoism in China during the second century BC, ancient Chinese 
medicine and Japanese	  ghost stories, are also used to inform the discussion. Such a non-
linear approach to the study of historical sources and the past is supported by the 
historiographical discussion held in Chapter Three, which was primarily informed by the 
spatial implications of research methodologies. This chapter therefore is not an historical 
study of the monster as such; rather, it uses monsters to bring an artistic approach (by 
means of a spatial methodology) to the discussion of the ontology of space. 
Consequently, The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body is used as a speculative 
and experimental study that admits inputs from visual, material and textual sources from 
different disciplinary frameworks and times, as well as the performative practice of the 
notions of the diagram and the encyclopaedia presented over the last few chapters, as 
seen particularly through an artistic lens. 
The first narrative is driven by the apparently innocent question: where does the 
monster exist? This question is explored through the interrelations between the physical 
sites that monsters inhabit, the bodies of monsters and views of the human body that are 
driven in particular by the physiological processes in which the mouth participates. That 
is, how do monsters become present in this world and in what ways do they interfere in 
human lives? A panoply of places emerges from this interrelation, some of them in the 
realm of the physical human body, others associated with those places or dimensions in 
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which human beings have often located their own transformational processes. This 
interrelation gives rise to the notion that there is a spatial ambivalence between the place 
where monsters exist and the physiological knowledge of the human body; there is a 
slow displacement of the monster from the outside world to inside the body according to 
changes in the knowledge (mapping) of both the world and the anatomy of the human 
body. This is particularly evident in changes in how the bodies of monsters have been 
imagined, observed and depicted, and how this has been influenced by understandings 
of the human body. The shifts in what an object is considered to be help produce 
changes in what it is. 
The question of ‘where’ points to a way of investigating the ontology of the 
monster through discussing the place(s) of its existence. The question is therefore 
twofold: through questioning where monsters exist, it also asks how monsters come to 
exist, as these two questions are not separable in the context of The Mouth of the 
Monster and the Hollow Body. This twofold question will be used to reveal how space is 
always implicated – that is, is active – in the conception of any ontology as something 
that is deeply related with the enaction and construction of identities, categories, 
structures and order. Given the discussions in the first part of this thesis, the question of 
where a monster exists cannot be understood as one regarding site, place or landscape; 
instead, asking ‘where’ means questioning the friction and tension between the physical, 
‘real’ and material and the abstract, conceptual, immaterial and metaphysical dimensions 
which necessarily rise to the surface if both dimensions are seen as co-constructing each 
other. Consequently, it is not possible to dissociate the ‘where’ from the ‘how’, as space 
is implicated in the formation of entities. In addition, if ‘where’ is also seen as ‘how’, 
then the ontology of the monster is multiply informed through the expression of the 
various frictions and tensions of the two dimensions. 
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The second narrative supports the first and is driven specifically through a study 
of the role of the mouth within the human body. As the mouth partakes in multiple 
systems in the body, such as digestion and the production of sound, it is a mediator 
between human beings and monsters. In relation to digestion, the mouth is the place 
through which food enters and exits, a passage between worlds and dimensions that has 
been transposed into the realm of the monster in order to understand the reasons behind 
the monster’s existence in terms of its interrelation with human beings. Within this 
interrelation – and confrontation – the mouth emerges once again as playing a 
fundamental role in the emission of sounds. On the one hand, there is the scream of fear; 
on the other, speech and rationalisation. Thus the mouth is the place where articulation 
(speech) both happens and does not happen (the scream), giving origin to different 
understandings of and confrontations with the monster, and playing a central role in 
finding a compromise with fear, with the unknown. This can be a fear derived from an 
absence of forms; that is, the fear of a lack of separation, divisions, limits or order. Thus 
monsters enact khora, the ‘bastard’ order that is neither and both the sensible and the 
intelligible (at the same time and never). The monster is the place where the unknown is 
displaced to, although it is never fully realised and controlled, being infinite and 
unreachable. The monster, as khora, as space, cannot be fully accounted for through the 
multiple understandings and perspectives that have emerged or co-existed over time. It 
is something that is multiple, ambiguous and evasive, a place of and for transformation, 
mutation and metamorphosis. 
In an experimental and speculative context, monsters are not simply metaphors 
for something ‘other’. The use of monsters in The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow 
Body, and in this chapter, differs from other	  approaches in which monsters are perceived 
as an imaginary referent for a certain reality, as a metaphor for animality, the monstrous, 
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evil or the ‘other’, one that is often read as holding political and/or social implications. 
This analysis does not approach the monster in the same way as Scott does when he 
says: 
	  
[It is] one of the most significant creations [which] serv[es] to reflect and critique 
human existence. Whether it has its etymological roots in a demonstration of 
something (monstrere) or a warning (monere), the monster as a metaphor continues 
to be a powerful expression of the imagination and the rational. (Scott, 2007, p.1) 
 
This would be to limit the monster to something that is purely a human creation, 
metaphorically speaking, possessing no physical existence in itself. Contrary to this 
perspective, an exploration of the ontology of monsters in the context of The Mouth of 
the Monster and the Hollow Body depends on the position that monsters are entities that 
might have existed. The analogical approach is deepened (relative to the discussion in 
Chapter Three) by releasing it from its ties with the contingency of reality. This chapter 
resorts, therefore, to a suspension of disbelief that would otherwise constrain the 
monster (and its ontology) and relegate it to the position of an entity with a doubtful 
physical and material existence. Such a step begets questions on the boundaries and 
limits of materiality, physicality, visibility, reality, abstraction and imagination; that is, 
on how things with multiple levels, degrees or modes of existence are materialised and 
dematerialised. 
The importance of researching an ontology of monsters through a suspension of 
disbelief is that, by releasing the ties of reality, an array of perspectives or other possible 
realities are unleashed, revealing a multiplicity of existences. These multiple existences 
can then be seen as a model for the re-framing of the ontology of space, in which space 
is not an entity with a single, ambiguous and evasive existence, but a combination of 
multiple existences informed by different combinations (and transformations) of the 
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physical, material and experiential realm with the abstract, conceptual and imaginary 
one. A plural identity thus emerges from a single ontology. Therefore, if The Mouth of 
the Monster and the Hollow Body is understood as a model for space, it shows how 
space can be multiply unfolded in terms of its own ontology. This thesis argues that the 
same strategy that was applied to the ontology of monsters in The Mouth of the Monster 
and the Hollow Body can be applied to space, providing a framework and method for the 
exploration of its ontology. 
Accepting that monsters might have existed implies the construction of a series 
of hypotheses that would account for their possible existence. This chapter builds these 
hypotheses not only around the accounts (from stories of encounters to biographies), 
images and sculptures of monsters, but also from traces within human beings 
themselves, the results of encounters with monsters, which are reflected either in the 
belief in their existence or, at the least, in the suspension of disbelief. As such, it starts 
from the idea that traces of monsters can be found in the processes of transformation and 
metamorphosis that occur in the interaction, friction and tension between the different 
physical, material, abstract, conceptual, immaterial, metaphysical, imaginative, affective 
and experiential aspects of everyday life – that is, the frictions, tensions and interactions 
that occur between multiple dimensions of existence. To pursue an understanding of the 
existence of monsters, therefore, a multiple set of possibilities demands consideration: 
1.  The monster is something external to the human body and exists in the same 
realm. Thus there is the possibility of physical contact between monsters (who 
are encountered as fearful beings) and humans. 
2.  The monster is an entity that exists outside the human body but not in the 
same reality as the human being. Although there is a possibility of contact 
between them, one or the other must cross between these two distinct realms. 
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3.  The monster is something internal to the human body; it is part of it and 
consequently there is no distinction between the two, they are always in 
contact. The monster is one dimension of the body. 
4.  The monster is something internal to the human body; it exists as part of an 
imaginative process and is expressed through sensory experiences, narrative 
constructions, artistic materialisations, and cultural and everyday practices. 
5. The monster is both outside and inside the body, and it moves between the two 
positions, either possessing the body or existing outside it. In this case, it can 
assume multiple stages and degrees of physicality. 
6.  The monster is the human in altered form, due to death or disease. 
7.  The monster is a physical phenomenon. 
The remainder of this chapter will present the story that results from the merging of the 
two narratives discussed above, as it emerges in The Mouth of the Monster and the 
Hollow Body. This story is composed of short meditations, which take the literary form 
of multiple allegories, guided by different types of monster-existence and 
understandings of the human body. These mediations, however, also constitute The 
Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body, and as such, they should not be separated 
from the visual diagram and the encyclopaedia; rather, they should be approached in 
combination with the other sides of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body, as 
an integral part of it – as discussed in Chapter Four.  
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The Story of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body 
 
 
The mouth, the scream and speech 	  
	  
The mouth in physiology is one of the five (in females, six) external orifices of the body. 
However, the question is: where does the exterior opening finish and become part of the 
interior? Is the mouth a limited cavity or an infinite open space crossing the interior of 
the body? A point of entrance, a point of beginning or a ‘limen’ is “a threshold below 
which a stimulus is not perceived or is not distinguished from another” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2005, p. 1016). George Bataille describes it thus: 
	  
The mouth is the beginning or, if one prefers, the prow of animals; in the most 
characteristic cases, it is the most living part, in other words, the most terrifying for 
neighbouring animals. But man does not have a simple architecture like beasts, and it 
is not even possible to say where he begins. (Bataille, [1970] 1985, p. 59) 
	  
The mouth is a version of the möbius strip or the Klein bottle, which in a continuous 
movement travels between inside and outside, between multiple dimensions. In 
describing the mouth in this way, Bataille alerts us to the movement that human beings 
make – as do other animals – with the mouth placed at the highest point of the body in 
order to release those sounds that are most profoundly animalistic: 
	  
… as if explosive impulses were to spurt directly out of the body through the mouth, 
in the form of screams. This fact highlights both the importance of the superior or 
anterior extremity of the body, the orifice of profound physical impulses; one sees at 
the same time that a man can liberate these impulses in at least two different ways, in 
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the brain or in the mouth. (Bataille, [1970] 1985, pp. 59-60) 
	  
The mouth is, for Bataille, an expression of both animal physiology and psychology. In 
The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body, however, the two routes that impulses 
travel are not the mouth and the brain, but the brain and the gut, which are both 
expressed through the mouth. The first, the impulses of the brain, are expressed in 
speech, and the second, those of the gut, in the scream. 
This dual aspect of the sound produced through the mouth is also associated with 
both the mythological and the logical. The scream is the mythological side due to its 
lack of rational, logical articulation – an eschatological fear that begins in the gut and is 
expressed in a chaotic sound. Speech, in contrast, is the logical (articulated, causally 
linked and integrated) emanation of the brain. However, this particular association might 
not have always existed in this form. As Bruce Lincoln (1999) shows, in ancient Greece 
the mythological and the logical have not always been associated with the irrational and 
the rational, respectively. In tracing the history of myth, Lincoln (1999) finds20 that until 
the Sophists, in the fifth century BC, mythos was a kind of discourse that portrayed the 
truth, as opposed to the gradual association of myths with stories, falsehoods and lies. 
When the word mythos came into being in ancient Greece it was associated with and 
used to describe a trustworthy story that accounted for the actions of the gods. The truth 
either existed in the actions of the gods themselves, which stood for moral and ethical 
values, or in the words of the poets as they expressed what they had been told by the 
gods. These two positions shared the idea that the gods never lie because they stand for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Lincoln (1999) uses textual analysis of works that range from early accounts, su ch  as the 
Iliad and the Odyssey in the eighth century BC, to the philosophical works of Plato in the fifth 
century BC. 	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truth. Thus, on the one hand, logos stood for persuasion and seduction, independent of 
any truth value, and as such was associated with the speech of woman, conveying ideas 
of seduction, weakness, flaws, impermanence, transience and instability. Mythos, on the 
other hand, was associated with man, conveying ideas of solidity, strength, constancy, 
permanence, immutability and absoluteness. According to Lincoln (1999), logos was the 
pragmatic tool of human beings while mythos was the truth, echoing the commandments 
of the gods. 
Such an understanding, according to Lincoln (1999), was possible up until the 
moment at which the system of writing superseded the oral system and prose became a 
tool of communication on the same level as poetry. Writing opened up the possibility for 
an argumentative structure (logos) that did not need to rely on memory, and hence 
another way of understanding truth slowly surfaced. In contrast, mythos was part of a 
system that was based on and derived from the spoken word, in which the poetic 
construction and its form supported the process of remembering (ibid). The existence of 
an absolute truth that is set by the gods negated the necessity for debate, as the words of 
the gods were indisputable and unchanging, and all that was necessary was a system that 
enabled their retrieval (ibid). However, in the process of the change from an oral to a 
written system, poetry – and consequently mythos – became a synonym for mischievous 
stories that were not to be trusted, told by a person who played with the emotions of the 
audience in order to control their beliefs, as opposed to the idea of poetry as the stories 
told by the gods through the poet, who was thought to be a medium controlled by the 
gods. In the latter incarnation, the poet was highly prized. As the tool through which the 
words of the gods were materialised, the poet possessed no control or authority over his 
own spoken words. The diametrical shift between the standing of the mythos and the 
logos, however, was complete by Plato’s time. The logos had become the tool that 
	   258	  
philosophers would use to convey their knowledge and argue for their positions on and 
understandings of the truth. According to Lincoln (1999), the reasoning behind the rise 
of the logos over mythos was the fact that in order to debate and uncover truth with any 
sense of authority, the philosopher could not appear to base it on the manipulation of the 
emotions and senses of others. 
	  
	  
Mouth, excreta, names and order 	  
	  
In medieval Japan, a certain type of ghost, the Gaki, symbolised a way of understanding 
the relationship between the body and the underworld. The Gaki had very thin throats 
and huge bellies, which meant they were constantly hungry because they could not eat; 
in fact, they were “constituted by hunger, not merely conditioned by it” (Lafleur, 1989, 
p. 274). They were constantly looking for whatever they could consume and, as such, 
represented the transformation or disappearance of excreta (Lafleur, 1989). In a wider 
context, they explained the disappearance of matter from the world. The Gaki were seen 
as beings that exist in-between the human world and the underworld; more precisely, 
they carried their own hell of punishment in the world (ibid). They were not completely 
material, although they were not without substance as they possessed a certain 
physicality, which enabled them to eat. This relationship with what they ate, transformed 
or made disappear was present in their names. They were called: 
	  
[O]nes with bodies like cauldrons, those with needle-thin throats, vomit-eaters, 
excrement-eaters, nothing-eaters, eaters of vapour in the air, eaters of the Buddhist 
dharma, water-drinkers, hopeful and ambitious ones, saliva-eaters, wig-eaters, blood-
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drinkers, meat-eaters, consumers of incense smoke, disease-dabblers, defecation-
watchers, ones that live under the ground, possessors of miraculous powers, intensely 
burning ones, ones fascinated with colours, inhabitants of the beach, ones with 
walking canes, infant-eaters, semen-eaters, demonic ones, fire-eaters, those on filthy 
streets, wind-eaters, burning-coal consumers, poison-eaters, inhabitants of open 
fields, those living among tombs (and eating ashes), those that live in trees, ones that 
stay at crossroads, and those that kill themselves. (Lafleur, 1989, pp. 283-286) 
	  
Two ideas emerge from these ghosts: 1) the relationship with eating and the 
transformation of excreta through an understanding of the mouth and 2) the strange 
classification system of Borges’ The Analytical Language of John Wilkins, which 
Foucault uses as a point of departure for his work, The Order of Things ([1966] 2002). 
Was this relationship with excreta and eating also present in European 
Christianity in the Middle Ages? The first interaction between the Gaki and medieval 
European monsters is found in the classification system of names. As opposed to ancient 
Greece, where monsters had a name and a genealogy – as Ginevra Bompiani shows in 
The Chimera Herself (1989) – that illustrated the very specific role they played within 
the mythological system, in medieval times most monsters seem to have come into 
existence without names: they were simply called ‘demons’. However, these nameless 
monsters also reveal the importance of the mouth. The mouth, as seen in the depictions 
of demons, was one of their most important features – they were frequently depicted 
eating, not excreta but human beings. In the context of hell, in which demons were the 
perpetrators of punishment, the mouth was the vehicle of permanent, endless suffering. 
Demons, dragons, evil spirits and other monstrous figures were driven by the mouth that 
regurgitates, destroys, kills, expels fire and spreads poisonous substances – for example, 
the Amphisbaena, two-headed serpent-like creatures who were said to be doubly 
dangerous as both their heads exuded poison (Borges, [1967] 2002, pp. 16-17). But 
demons were also portrayed as eating themselves, as with the Greek monster Uroboros, 
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who became an alchemical symbol in the Middle Ages (ibid, p. 150). What, then, is the 
relationship between the human body and demons in the context of the Western world? 
	  
	  
The body, demons and resurrection	  	  
	  
If we look at medieval European medicine we find that the idea of possession, 
particularly before the witchcraft panic of the 16th and seventeenth centuries, did not 
play a substantial role in the explanation of illnesses (Siraisi, 1999, p. 149). The body 
was thought to be affected by entities, but they did not possess it. Therefore, in 
distinction to Chinese Daoism, there was a separation between the understanding of 
cosmology and the understanding of the body in terms of the interaction between these 
two systems and the divine. However, if the physical body was not greatly affected by 
demons while on earth, it was a different case in the afterlife. 
Resurrection was a matter of intense debate in the early Church, with the 
convergence of two different ways of understanding the body: Hellenistic thought and 
the Judaic tradition (Tazi, 1989, p. 523). Resurrection was a difficult concept at the 
beginning of Christianity because it implied an understanding of the body, of the flesh, 
which presented problems for the Church’s explanatory model of the afterlife (ibid). The 
idea of resurrection came from the Judaic tradition, which did not have a clear 
separation between the body and the soul. However, as Tazi (1989) shows, the idea of 
such a separation had been a matter of deep reflection in ancient Greece. For instance, in 
the Timaeus, the mortal soul inhabits the belly (the soul of irrational appetites) and the 
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chest (the soul of higher emotions), while the immortal soul inhabits the head (the soul 
of rational thought). However, all these were but expressions of the perfect soul that 
guides the cosmos. As such, despite inhabiting a material body, the soul was something 
immaterial.  
According to Tazi (1989), the Greek notion of the soul made it difficult for 
Christianity to explain how we can exist after we are dead. As his enquiry illustrates, 
heaven was a place to which we ascended after death, but it was difficult to justify the 
existence and importance of a physical body in a system in which both heaven and hell 
were seen as immaterial places, places for the soul. At the beginning of Christianity, 
Tazi (1998) reveals, there were two different explanations. On one hand, the body was 
the mortal part of the human being, perishing with death and disappearing after it, and 
thus the soul would ascend to heaven and the body, the flesh, played no role at all in the 
system that led to resurrection (ibid). On the other hand, there was a perspective in 
which the body played a very important role in protecting human beings from the 
desires of the soul. All sin came from the soul’s desires, and the body was not only its 
container but also the means through which the human being could fight these desires 
(ibid). This second perspective was associated with another notion, that of identity: the 
soul required an identity and the construction of that identity was dependent on the 
existence of a body (ibid). Consequently, the body began to play a more important role 
as it was recognised that it was the body that would actually go to heaven or hell; 
however, it did this as a rarefied body, a body that was not just form or flesh but the 
container of the soul and the identity (ibid). Looking at the images of hell (and related 
beliefs), it is possible to verify the importance of the flesh at this time through the 
punishments inflicted on fallen Christians in this netherworld. 
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The body, food, excreta, medicine and systems of correspondence 	  
	  
Medicine also reveals a particular relationship between the body and the mouth, and also 
excreta. The mouth is one of the places through which medicine is imbibed. Although in 
medieval times there were many different forms of healing, one of the most important 
practices was the ingestion of healing substances. However, there was also an important 
relationship with what the body ejects – both prognosis and diagnosis were carried out 
by inspecting faeces, urine and blood. As Siraisi (1990) shows, illnesses were believed 
to be a matter of imbalances within the body resulting from external causes: 
	  
[M]edical theory asserted that the human body exists in either health, sickness, or a 
neutral state between the two. Deviations from health were classified into congenital 
malformations (in medieval Latin, mala composition of the body), complexional 
imbalance (mala complexio), and trauma (solutio continuitatis, or break in the body’s 
continuity). This classification placed almost all internal illness in the domain of 
complexional imbalance. Relatively little attention was paid to the first of these three 
categories, and when surgery emerged from medicine as a separate occupation and 
discipline in the West during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the management of 
trauma became the characteristic task of the surgeon. Hence, the care offered by 
medical practitioners other than surgeons consisted primarily in the management of 
the body in health (that is, the maintenance of a good temperament) and the treatment 
of internal and some external illnesses attributed to complexional imbalance. (Siraisi, 
1990, p. 120) 
	  
Another important thing to notice about medieval medicine is that it emerged out of the 
convergence of three different sets of theories: those of Greek antiquity (through the 
teachings of Hippocrates and Galen), those of the Islamic world, which permeated 
Christian philosophy, and those of pagan practices (Siraisi, 1990). Medieval medicine 
inherited the theory of bodily imbalances from classical Greece, where the main concern 
was helping the patient regain lost bodily harmony. The Greek idea of the bodily 
humours persisted, creating a system in which cosmology and medicine were fused 
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(ibid). Consequently, medicine became less about knowing the body than about 
comprehending its part in a larger system, and within this system food possessed 
multiple significances (ibid). As Siraisi shows, a vegetable such as a lettuce was not 
only food but also medicine, and its impact on the body would differ according to the 
reason for its ingestion. As Siraisi states: 
	  
Indeed, food and medicine shaded into each other. Avicenna declared, in a passage 
frequently cited and discussed by Latin medical writers, that the formal distinction 
between them was that food was assimilated by the body, whereas medicine 
assimilated the body to itself. But both food and medicine were complexionate and 
affected the complexion of the person who ingested them. (Siraisi, 1990, p. 121) 
	  
Thus the digestive system can be seen to play different roles and have different sorts of 
presence and meaning both within the body and in the cosmological system. 
A particularly important food in this system was the mandrake as it played just 
such a double role as food and medicine, revealing that medicine was the combination of 
a wide system of practices. In medicine, mandrake was used as an anaesthetic because of 
its soporific properties, although it possessed hallucinogenic ones as well (Dixon, 2003, 
p. 188). In addition to this aspect, the mandrake’s peculiar shape meant it was used in 
magical practices as a talisman (ibid, p. 185); the root’s human shape gave it 
anthropomorphic properties (as Borges ([1967] 2002, p. 96) points out in The Book of 
Imaginary Beings). The body of the root was seen as a human body, yet one that was not 
fully human due to the flower that sprouted from its head. This view of the mandrake 
was so embedded in medical practice that dogs were used to dig the root out because, 
when it was pulled from the earth, the mandrake was supposed to release a scream that 
was capable of killing anyone involved in the act (Siraisi, 1990, p. 152). Mandrake was 
therefore an anthropomorphised monster due to its form and its influence on the human 
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body. This perspective allows us to observe the interactions between multiple 
dimensions or types of existence, in which the monster can be both food/medicine and 
physical experience. 
Turning to the end-process of the digestive system, the excreta, and its 
importance in medieval Europe for prognosis and diagnosis, Siraisi (1990, p. 124) notes 
that “when it took place, observation consisted primarily of taking visual note of the 
patient’s external appearance, listening to the patient’s own narrative of the illness, 
and inspecting and smelling his or her excreta”. Examination of excreta was an 
important element in diagnosing the patients’ problems or bodily imbalances as it was 
thought to contain the ‘bad humours’ that were provoking the disease and which the 
body was attempting to eliminate (ibid). Consequently, forcing the sick body to expel 
excreta – through phlebotomy (blood-letting) or inducing vomiting or diarrhoea 
(purging) – was a way of improving its balance. The category of excreta included not 
only urine and faeces but also blood. When examining excreta the doctor knew he 
should be particularly aware of its colour, odour and consistency, and particularly in 
blood-letting, in the viscosity, hotness or coldness, greasiness, taste, foaminess and 
coagulation velocity of the blood (ibid). Urine was also of such importance that all 
physicians carried ‘urine wheels’. These were colour charts which depicted all the 
possible tonalities of urine, relating its colour to different diseases, thus enabling the 
physician to compare and contrast the colour of the patient’s urine with the colours on 
the chart in order to make a judgment about the illness and the cure. 
Nonetheless, at every moment other dimensions of experience were brought to 
bear – for instance, “in describing the rhythms of the pulse, the terminology of musical 
proportion and metrical verse was also applied”, and so the mouth, the word and Gaki-
like names mark their presence. As Siraisi observes,  
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... a set of standard adjectives was used to describe individual instances of pulse that 
supposedly combined specific variations in all ten categories; these terms include a 
number of comparisons with the motion of animals – for example, pulses were said 
to be antlike, goatlike, or wormlike (Siraisi, 1990, p. 125).  
 
In this way, systems of interactions were put in place that brought together the multiple 
dimensions. 
Apart from examining the patient, the main means of identifying a disease 
continued to be according to the textual tradition, and this guided the interpretation of 
the examination (Siraisi, 1990). The fact that there was not always an examination or 
even any contact with the patient at all reveals that the textual tradition was not simply 
used for guidance but comprised the very centre of medical practice. The textual 
tradition existed over and above observation – it was a system in which the apparent 
intricacy of the world revealed itself through diseases, which were then inscribed in 
tabula (or tables). As a consequence, new diseases and even new medicines and 
treatments were inscribed in the tables, expanding them without changing their core 
structure, the system of correspondences. Diseases were categorised according to their 
description in terms of the four humours, but as Siraisi (1990, p. 130) says, “another 
kind of classification of disease that was followed in many practically oriented 
manuals, presumably because it was useful, [emphasised] the concept that different 
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The cosmological body and divinities in the body 	  
	  
In Chinese Daoist philosophy, in the second century BC, the body was seen as part of an 
overarching cosmological system of interactions driven by a replicating logic, in which 
“cosmogenesis merged with embryogenesis” (Levi, 1989, p. 106). In this system there 
was a complete transposition of a cosmological understanding to the body, in which 
each body part was the representative of its divine counterpart. However, this was not a 
not just a macro-micro relation, in which the macro cosmos is present in the micro 
cosmos of the body through a process of degeneration, as it was, for instance, in the 
Timaeus. In the Daoist system there was a complete transposition of the macro to the 
micro because there was no difference between the two dimensions – “the body is 
thoroughly divine” (ibid, p. 109). The cosmos existed within the body and existed 
through different entities, all of which were divine – although some were also 
pernicious: for example, the ‘three cadavers’ (ibid, p. 111). The relationship between the 
body, the divine and everyday practices was well established; the presence of these 
elements in the body reflected the ancestor worship that structured the whole of 
Chinese society, which consisted of making bloody offerings to the divinities, who 
were believed to be the spirits of the departed (ibid, p. 114). However, alongside the 
‘three cadavers’, the body was also the vessel of delicate spirits and it was possible 
through breath (a divine metamorphosis of bodily fluids) to care for the divine within 
the body (ibid, p. 115). The understanding of how the fluids existed within the body in 
relation to the divine was translated into a set of practices in which breathing exercises 
played a crucial role, not only for the maintenance of the body but also in establishing a 
connection with the divine (Levi, 1989). 
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The body, its depiction, pictorial planes and tables 
Figure i – Las Meninas (1656) by Velázquez 
 
Foucault describes in The Order of Things ([1966] 2002) how Velázquez’ Las Meninas 
(1656) can be understood in the different interactions and on the different planes 
revealed in the painting itself (figure e). The two elemental planes are that of the 
painting itself (the object) and the plane of representation. However, Foucault alerts us 
to the fact that other planes unfold within the picture: 
	  
For in it there occurs an exact superimposition of the model’s gaze as it is being 
painted, of the spectator’s as he contemplates the painting, and of the painter’s as he 
is composing his picture (not the one represented, but the one in front of us which we 
are discussing). There three ‘observing’ functions come together in a point exterior to 
the picture: that is, an ideal point in relation to what is represented, but a perfectly 
real one too, since it is also the starting-point that makes the representation possible. 
(Foucault, [1966] 2002, p. 16) 
	  	  	  
 
 
Figure has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
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This interaction between planes is also present in Courbet’s A Burial at Ornans (1849-
50), painted two hundred year later. As this painting is almost life-size, it particularly 
engages with the plane of the viewer because perspective is distorted when the viewer 
faces the painting: the plane of the viewer becomes perpendicular to the plane of the 
painting, giving them the sensation that they are the one who is being buried (figure f). 
Due to this distortion, the parallel planes of the viewer and the painting  become two 
perpendicular planes, which act to bring the viewer into the image. Two perpendicular 
planes also exist in medieval anatomical depictions, particularly in Guido of Vigevano’s 
The Book of Notable Matters. In these depictions, the body is both suspended in the air, 
with the feet hanging loose, almost as if ascending to heaven, and laid out on a 
horizontal plane, the plane of the surgical table or the sickbed, as it waits to be treated, 
examined or observed. 
Figure j – A Burial at Ornans (1849-50) by Courbet 
	  
	  	  	  	  
Figure has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
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The hollow bodies of demons and humans 
 
The premonition of the divine within this medieval depiction is also observable in the 
way the interior of the body is revealed. This is a hollow body, in which the inside of the 
body is a void surrounded by a thin layer of flesh and skin. This can also be seen in the 
depictions of the Resurrection in early Christianity, which exemplified the idea of the 
rarefied body as the soul’s container, a form within which the soul exists. In these 
depictions, the body is a bottomless container of all the internal invisible processes. 
Similarly, the image of the medical body reveals how a notion of a complex system 
emerges. The body is porous, with substances entering and exiting it, and crossing 
different dimensions within it – it is simply the form of these activities and dimensions, 
the place where all these transformations happen. This hollowness can also be seen in 
monsters: their bodies are depicted as hollow, with the cavity of the mouth (that 




The hybrid body of named monsters 	  
	  
As mentioned above, in ancient Greek times monsters would possess names, families, 
genealogies (Bompiani, 1989). For instance, the Griffon, a hybrid of eagle and lion, 
carried this duality into the Middle Ages, becoming symbolically divided between two 
opposing perspectives (Borges, [1967] 2002, p. 74). On the one hand, the Griffon drew 
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the chariot which symbolised the Church, but on the other, it was also a symbol of the 
devil (ibid). In distinction to the demons of hell, monsters with names had bodies that 
were markedly material as they existed most frequently as animal hybrids, giving them 
an identity that was permanently sealed when, after death, they were sent into the 
heavens as constellations (Bompiani, 1989, p. 369). An exception was the Chimera, 
whose tripartite form deprived it of a single identity, meaning that it became more of a 
verbal than a visual element, thus informing the idea of it as “the creature of language, 
the metaphor of metaphor” (ibid, p. 377).  
The importance of the hybrid monster in ancient Greece is revealed by Joahnes 
Fritsche in The Riddle of the Sphinx: Aristotle, Penelope, and Empedocles (2005) when 
he asks:  
 
But so far humans have indeed assumed the existence of goat-stags and gods. Are 
humans systematically hallucinating animals? Are they subject to a blind mechanism of 
imagination that encloses them in a horizon of notions and ideas that have little or 
nothing in common with reality? Or, are their sense organs such that they always give 
false or imaginary idea of reality? In which way does it matter whether the ideas humans 
have about reality are false or not? (Fritsche, 2005, p. 2)  
 
The Platonic and Aristotelian answer to this is: 
 
Our inborn or empirically acquired ideas of things are not false. It is only our 
capacity, and need, of combining different ideas in sentences that can bring about 
falsehood and non-being. There are no goat-stags. However, there are goats and 
stags, and the monstrosity of the goat-stag results from combining the features of 
different things in one and the same thing. (Fritsche, 2005, p. 2) 
	  
In the Harpies, for example, the multiplicity inherent to being a monster was not only 
expressed in their bodies – a combination of the female body with that of a bird – but 
also in their repetition, as the Harpies were a plural monster (Bompiani, 1989, p. 367), a 
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multiplicity. As monsters that also played an important role within the system of body-
mouth-food-digestive-system-excreta, the Greek myth of the Harpies tells that they were 
sent by the gods to contaminate and devour the dishes of a banquet prepared for a 
Thracian king, who had insulted them (Borges, [1967] 2002, p. 78). 
	  
	  
The articulated body 	  
	  
The medieval hollow body and the inhabited body of Daoism present understandings of 
the body distinct from those of ancient Greece. The Greek body was an articulated, 
ordered body. In The Expressiveness of the Body ([2002] 2006), Kuriyama argues that 
an understanding of the musculature was only able to develop through the medical 
traditions that emerged from Greek knowledge. Consequently, for Kuriyama, the 
question is: what enabled the ancient Greeks to visualise the muscles? In order to see the 
muscles, there must be an initial wish to see them, and this was manifested in the desire 
to perform dissections and observe anatomy. However, there is more to anatomy than a 
simple curiosity about the interior of the body; what defines anatomy is not just the 
opening up of the body to look into its interior – this was already common practice with 
animals in the context of divination. The existence of a desire to specifically observe the 
human body was a necessary precondition. As such, Kuriyama ([2002] 2006) argues that 
prior to knowledge of the musculature, and the anatomical knowledge and dissection of 
the Hellenistic period, there existed in classical Greek society a desire for or attraction 
towards certain features that only later came to be embodied in the muscles. 
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This attraction revolved around ideas of order and articulation. The idea of 
articulation also encompasses the idea of a clear separation and division between things: 
it is only when something is clearly distinguished that it can it become articulated with 
something else, otherwise without separation and distinction there are not two elements 
but only one, a single element which is indistinct as it takes multiple but similar forms. 
The idea of the musculature was therefore closely related to the construction of the idea 
of identity in ancient Greek culture (Kuriyama, [2002] 2006). Muscles, or the 
indeterminacy between muscle and flesh, reflected the cosmos as imbued in the body: 
the lumps seen beneath the skin depicted the strength that came from divine 
impregnation. But with changing notions of nature and an increase in the perception of 
individuality, muscles gradually became the vehicle of human agency, the evidence of 
self-command and will (ibid). 
It must not be forgotten that order in ancient Greece equalled beauty and 
goodness, as Brague reminds us in The Wisdom of the World (2004); it was an idea that 
mirrored their understanding of the cosmos. The quest for a good order is epitomised in 
the Timaeus, where Plato describes the workings of the cosmos in correlation to the 
human body. In tracing the connection of order with the human body, the idea of 
articulation (discussed by Kuriyama) emerges as fundamental. It was widely used in 
describing the bodies of heroes, which were more perfect than common human forms. 
More importantly, beyond the strength and power – fundamental to a hero – that the 
muscles enabled, the notion of the body was taking shape in the form of the hero 
(Kuriyama, [2002] 2006). This form portrayed action and readiness for action; all the 
parts of the body, in their fullest meaning and function, were fitted together so as to 
work perfectly (ibid). The body of a hero needed to be more than the body of a mortal 
because the hero was closer to the gods; it needed to be more perfect, in better order, 
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with all its parts performing at their peak. As such, the “arthroi … were not joints in 
the modern anatomical sense – at least, not just joints – but the divisions and 
differentiations that gave the body distinct form” (ibid, p.135). 
Such multiple uses suggest that articulation represented order, and the 
destruction of this order led to death. In contrast, an unarticulated body – soft, fluid, 
unstructured – was observed as being close to death; it was therefore a defeated body 
with a shifting shape, a body in transformation. In addition, indeterminacy w a s  also 
seen as the mark of the immature. Viviparous animals, Aristotle observes, produce 
offspring that from the start look similar to themselves, whereas lower animals 
produce something tha t  i s  no t  yet articulated (adiarthroton), like eggs or larvae 
(ibid, p. 135). As Kuriyama summarises: 
	  
Before [they] became fascinated with special structures named muscles, the Greeks 
celebrated bodies that had a particular look – a special clarity of form, distinct 
“jointedness,” which they identified with the vital as opposed to the dying, the 
mature as opposed to the … unformed, individuals as opposed to people who all 
resemble each other, the strong and brave as opposed to the weak and cowardly, 
Europeans as opposed to Asians, the male as opposed to the female. (Kuriyama, 
[2002] 2006, p. 143) 
 
	  
The body, the mouth, digestion, speech, scream and the monster 	  
	  
The importance of the idea of articulation is also present in language. This importance 
can be seen firstly through the ancient Greek concept of speech itself, the articulation of 
the voice by the tongue (Kuriyama, [2002] 2006, p. 136), and secondly through the 
introduction of the grammatical article into the Greek lexicon (Vernant, 1983, p. 347). 
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The article, as discussed by Jean Pierre Vernant in Myth and Thought Among the Greeks 
(1983), enabled the transformation of adjectives into substantives, and what might seem 
at first to be a small intervention in fact had the impact of transforming the ways in 
which thought could be structured. Speech, as Kuriyama ([2002] 2006, p. 136) 
illustrates, was seen as what made humans human; it was the way in which reason could 
be expressed. 
However, the connection of speech with articulation extends beyond the 
operative and physical device of the tongue, as speech was the main tool for argument 
before the establishment of writing, as shown earlier, and it had to be articulated in such 
a way as to facilitate memorisation – it needed cadence and rhythm, or the articulation of 
words according to a sound structure (ibid, p. 136). In distinction to digestion and 
pulsation, which according to the ancient Greeks were examples of movements or 
processes that human beings could not control, the activities of walking and speaking 
were examples of controlled movements, and it is the muscles that allow human beings 
to control these actions (ibid, p. 144). As Kuriyama ([2002] 2006, p. 144) suggests: 
“Muscles allows us to choose what we do, and when, and how; and this choice marks 
the divide between voluntary actions and involuntary processes. Muscles, in short, 
identify us as genuine agents”. Speaking is thus a voluntary act, but an act that is only 
available to those who can control their muscles. Consequently, those who cannot speak 
cannot control themselves and do not possess autonomy and agency; they are not 
individuals but part of a horde controlled by some other entity (ibid, p. 146). As 
Kuriyama ([2002] 2006, p. 146) says, “the bulging swells that knot the limbs and 
torsos of mythical beasts and heroes may signal courage, or strength, or passion and 
all virtues of heroes, not as personal qualities rooted in an inner self, but as marks of 
divine favor [sic], manifesting the influx of godly powers”.  Monsters that ‘eat’ (or 
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devour) are therefore revealing the fact that they are guided by external forces, they do 
not control themselves, and the actions they take are guided by uncontrollable bodily 
processes such as digestion. 
Thus once again this investigation returns to the mouth, to the beginning of the 
body and the story (emulating the Timaeus), to the scream and speech. The mouth, as 
seen throughout the story taken from the narratives of The Mouth of the Monster and the 
Hollow Body, plays multiple roles in the relationship between human beings, monsters 
and the affective dimension of their interaction. On the one hand, there is speech, the 
articulated sound, which expresses the making of order. On the other, there is the scream 
or inarticulate sound. However, both constitute the same cyclical way of becoming 
connected with the monster, while both human beings and monsters share their own 
fears and impossibilities. The actions of screaming or speaking gives the monster a 
physical, emotional, material existence; a materiality which had previously come into 
the body through eating is activated at the moment of confrontation with the monster 
either in the gut and the lungs or in the head and the lungs. The monster can therefore be 
seen as a place where the paradox of multiple, coeval existences occurs. As such, it 
reveals a series of strategies through which this paradox is managed, allowing for 
comfort and alleviation through the relinquishing of agency, thus ensuring human beings 
the possibility of life. This paradox is space itself, but it is also one that space shelters in 
the form of the monster. 
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Conclusion 
	  
This thesis has shown how space, as an entity, has given rise to a multiplicity of 
definitions and understandings. As Chapter One noted, because the concept lacks a clear 
referent – space is sometimes presented as physical and at other times as abstract and 
metaphysical – the definitions often appear contradictory, as if describing distinctly 
different things. There seems to have been little consensus on the idea of space over the 
course of Western civilisation – no one definition has persisted across time and place, 
not even contingently or provisionally. Instead, this research points to the possibility of 
the continued coexistence of multiple distinct understandings. Its findings have led to 
the conclusion that space is an ambiguous and indeterminate concept that cannot be fully 
understood or apprehended, and that attempts to do so have neglected this essential 
characteristic. 
Taking this position as its point of departure, the thesis has investigated why it is 
impossible to pin down a specific referent for space. Two concurrent hypotheses 
emerged: 1) space is an entity that is unreachable, ungraspable and unknowable despite 
the fact that it can possibly be sensed, and 2) space is a multiplicity that is 
heterogeneous, discontinuous and multidimensional. As such, ambiguity and 
indeterminacy are the inherent characteristics of space itself and not by-products of a 
lack of precision in academic discourse when attempting to define the concept; space is 
always partial, always unknowable in its entirety and thus is crucially a non-
representable entity. It is not possible to limit the dimensions of space to a single 
definition – its very name refers to this lack of limitation. However, although it 
possesses a name in everyday speech, it is not actually possible to speak of what space is 
(that is, to name it); we must rather speak of how space can be. This thesis therefore 
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suggests that what informs the multiplicity and unreachability of space is the idea that it 
reflects (and drives) the tensions, frictions, exchanges, transformations and 
combinations that result from a co-constructive process between different realms: the 
physical, material, abstract, conceptual, immaterial, metaphysical, imaginative, affective 
and experiential which inform (historical) everyday life. Space performs the boundaries 
and limits between these realms. It combines multiple realms through the very process 
of constituting them as entities, informing the practices and materialities that are 
emergent in the performance, because this is an enacted process, in which space 
intervenes through experience and affect, allowing for the conceptualisation and 
formation of identities and classifications, and the activities of ordering and structuring. 
Space is also the third, or beyond the third, the ‘other’ in the triad that includes subject 
and object; it is the entity that can never be constituted (or fully materialised) because it 
escapes the epistemologies of both the sensible and the intelligible and is thus the 
vehicle for a ‘bastard’ type of reasoning and order. However, because space is 
unknowable, as Chapter Two argues, it cannot be represented or fully addressed through 
language or other representational means, and this fact lies behind the difficulties of 
expressing the idea of space and constructing its ontology. 
The viability of the hypotheses this thesis suggests (in order to alleviate the 
tensions, oppositions and paradoxes inherent in conventional understandings of space) 
rests on avoiding a representational position and adopting instead an enacted ontology 
that does not separate humanity and the world but sees them as co-constructed, enabling 
space to emerge as an entity that addresses and is informed by multiple realms and 
dimensions. However, this model of the world, as seen in the discussion of Ingold’s 
(2011) work in Chapter One, requires the integration of processes of discontinuity, 
disruptions and breaks, not only because these are part of how we experience the world
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and therefore inform our understandings and actions as part of the world, but also 
because they allow the conceptualisation of a multidimensionality that although 
interactive is constituted by separate layers or facets and although unified is not without 
disruption. Furthermore, it does not dismiss the potential of abstraction in constructing 
structures that compare, contrast and observe similarities and differences, connections 
and relationships. This new conception of space therefore requires an epistemology that 
is non-representational, enabling us to entertain the possibility of space as a multiple 
entity that necessarily escapes all attempts to constrain it within a single viewpoint; it 
thus remains ‘unknowable’. As a result, this conceptual framework perceives space as an 
eternal conundrum  – a paradoxical and unknowable entity – in which all understandings 
and approaches are possible and related, simply presenting different facets of the same 
thing, which nonetheless remains unidentifiable as a single entity. 
Space can therefore be seen as constituted by all its multiple conceptualisations 
(historical and contemporary), as they continually add further dimensions: some fade 
away at times, although they never entirely disappear, while at other times they draw 
closer to each other. All these conceptualisations are space as they are each a facet 
comprising its multiplicity. Space is, therefore, the container and the content, death and 
life, the structural and the relational, the process and the disruption – it is the multiple 
spheres of a ‘Russian doll’. However, these spheres do not necessarily exist inside each 
other consecutively: some of them might share the same place while others might be far 
apart, some are contained within others while others do not touch or only intersect at 
some places; they exist as a mise-en-abyme. 
Space is therefore beyond multiplicity, multidimensionality; it cannot be defined 
by the concepts that have been used to define it as infinite and finite, absolute and 
relative, homogeneous and heterogeneous, limited and unlimited, dead and alive, static 
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and changing. This is because it partakes in the very definition of these concepts. It is a 
place of beginnings where all conceptualisations are drawn together through its potential 
for transformation, but it is a place of beginnings without origins, as space itself has no 
precise and definitive beginning. Space is not an entity with a single, albeit ambiguous 
and evasive, existence but a combination of multiple coexisting existences informed by 
different combinations (and transformations) of the physical, material and experiential 
realm with the abstract, conceptual and imaginary one; it is an entity with a multiplicity 
of existences informing its ambiguous and evasive nature – a plural identity that 
emerges from a single ontology, as discussed in Chapter Five. This nonetheless suggests 
the impossibility of materialising space as a meaningful whole: space can only be 
encountered in research through a ‘corralling’ process. However, it cannot be fully 
actualised by means of a research methodology, only suggested by way of its facets. 
Space, nonetheless, due to its multiple dimensions and facets, enables processes of 
research that are epistemologically driven by experience, affect, non-representationality 
and non-linearity, without a specified origin. 
Precisely because the multiple understandings of space seem to be informed by 
the processes of transformation and metamorphosis that occur in the interaction, friction 
and tension between the physical, material, abstract, conceptual, immaterial, 
metaphysical, imaginative, affective and experiential that inform everyday life, and 
because aesthetics could be regarded as a by-product of such tensions, this thesis has 
argued that the path to approaching the ontology of space lies through an artistic 
framework. Aesthetics might alleviate the tensions provoked by the ambiguity of space 
and facilitate access to its ontology through a sensuous, experiential and imaginative 
form of understanding. It is also possible, using artistic practices as a means of 
exploration, to present the detoured workings of space as a methodological device, as 
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revealed in the discussion of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body in 
Chapters Four and Five. As such, this thesis provides a set of moves that it considers an 
important way of considering an ontology of space with a productive methodological 
purchase. This enhances and supports research practices by enabling a discourse that, 
because it starts from an aesthetic perspective, does not become constrained within an 
intelligible-sensible dichotomy but instead takes advantage of the multiplicity and 
multidimensionality of space. 
One of the findings that is important in this context is that although space can 
never be fully apprehended or represented, it nevertheless informs a set of practices, 
frameworks and even materialities. As such, the connection between structures and 
space is fundamental to the belief that space has a methodological purchase. In turn,  a 
spatial structural method (that is, space as a methodological device) can be used to 
explore the ontology of an entity by revealing the connections and disconnections, 
similarities and differences, tensions and multi-level dimensions of its constitution in 
multiple realms. 
This thesis has used the notion of structure to establish the viability of space as a 
methodological device, not only in so far as its association with a type of spatial 
conceptualisation is concerned, but also as an active element existing in the realm of 
spatiality. Its potential was investigated in the first part of the thesis, in which structures 
emerged as constituents of enacted orders, as being the facet of space that, being 
relational, plays with the infinite set of experiences of order that space allows. As such, 
structures are a key element in the thesis as they provide an avenue by which to reach 
the perception that space has a practical, productive side. Chapter Four then illustrated in 
a visual diagram how structures are multiply integrated: the diagram was informed by 
the concurrent coexistence of multiple structures, each of them presenting different 
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approaches to space in an integrated, interactive and non-hierarchical way – a single 
unity constituted by the non-unified but interactive, infinite dimensions of space. The 
diagram thus enacted the paradoxical and impossible nature of space. 
The diagram can therefore be understood as an enacted, non-representational, 
material outcome of the processes of experiencing and perceiving order through 
interactions between multiple realms. More simply put, a diagram combines the practice 
of drawing with structures from the point of view that the two dimensions are co-
constitutive and part of the whole process that enacts space. As such, diagrams not only 
embody and enact space, but they are also expressions of space as a methodological 
device. Space has methodological purchase when informed by its (open and accepting) 
conceptualisation as comprising a multiplicity of dimensions and facets that nonetheless 
constitute a single entity. However, exploring and  constructing space as a 
methodological device, and putting it into practice, is a process that is shared in a 
dialogical fashion with the beholder; or more accurately, with the world itself. An 
analysis of The Mouth of the Monster and the Hollow Body also revealed that space, in 
its methodological productivity, could be fundamental to approaching and researching 
concepts (such as space) that are ontologically ambiguous, unrepresentable, unreachable 
and unknowable in their totality. This insight has created a perspective on space in 
which space constitutes itself; it is a mise-en-abyme. That is, it is a mise-en-abyme – 
created through a ‘bastard’ kind of order – that constructs itself as a device through the 
multiple perspectives and understandings of space itself. Space is then an infinite 
creation of infinities, successively falling into each other. 
Nevertheless, for the conceptualisation of space to be meaningful in the context 
of research methodologies, it is necessary to emphasise that space is both multiple and 
multidimensional. The idea of multiple realities corresponding to an	  infinite number of 
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subjectivities, however, is still insufficient for an understanding of the 
multidimensionality of space. Even with the idea of the multiple realities of multiple 
subjectivities, the multiplicity is still reduced, necessarily complying with the notion of a 
single ‘outer’ reality from which these multiple subjectivities emerge. As such, it does 
not 1) speak about the existence of a multiplicity of perspectives in the same subject, 
particularly when these might be contradictory; 2) account for the notion of ‘outer’ 
multiple worlds or realities; or 3) conceive of the interaction and co-construction of all 
these dimensions. 
Thus, as a productive methodological device, space is a mise-en-abyme that 
constructs itself as a device through multiple perspectives and understandings, which are 
possible due to the fact that although interacting with and informing each other, the 
facets of space exist in different dimensions. The mise-en-abyme is possible because 
although it is constantly self-reflective, it is never so in relation to the same aspect or 
through the same perspective. This is a mise-en-abyme methodology that does not hide 
but, rather, explores ontology through the perspective that we can never say that it is, 
that is known, but instead that it must rest in ambiguity. We can only show, not explain. 
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DISCLOSING SPACE: ORDER AND MEDIATION FROM HAND-DRAWN 





University of Plymouth 
 
 
In this paper hand-drawn scientific illustration will be presented as a mediator between humans and 
ideals of the physical world, which are needed to be made attainable thereby enforcing a 
materialisation. In order to deconstruct this mediation an analytical framework will be created through 
the exploration of two antithetical order systems and their interaction with subjective and objective 
human dimensions. The use of this framework reveals how the mediation operates on different levels 
of the construction and understanding of hand-drawn scientific illustrations; as scientific drawing is an 
embodied action guided by conventions for its construction and analysis. Consequently, it becomes a 
case study for understanding the human felt experience on the construction of scientific theories that 
deal with order and systematization. Observed through this perspective, hand-drawn scientific 
illustration propels an analogous function to geometry in mathematical conceptualizations, as these are 
both apparently disruptive forms of mediation. This correlation prize open issues concerning space, 
particularly regarding its role as the conceptual foundation of geometries. The mathematical 
correlation will unfold from an isotropic/anisotropic discussion inside Newtonian mechanics. The 
outcome of this reading will reveal the interactions between the human connection with the physical 
world and conceptualizations of space, as despite the inherent immateriality of this relationship, 
concrete and tangible signifiers, such as verbal and mathematical languages, have long characterized 
our understanding of space. Consequently it is expected that observing geometries as a mathematical 
materialized mediator of the human/space interaction, this relationship begin to be unveiled. 
 
 
In the preface of The Order of Things (1990), Michel Foucault discusses different layers of order 
operating systems and how the workings of culture, built upon an interplay between these, can liberate 
order itself. During this process the interstices between the operating systems are revealed, which open up 
the possibility of other kinds of order. 
 
Thus, between the already ‘encoded’ eye and reflexive knowledge there is a middle region 
which liberates order itself: it is here that it appears, according to the culture and the age in 
question, continuous and graduated or discontinuous and piecemeal, linked to space or 
constituted anew at each instant by the driving force of time, related to a series of variables or 
defined by separate systems of coherences, composed of resemblances which are either 
successive or corresponding, organized around increasing differences, etc. This middle region, 
then, in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the most 
fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be 
more or less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this experience of order 
in its pure primary state always plays a critical role); more solid, more archaic, less dubious, 
always more ‘true’ than the theories that attempt to give those expressions explicit form, 
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exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. Thus, in every culture, between the use of 
what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is the pure 
experience of order and of its modes of being. (Foucault 1990, p.xxii) 
 
At one extreme of the layers of order there is a type, “the encoded eye” that unfolds from the perceptual 
confrontation with the qualities of things. This confrontation encourages us to analyse things by grouping 
or separating, creating matches and seeing sequences of causes and consequences, as if the distinguishing 
codes were innate to things and we were driven by the qualities themselves to order what they have 
produced. However, Foucault points out that this classification is subject to the underlying human drives; 
that order only emerges when almost imperceptible subjective criteria are used, making the work of order 
almost a primary and instinctive necessity. In contrast there is another ordering at work; the generation 
and implementation of analytic structures, which are born from conscious thought and action, the 
“reflexive knowledge”. These analytic structures, or grids, also play another part when they make visible 
the organising system that constitutes order, thus enabling discourses about universal laws. This second 
type of order forms the work of Philosophy and Science and in it is recognised the existence of measuring 
standards, which become themselves a studied and regulated subject matter. These two extremes of order 
enaction will be used in this paper to guide a reflection on hand-drawn scientific illustration as an instance 
in which both ordering systems are apparent. The paper will show how in certain scientific illustration the 
order of the “encoded eye” and the one of “reflexive knowledge” operate by means of subjective and 
objective interplay and what impact this has on knowledge. 
 
The issue of scientific illustration discussed in this paper is intentionally limited to hand-drawn examples. 
Although these two types of ordering systems are evident elsewhere, for example in scientific 
photography, drawing has been chosen since it is more immediately embodied and there are established 
conventions and techniques for their construction and analysis. As a consequence it is discernable the 
presence of the two types of ordering systems in hand-drawn scientific illustration due to the simultaneity 
and interplay of subjective and objective facets, both in the representational method —drawing— and in 
the purpose of the illustration. At one level it is possible to see in these drawings the interaction with the 
qualities of things inducing an unconstrained immanent order —an order that is brought up by a kind of 
primal confrontation with things and which is conveyed in the drawing action. However, this action is 
disciplined by a pre-determined and objective structure that creates rules on how to drawn scientifically —
for example an almost inviolable rule is that the light source should be at 45° angle to the object and 
orientated from left to right21. 
 
The illustrator should ask the scientist what conventions apply to the subject at hand. Among 
the questions to be asked are: what views are needed (lateral, dorsal, ventral, three-quarter, 
sagittal, cross section, exploded)? In what positions should the specimen be drawn? For 
taxonomical illustrations, for example, animal often are drawn facing left. Should dotted or 
dashed lines be used to indicate internal structures? Obtain a sample drawing for that specific 
discipline. Maintaining consistent conventions permits the work of several illustrators to be 
easily compared and ensures that an illustration will be ‘read’ properly. (Hodges 2003, p.35) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 By setting such a rule it is avoided that convexities and concavities are mistakenly read, reducing flaws and 
subjective interpretations of the drawing. As Dominic Lopes accounts in Drawing in the Social Sciences: Lithic 
Illustration, this rule becomes evidently important in lithic illustration. 
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These rules exist in part to release the mechanisms of drawing while guiding and keeping under control 
the representational act —so to contain it within its contextual framework, the scientific knowledge— as a 
reminder that what is intended is an order within the scientific sphere. By reminding the illustrator of the 
purpose of the drawing it is not mistakenly thought that the aim is to create a simulacrum22 or a hyper-real 
representation23. Being a ‘hand-drawn’ scientific illustration it shares some characteristics with other types 
of visual representations, especially those said to be realistic, or those that create an illusion. The aim is 
not to portray a simulacrum of an object that, although physically absent, would exist in the illusion of 
seeing and experiencing it in the virtual space of the representation24. It is neither the aim to create a sign 
that indicates the existence of something somewhere else for which it stands. Nonetheless, there is a 
virtual representation in hand-drawn scientific illustration, as there always is, as long as there is a visual 
representation of something. Consequently, and although hand-drawn scientific illustration can be 
observed just for its visual qualities, its realism and illusionary dimension are accessory properties which 
only surface due to the techniques used to depict the object. These techniques of rigour and precision thus 
become rules on how to draw scientifically, as they not only enable a rigorous and structured 
formalisation —enforcing the scientific order, but also become representatives that state scientific 
objectivity. Therefore, by using these drawing techniques it is possible to balance the subjective and the 
objective in the action of drawing.   
 
The rules act as norms and placeholders bridging the empirical order and the theoretical order, the 
scientific analytic structure. Therefore, above all the rules, runs the scientific discourse determining the 
co-ordinates of the analytic structure, or grid. This shows which are the congregating factors of the 
different taxonomical categories and presents a scale that specifies the differences and similarities through 
which the object should be differentiated. The scientific grid operates not only as a primary criterion to 
guide what should be depicted in the drawing, but also, by insisting on the taxonomical purpose, ensures 
that it is a recognisable, even ‘familiar‘, ordering of the world that is being drawn. Consequently, a 
scientific drawing is never an innocent representation since it is guided by a prior analysis of what is being 
represented, which is not only supported but also restricted by the examining grid that insists on what is 
essential to the category. Therefore, it is not a representation of specific properties of the individual that is 
intended and that is being structured —although one starts from the individual— but the qualities of a 
category, for instance a species. Therefore, what is represented in hand-drawn scientific illustration is an 
archetype, the perfect exemplar, and through it the organising and communicating system of a particular 
kind of scientific knowledge into which the object of study is inserted. For this reason, more than an 
archetype, it represents an ideal, in order to create a taxonomy the individual needs to be abstracted so that 
the qualities of the category can be idealized and the analytic structure given form. Consequently, what 
one can observe in a hand-drawn scientific illustration is a virtual image of an ideal, which therefore 
reveals in each moment the existing scientific paradigm. In conclusion, despite being a drawing, hand-
drawn scientific illustration is a scientific tool and this needs to be visible in the representation so that it 
becomes observable that it is a discourse on scientific knowledge that is being constructed; although one 
that is based upon two antithetical order systems. Such a diametric construction is more easily 
recognizable when hand-drawn scientific illustration is observed throughout history. 
 
In order to unravel the work of these two order levels in hand-drawn scientific illustration it is helpful to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 ‘A simulacrum is a ‘simulated object’. It is an object that has many of the same visible attributes as its original, yet 
it does not share its essence’. (Ettlinger 2008, p. 35)  
 
23 Throughout the paper, and after the Or Ettlinger, by hyper-real representation will be understood as a representation 
of things that may or may not be physical but that exist as signs referring to other entities. Therefore they may have an 
existence in the virtual space of the representation or in the physical world.  
 
24 In The Architecture of Virtual Space (2008), Ettlinger advances a theory of pictorial images according to which 
pictorial representations are the creation of a virtual space where a non-physical reality takes place. 
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look into what objectivity meant throughout the history of hand-drawn scientific illustration. Observing 
objectivity as a scientific paradigm that has not been a constant, but an emerging and growing concern 
throughout time within the scientific framework, when looking into hand-drawn scientific illustration 
history this pursuit is revealed. The process for the foundation of modern scientific illustration, comprising 
most of the rules we still use nowadays, was a slow one. Around the fourteenth century changes start to 
happen which are encompassed in the representation of things: the images start have realistic concerns. 
However, with exceptional rare cases there is no intention to portray any kind of scientific knowledge in 
the representation of things. Images existed to show other dimensions, mainly religious and mythological 
ones, either then the actual thing or the knowledge of the thing. When the knowledge of something was 
communicated it was most frequently used diagrams and not scientific illustrations. Therefore, in most 
cases, the need for an actual confrontation with the thing being represented did not existed. By the 
sixteenth century representations achieve a degree of realism that doubts exist as to whether they were 
attained via direct observation of the portrayed thing or not. Such changes indicate a growing concern 
with the representation and communication of a rational and scientific knowledge of the object instead of 
a religious and mythological one. Nonetheless, until the eighteenth century it was common practice to 
represent something based on other drawings instead of an analyses driven through direct visual contact; 
copies were considered an acceptable way to share the knowledge but also to learn drawing techniques. It 
was also accepted that the illustrator could “perfect” the drawing so that it better conveyed the taxonomy. 
Only recently is there a demand that drawings are based on live exemplars and supported by extended 
levels of information. Additionally, and also only recently, the drawing activity has to follow the 
previously mentioned rules in order to depict things so that representations match the objectivity standards 
of contemporary science. This synthesized overview gives us a framework through which we can observe 
what was supposed to be depicted and the way to do it throughout history. Consequently, when analysing 
hand-drawn scientific illustrations it is possible to perceive the changes in the scientific paradigms and in 
what objectivity meant. Therefore more than a history of representations, even of the different codes on 
how to draw scientifically, it gives us a panorama of those changes. As a result, it is possible to observe 
that scientific representations —and thus the scientific discourse for which the representations stand for— 
is not only informed by objective premises but also built upon a subjective human dimension that is 
present in the act of drawing along with the paradigms themselves that guide the structuring of the 
scientific grid. The significance of scientific illustration lies in the essential confluence and visibility of 
these two different layers of order construction informed by subjective and objective dimensions. 
Therefore, hand-drawn scientific illustration acts as an important mediator between these dimensions.  
 
On this basis, examining hand-drawn scientific illustration as a mediator can unveil the workings of 
subjectivity and objectivity. On a first analysis three sub-categories of interaction fall under the scope of 
the mediation determined by the three key stakeholders in scientific illustration: the illustrator, the 
scientist and the observer: 
 
i) Illustrator and object: at the moment of the representation construction, when the illustration is being 
drawn and both ordering spheres are in action. In this sub-category the mediation occurs when the 
illustrator confronts the thing being represented through the depicting rules used in cooperation with the 
scientific grid. The mediation is done through direct confrontation with the object and the intention is to 
organise the information in the form of a drawing. 
 
ii) Scientist and knowledge of the object: when, after the taxonomy is created, scientists use the illustration 
to return to the structure, or the laws governing the structural decisions of the taxonomy. The mediation in 
this sub-category is based on all the elements present in the illustration that allow the scientist to read the 
knowledge in conformity with the grid. This is the reason why frequently in the representation there are 
additional schemes, drawings or textual information. In this way the representation becomes a tool in the 
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knowledge sphere whose content often needs to be guided, pointed, taught so that it can be understood. 
Additionally, the mediation in this sub-category is not one in respect to the object but to the knowledge of 
the object. As previously observed, hand-drawn scientific illustration does not primarily concern itself 
with simulacra or hyper-reality. Being either of these would be antagonistic because what is being 
mediated both in i) and ii) does not lie outside the illustration analytic structure — either when making it 
or reading it— in the virtual space of the image, nor outside the purposes that justify its very own 
existence. 
 
iii) Observer and drawing: when the illustration is apprehended without any governing rules or scientific 
gird, and therefore the object can only be grasped outside the laws that determined its representation in the 
scientific context. This sub-category however can be further subdivided into: a) when the observer is 
unaware that what is presented is a scientific illustration; b) when the observer is aware that what is 
presented is a scientific illustration and therefore knows that there is another order present beyond an 
aesthetic representation. In a) it is possible to consider the simulacrum and the hyper-real, but then the 
representation ceases to be a scientific illustration and rests just as a representation. In b) as it was 
observed in ii) it might be necessary that there is an external intervention so that the scientific information 
is communicated. Nonetheless either in a) and b) the mediation is performed through the image and it is 
mostly based on empirical knowledge. 
 
All three sub-categories derive from the above understanding of hand-drawn scientific illustration, which 
acknowledges it as a tool intended to support a taxonomy that is informed by diverse interactions between 
the two order levels and their interplay with subjective and objective dimensions. In this account hand-
drawn scientific illustration is not reducible to the representation and its constituent elements, instead it 
should be regarded as an analytical system that is present during the entire process of the representation 
construction in which what is being portrayed is a system of knowledge. Nonetheless in all the sub-
categories there is not only a scientific but also a felt experience of the thing conveyed by the mediation, 
although with different weights. This is the reason why we are able to use these three sub-categories (and 
two sub-divisions) to examine hand-drawn scientific illustrations as a medium that reveals some of the 
processes of subjective and objective interactions. This suggests that there is something quite specific at 
work in hand-drawn scientific illustration that enables it to congregate and make visible these different 
dimensions and orders in just one thing.  
 
The mediation achieved by scientific illustration is only possible as the process used to build and 
communicate the information—drawing— makes distinctively visible what is being mediated (two 
disparate orders and their configuration with subjective and objective dimensions). However, this 
transparency is a peculiar one as it causes disquiet in the viewer by bringing together in different moments 
what is thought to be antithetical: the subjective and the objective. The trigger is in fact just the 
recognition that what is being observed is a drawing and of what a drawing is: a subjective action that 
mainly concerns the relation established between one person and the thing being drawn, thereby 
transferred into an action, the gestures that make the strokes. It is thereafter possible to say that the 
specificity of hand-drawn scientific illustration derives from the inherent qualities of scientific drawing. 
This is a particular drawing process informed by two main dimensions: the act of viewing and the codes 
on how to draw scientifically. Which is then the interrelation between these elements? If we observe 
drawing as a particular way of analysing something through a sensorial connection —which is guided by 
the senses (mainly the vision) and transformed into gestures— it hence becomes an embodied analytical 
viewing where two levels of interpretation occur. The first one comes from the act of viewing which is in 
itself a way of understanding something. However, there is a goal guiding the viewing when this act is 
placed in a drawing context. Inside this context, the goal is the conversion of what was perceived by 
viewing into a materialised thing, strokes on a paper. It is during the materialization that the second level 
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of analysis takes place; when the strokes become a composition by their organisation and ordering. 
Consequently, the act of drawing rests in a delicate interaction between the viewing and the gesture as 
these two actions work simultaneously in a process that is partially conscious and partially immanent but 
deeply subjective. Therefore, how can a drawing be a tool for the sciences even nowadays? It is when this 
question is apprehended that the tension between subjective and objective becomes visible as we are 
aware that the illustration is intended to be a scientific product, and therefore must convey scientific 
expectations.  
 
Scientific analyses are generally regarded as guide by purposes other then portraying a subjective human 
connection with something, a detached knowledge of the thing is expected. Additionally, it is also 
intended that the information gathered and communicated is structured in a way so that it can be 
understood by those with the means to read it and thus replicable. The objective is that the knowledge 
formulated can be widespread, used and reinforced by others. Consequently, hand-drawn scientific 
illustration needs to be placed within the scientific context in order to gain validity. Such is the reason 
why in order to give it a scientific framework there are necessary specific drawing rules and methods. 
Thus the specificity, importance and validity of hand-drawn scientific illustration is achieved through the 
combination of different kinds of analyses which are informed by a multi-dimensional connection 
between subject and object. This particularity in hand-drawn scientific illustration of grabbing a multi-
dimensional connection, which becomes visible in the drawing itself, enables all the three subjects 
(illustrator, scientist and observer) to be in contact with a representation of a knowledge — whether the 
understood knowledge is subjective, objective or both. Therefore, in a hand-drawn scientific illustration 
the subjective and objective dimensions become present in the drawing through the materialization of the 
multi-dimensional connection performed by the three sub-categories. Until this moment the role of hand-
drawn scientific illustration as a mediator between subjectivity and objectivity was examined through the 
analysis of the three sub-categories (and two sub-divisions). However, if the sub-categories are in fact 
different reflections of a connection between subject and object, then the interaction between illustrator, 
scientist and observer with object, knowledge of the object and drawing can be redefined into one major 
category: the viewer/viewed category. At this stage it will be sufficient to flag the complexity and nuances 
of the viewer/viewed interaction as being more extensive than a physiological and perceptible deed in a 
particular representational practice25. Consequently, when regarding scientific illustration as a mediator, 
viewing is not only vital for making the representation in the hand-drawn context, but also for reading the 
illustration in its multiple dimensions and orders. Nonetheless, the relation between viewer and viewed 
does it not insist on the necessity of something to be seen? If so, it primarily exists the necessity for a 
connection between subject and object, which subsequently requires a materialised mediator so that the 
aim of the connection can be achieved. Is it then possible to communicate and be connected with an 
abstract idea without a materialisation? Or to portray a scientific ideal without a representation, as is the 
case of hand-drawn scientific illustration?  Is it not the materialisation, whether verbal, mathematical or 
visual, the only way we have to communicate ideals? In hand-drawn scientific illustration it is visible, 
through the materialized mediator, the tension between an intellectualised ideal of the world and our need 
to understand and act on it; a multi-dimensional connection between Man and the physical world. 
Accordingly, if there is the necessity to materialise this connection, such a translation becomes the 
physical mediator to which we have direct access, so as to get in contact with abstract ideas and ideals. 
Therefore the tangibility of hand-drawn scientific illustration becomes vital in the mediation process, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 This broader perspective of the viewer/viewed relation and the apparently seemless fusion of orders will be 
discussed in future paper/thesis particularly in relation to the reception of relics using the work of Christof L. 
Diedrichs. In the paper Desire for Viewing: 'A deluge of images' in the Middle Ages (2005), Diedrichs analyzes how 
formal developments in relic holders are guided by different modalities of seeing, giving an expression and authority 
to this action that prompts a reflection on the relation between what is seen and desired to be seen. Consequently 
reporting that beyond a reflected, conscious and controlled experience of something, there is also a connection 
between subject and object that overrides comprehension. Viewing can afterwards be understood as an action with 
different degrees and manifestations of both an analytical and reflexive dimension and a felt, sensorial even emotional 
one. In this broad perspective viewing can be seen as an inborn modality of connection, construction and ordering of 
the physical world, which is informed by subjective and objective dimensions. 
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by feeding the viewing construction —both when making and reading the illustration— not only enables 
the combined work of the two order levels but also reveals them. Derived from this conclusion it is now 
possible to make an overall picture on how does hand-drawn scientific illustration function as a mediator. 
Additionally, which is the importance of such a mediation as the aim for analysing hand-drawn scientific 
illustration is to derive an analogy with geometry, so that the conceptualizations, role and importance of 
space inside mathematics can be understood. 
 
As a taxonomical tool hand-drawn scientific illustration is used to construct a discourse on order and 
making order, which is informed by a multi-dimensional connection between subject and object, or Man 
and the physical world. In turn, this connection has its origins in the confluence of two distinct order 
systems and their interplay with subjective and objective dimensions. However, the multi-dimensional 
connection impacts not only on the construction of the scientific grid itself —that reflects our discourses 
on order and making order— but also on the materialisation of that construction. Consequently, hand-
drawn scientific illustration can be presented as the materialization of intellectualised ideals of order in the 
world, as in order to be constructed and reflected upon these need to be formalized. Consequently, hand-
drawn scientific illustration is a necessary materialized mediator between Man and abstract ideals of the 
physical world and it’s ordering, as in order for Man to be use these ideals it is necessary to make them 
attainable and manageable. Nonetheless, by performing this mediation, hand-drawn scientific illustration 
makes transparent the human action on scientific constructions thus becoming disruptive. Moving into 
another representational model, the mathematical language, and its relation with space, is it still possible 
to find similar disturbances? Is there something in mathematics that plays a similar role to the one 
performed by hand-drawn scientific illustration? Is there something in the foundation of what is 
considered to be a rigorous method of abstraction and logical reasoning that reveals the dual order system 
and its interplay with subjective and objective human dimensions? Where do ideals fit in mathematics and 
how are these materialized? In a paper entitled The Causal Efficacy of Space (1964), the circumstances 
that make spatial anisotropy a sustainable conceptualisation are analysed by Dudley Shapere. The analysis 
is informed by observing how different conceptions of space influence a set of related concepts thereafter 
creating a network of congruent and context specific word meanings. Nonetheless, such a network is only 
possible when some breaches are created between theoretical conceptualizations and the ordinary usage of 
the word space. Thus, a friction between the two order systems is generated, revealing the context in 
which some scientific positions where assumed, like Newton’s refusal of anisotropy26. Proceeding from 
the work of Shapere it will be built an analogy between geometry and hand-drawn scientific illustration as 
in this paper are set significant indications about the relation between Man, space and mathematical 
constructions.  
 
In the Causal efficacy of Space, Newton’s mechanics is used as a case study to illustrate how language 
interacts with abstract thinking in conceptualizations of space and how these conceptualizations impact on 
mathematical constructions. In order to study the physical behaviour of entities, Newton had to encompass 
measurements of size, shape and relative positions in his theory and in turn an analytic structure is needed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The relevance of this question is better understood when reading what Shapere himself stated about the distinction 
between isotropy and anisotropy. ‘Modern relativity theory and cosmology raise the question of whether physical 
space (or any region thereof) is ‘isotropic’ or ‘anisotropic’ —that is, as various authors put it, of whether space is ‘the 
same in all directions,’ of whether it has a ‘unique direction’ or ‘orientation,’ or of ‘the equivalence of different spatial 
directions.’ To common sense, however, such locutions are only confusing: for what can it mean to raise the 
possibility that space itself, independently of its material content (though perhaps because of its material content), has 
any direction? This confusion is increased by the fact the terms ‘isotropic’ and ‘anisotropic’ are here borrowed from a 
language used to talk about media: thus Van Nostrand's Scientific Encyclopedia defines these terms only with 
reference to media, declaring an isotropic medium to be one ‘whose properties are the same, in whatever direction 
they are measured.’ We can understand this usage —water is an isotropic medium, a crystal is not. But common 
sense, at least, does not consider space to be a medium, but rather to be a container of media, and thinks of media or 
bodies in space as possibly manifesting different properties in different directions, but never of space itself as possibly 
doing so.’ (Shapere 1964, p.111) 
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which accounts for space. In mathematics those analytic structures are geometries, thus opting for a 
certain geometry alternatively to others has implications on what is primarily considered as space and 
thereafter an entity, behaviour and their characteristics. Consequently, Newtonian mechanics is dependent 
of an entire structural web of concepts and concept meanings that guide the geometry. In Newton’s case 
the developed geometry did not comprise space as anisotropic. Therefore, which analytic structure and 
concept-meanings did Newton use, which prevented him to think of space as anisotropic? Newton’s space 
is considered to be absolute and uniform in the sense that has no qualities able of any kind of interaction. 
In it there is no agency; space is ‘’indifferent’ to the phenomena which take place in it’ (Shapere 1964, 
pp.111-121), thus uniformity is a property of entities themselves and not from being uniformly activated 
by space —which is the Riemannian space. Consequently and moreover, Newton’s space can neither be 
isotropic nor anisotropic as it has no properties at all, it is just a container. Inhibiting Newton from 
attributing any kind of qualities to space is the fact that his conception of space was coincident with a 
certain usage in verbal language of this word. A usage that is grounded in a felt experience thereafter 
feeding, as a primary conception, other levels of abstraction. Newton’s conceptualization of space 
coincides with one of the common language meanings of such word, it is therefore possible to observe the 
interactions between verbal language and mathematics, opening up the path to observe the dual 
construction of the two types of order and their interplay with subjective and objective dimensions. 
Consequently and additionally, the role of space and geometries in our connection with the physical world 
through mathematics becomes clearer. 
 
Newton’s conceptualization of space, which informs his geometry, not only is grounded as it is also 
considered the most representative of one of the only three types of physical conceptions of space that, 
according to Keimpe Algra27, exist from antiquity up until Einstein’s time, since all these three types of 
physical space have their roots in ordinary language. 
 
Newton’s concept of absolute space is no doubt the most famous representative of the (c) kind 
of space, his concomitant notion of relative space rather belonging to the (b) kind. Also this 
concept of absolute space might be regarded as an extension of one of the senses in which the 
word space is used in common parlance. We use ‘space’ in this sense e.g. when we say that a 
body moves ‘through’ space, and the concomitant notion of absolute place when we say that 
body (A) ‘occupies’ the place formerly held by body (B). (Algra 1995, p.18 ) 
 
Both Shapere and Algra support the idea that conceptualisations of space have profound connections with 
ordinary language up until Einstein’s time and that it was a departure from this conceptualization model 
that enabled Einstein to be groundbreaking. Nonetheless, Einstein himself made misinterpretations of 
Newton’s concept. This was possible since Newtonian’s geometry is set on a structural web of concepts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, Keimpe Algra enquires on how physical space was thought, questioned and 
understood throughout ancient Greek physical theories. In order to proceed with his study, Algra distinguishes three 
main categories in which concepts of physical space until the 20th century can be divided. This derive from the 
functions that a concept of space may fulfil in physical theories which foundations are in everyday experience and 
therefore are rooted in the ordinary usages of the word space in language. According to Algra, 
“Space may figure as: 
(a) a kind of prime stuff or ‘reservoir of physical possibilities’, or 
(b) a framework of (relative) locations, or 
(c) a container, the ‘fixed stage where things Play out their comedy’, a space in which things are and through 
which they can move, to paraphrase Epicurus.” (Algra 1995, p.15-16) 
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with a specific logical cohesion. In case such structure is not interpreted within its own logical system, 
which signifies using the exact same word meaning for the set of concepts, interpretation errors may 
occur. Yet, a misinterpretation of Newton’s space based on an incorrect word reading is only a reflection 
of a more profound problem, thus it does not fully explain Einstein’s misreading. Such confusion firstly 
derive from the multiplicity and fluctuations of the meanings of the word ‘space’ in verbal language, 
which create a divergence and resistance in the understanding of other conceptualizations involving this 
word. Secondly and deeper in the analysis of the misinterpretation, the multiplicity of meanings has its 
origins in various subjective felt experiences, which entails some contradictory experiences. These diverse 
experiences, in turn, inform the different conceptualizations of space that are transferred into ordinary 
verbal language. Therefore, ordinary verbal language becomes a reflection of the constructions of the first 
type of order. Finally, when scientific usages are interconnected with verbal language —as in Newton’s 
case— the two orders come together and therefore the word turns into something that needs to be 
understood and read in its precise context. If up until Einstein the relationship between ordinary usages 
and scientific ones was much more intimate, the fact that it took place in a departure from the common 
usage since the beginning of the twentieth century, made this concept even more unclear. These 
circumstances contributed to a deeper and disturbing proliferation of meanings, making space an even 
more difficult and demanding concept to communicate, use and comprehend. New conceptualisations 
seem counterintuitive and contradictory in regard to what is felt as being physical space. Therefore, these 
new conceptualizations make space for an even more unsettling concept. However, the uneasiness with 
the concept of space does not primarily emerge from the described developments; they are a result of the 
concept itself and its characteristics that generate an absence of a sole and converging meaning. Space is 
in itself indefinable as it is unattainable to observation and analysis; consequently the lack of consensus 
concerning this word is a manifestation of something deeper, as the problematic is the very own essence 
of space and our understanding of this essence. Consequently intellectualizations of space can be observed 
as a multi-dimensional connection with the physical world, which are articulated through verbal and 
mathematical languages and interconnections of both. 
 
Considering the diverse intellectualizations of space is it then possible to observe geometries as 
materialized mediators guiding the attainability of space intellectualizations in mathematics? As 
previously observed, Newton adopted a geometry in conformity with a certain conception of space. This 
conception of space was informed by a particular subjective experience of the physical world and for that 
reason it was impossible for him to conceive space as anisotropic. Consequently, Newton’s space bounded 
him to a specific analytic structure, or geometry, but for what are geometries used? Geometries are used to 
guide and make scientific (mathematical) readings of the relations between physical entities. Thereafter, 
by matching these readings with the theories that would explain them, it is possible to account for the 
validity of those same theories. However, because geometries are informed by conceptualizations of space 
it not possible to account for the essence of space itself; the outcomes of geometries are pragmatic and 
usable measurements that inform descriptions of the physical world and it’s ordering. By using geometries 
is then possible to construct, validate and convey our scientific theories. Therefore, a geometry it is not 
only an analytic grid which is built upon space conceptualizations, but also the tool that makes those 
conceptualizations applicable so that a scientific order may be achieved. However, prior to the geometry, a 
necessary ontology of space that releases us from the constraints of our inability to analyse and define 
space —so to transform it into a mathematical concept (a geometry)— is required. This is a necessary 
construction although a very unsettling and disturbing one as it is based on a structure built on something 
that we cannot account for physically but to which we have attributed physical properties. Consequently, 
geometries can be put forward as materializations of an abstract ideal of order in the physical world —
space— as these are adopted, constructed and used in conformity with an ontological conception of space. 
What then becomes visible in the different geometries is the human presence —through it’s multi-
dimensional connection with the physical world— in mathematical constructions. This visibility occur as 
space conceptualizations —in mathematics— are informed by abstract intellectualizations and 
idealizations of order in the physical world which convey scientific purposes, or the “reflexive 
knowledge” order, and an immanent desire of order informed by felt experiences of the physical world, 
	   331	  
which convey the “encode eye” order. Therefore, as hand-drawn scientific illustration, geometry is also 
the materialisation that operates, makes visible and attainable a mediation. Consequently, geometry is on a 
first level a materialized mediator, within mathematics, between two order systems and their interplay 
with subjective and objective dimensions; and on a second level between Man and space 
conceptualizations — ideals and understanding of a connection with the physical world that concern its 
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28 Going back to the first page of this article to re-read the quote of The Order of Things, it becomes apparent that a 
further step needs to be taken in order to overcome the two order types and go deeper in the understanding of space.  
The two orders dualism concerning space is more evident in the abstract/physical space dichotomy, which is reflected 
in the disturbing multiplicity of space conceptions that exist within mathematics but also in verbal language. How is it 
then possible to overcome this dichotomy? This question will be addressed in future research by taking in 
consideration contemporary mathematics. Since Einstein times there are conceptions that do not seem to derive from a 
felt experience of the world. How are these possible and what is the role and importance of space in this theories? Is it 
then possible to conceive space outside the two orders dualism?  
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Earth-Sky Cosmologies: 
A Reflection on Cosmology Through Human Practices 
(Part 1) 	  
Rita Cachao 
rita.cachao@plymouth.ac.uk 	  	  
Abstract 	  
Presently cosmology is regarded as a discipline that is mainly concerned with the 
understanding of the cosmos in the heavens as an external readable structure that can 
reveal the origin of the Universe. In this context Man is positioned as an external observer 
detached from the studied phenomena. Such understanding of cosmology has a history 
that traces back to the origin of the word cosmos within the ancient Greek civilisation, as 
informed by a Man-world dichotomy and the symbolic placing of the unknown world in 
the sky. However, cosmology, as the word cosmos implies, is about the conceptualisation of 
the world, moreover, about the reflection and expression of the interrelation between world 
and Man and not about a detached cosmogenetic understanding of the universe through the 
heavens. Overcoming the restricting contemporary accounts of cosmology, the 
philosopher Rémi Brague presented an argument in the work The Wisdom of the World that 
rethinks cosmology within a framework where the human is fundamen- tally and inevitably 
implicated. Departing from Brague’s work, in this paper it will be argued that re-thinking 
cosmology requires a shift in focus to conceive of practices, such as drawing, as human 
worldly experiences bringing to the surface the role of the human as more than an 
observer of the world. This shift will be supported by a close examination of two hitherto 
separate discussions: cosmology as an emerging discipline during the Enlightenment and 
the role of drawing within the epistemological model of 18th century natural history. 	  	  
As the philosopher and philologist Rémi Brague (2003, pp. 2-6) reminds us, a triad exists 
within a contemporary understanding of the cosmos: cosmography, cosmogony and 
cosmology. From these three words the first two have a deep heritage within Western 
thought, the usage of which can be traced back to the ancient Greek civilisation (Brague, 
2003). Brague defined the first, cosmography, as “the drawing or description ( graphein) of 
the world as it appears at a given mo- ment” and the second, cosmogony, as “the story of 
the emergence of things or, perhaps, the story of cosmogenesis… [; the explanation of ] 
how things come to form ( gignesthai ) the world as we know it, in the structure in which we 
find it today” (2003, p. 3). Cosmology, however is a much more recent term, the origin of 
which dates from the mid seventeenth century (Brague, 2003), yet as a working concept that 
underlies a discipline, the first records date from the 18th  century in the context of 
German philosophy, particularly in the work of Christian Wolff.2 	  
As the discipline of cosmology was created during the 18th  century, its conceptualisation 
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con- sequently bares the ideas and agenda of the time, or of what was called the 
Enlightenment, the Age of Reason. Supporting the emergence of the Age of Reason was 
mechanical philosophy3, but also empiricism, as 	  
“[t]he enthusiasm for reason in the Enlightenment is not for the faculty of reason 
as an independent source of knowledge (at least not primarily), which is actually 
put on the defensive in the period, but rather for the human cognitive faculties 
generally; the Age of Reason contrasts with an age of religious faith, not with an 
age of sense experience” (Bristow, 2011, p. 5). 	  
Therefore, the logical and mathematical grounding of mechanical philosophy could also 
be sustained in combination with an empirical framework. Despite the fact that mechanical 
phi- losophy was not at odds with empiricism, at the time, not all philosophers would agree 
with such an epistemological combination and a multitude of positions emerged. One of the 
philosophers that despite being a rationalist, was not opposed to empiricism was Christian 
Wolff. Moreover, Wolff aimed to “include empirical knowledge as the foundation for 
philosophical knowledge and establish a definitive place for empirical knowledge within 
his system of Human Science” (Hettche, 2008, p. 15). Another characteristic of the 
Enlightenment was a general tendency to release knowledge from metaphysics, which is 
correlated with the rising prominence of both mechanical philosophy and the emergent 
empirical methods (Bristow, 2011). Nonetheless, a rational and empirical philosophical 
position was not in opposition with religion and metaphysics in general and consequently, 
not all philosophers were anti-metaphysics, as was the case with Wolff (Bristow, 2011; 
Hettche, 2008). Therefore, in trying to understand what cosmology, as a discipline, was at 
its origins, it becomes necessary to unpack what were the epistemological foundations that 
could have given origin to the discipline during this period. In doing so, and given the 
wider outlined perspective of Enlightenment, this paper will use and delineate the 
foundational principles of truth-to-nature4, the epistemological model underlying natural 
his- tory, as an exemplary case of a framework in which rationalism, empiricism and 
metaphysics where correlated in a same epistemological framework –the same correlation in 
which Christian Wolff has been positioned. 	  
Up until and for a period during the seventeenth century, nature was examined pursuing a 
scheme that had the accidental, the variable and unpredictable as underlying principles 
within the episte- mological framework (Foucault, 1970; Hankins, 2007). A scheme guided 
by superstition and supernaturalism within religion (Bristow, 2011) unleashing a 
mythological facet, inside which the ontology of nature existed and that, as the science 
historians Lorrain Daston and Peter Galison (2007) reveal, can be found in the imagery 
and curiosity with the monstrous and the aberrant. However, a move was made towards 
principles such as the typical, the ordinary, the average and characteristic - ultimately the 
archetypal principles that become ingrained by the mid 18th century (Daston and Galison, 
2007; Foucault, 1970). Underlying this process was a shift to a belief in a “natural theology 
that characteristically praised the regularities of God’s laws as more worthy of admiration 
than the exceptional marvel or miracle” (Daston and Galison, 2007, p. 68). Within this 
approach to theology, which started to emerge in the seventeenth century, it was thought that 
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through reason and without calling on the Bible it was possible to find the divine truth that 
lay in nature; God’s creation (Hankins, 2007). Consequently, Man and Nature became 
close to each other, since the latter stopped being regarded as something unknowable and 
within an unreachable domain. Such theological transformation came to have deep 
implications in 18th century philosophy and science. 	  
The principles of natural theology within 18th century philosophy and science were carried 
by the belief that the work of God was structured and organised according to rules and 
principles. As the historians Rienk Vermij (2008) and Thomas Hankins (2007) point out, 
this was an argu- ment based on a supreme intelligent and designing agent that created and 
ordered the natural world, which stands in opposition to the idea of a world set in place by 
irrational and unknowable forces. Thus uncovering the work of God could be achieved 
through an enquiry of the physical world, or Nature, within which the order of all Nature’s 
elements could be displayed. As such, 18th century Man believed that it was possible to 
perceive the order within the world directly by observation of Nature and abstract 
reasoning5, breaking away from the mythological, and establishing a universal science of 
order; the taxonomical programme. Thus, this programme had to entail an epistemological 
shift so that signs can become “tools of analysis, marks of identity and difference, 
principles whereby things can be reduced to order, keys for a taxonomy” (Foucault, 1970, p. 
64); therefore enabling Man to ‘see’ nature’s inner workings, its structure and order, in the 
end: God’s laws. Such framework, according to Foucault (1970), came into existence by the 
end of the Renaissance and faded at the beginning of the 19th century. From inside this 
framework a new empirical field came to existence: natural history. 	  
The taxonomy of the natural world as the project of natural history became epitomised in 
the work of Linnaeus and the making of Atlases6. Within the work of natural historians, 
the taxo- nomical project entailed a search for the transversal organising principles that 
could constitute the grid within which elements existed and had their own specific places. 
According to Foucault, in order to achieve such a grid it was first necessary to detach 
elements from their linguistic signification; however, such was only possible after the 
seventeenth century as before “signs were then part of things themselves, whereas in the 
seventeenth century they become modes of represen- tation” (Foucault, 1970, p. 141). This 
change in the modes of signification by means of modes of representation, opened a gap 
between elements and language, a gap within which natural history found its place by 
resorting to the practice of drawing in order to bridge the understand- ing of elements 
(Foucault, 1970, p. 141). As a result through the “fundamental articulation of the visible, 
the first confrontation of language and things can now be established in a manner that 
excludes all uncertainty” (Foucault, 1970, p. 146), regarding what the elements are, their 
place in the grid - thus in the world - and in God’s intentions. The practice of drawing 
within natural history ultimately enabled the construction of the taxonomical grid in which 
potentially everything could have a place through its representation as a sign. 	  
Natural history through the practice of drawing made possible a new interpretation and 
naming system that was accessible to all knowledgeable people given the empirical 
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transparency of this construction. The practice of drawing and the process within which 
drawings were created7 in natural history was a process that had embedded in itself the 
observation of individual elements and the abstraction of their formal characteristics so 
that the specificity of the individual could stand for a same group of elements and therefore 
be quantified and translated into the generalisation and universality of the topographical 
grid. Drawing was consequently an empirical enquiry that released the morphological 
aspects of elements from the linguistic signification, enabling order through archetypal 
disclosure. Thus, within natural history, drawing became the means through which not 
only knowledge could be discovered and assembled, by the materialisation of signs, but 
also one in which knowledge could be constructed as a reflective process of ‘see- ing’. In 
this dual function - assemblage and construction of knowledge - drawing became an 
empirical, but also recursive practice as the very own process of usage and construction of 
the taxonomical grid would be employed to refine, improve and enlarge the grid on a 
continuous process (Daston and Galison, 2007; Foucault, 1970). The overall process of 
constructing and using the taxonomical grid through drawing was therefore a recursive 
method of empirical ordering and abstract reasoning that was used to inform a new 
epistemological model; the truth-to-nature model. 	  
Nonetheless, within a truth-to-nature model, a third function was also expected from the 
practice of drawing. As Daston and Galison explain, two types of drawing are expected to be 
seen within Atlases: the ‘ideal’ type and the ‘characteristic’ - or archetypal. In the framework 
of 18th century scientific drawings, “the ‘ideal’ image purports to render not merely the 
typical but the perfect, while the ‘characteristic’ image locates the typical in an individual” 
(Daston and Galison, 2007, p. 70). As such, drawings were expected to be perfected by 
selecting what to represent and how to portray8 it in order to achieve what was thought 
would be a beautiful9 and perfect form. This means that not only the ‘perfect’ was thought 
to be beautiful but also, and above all, that it did not exist as a ‘pure’ form in nature, 
however Man, through drawing, could reach an understand- ing of the ideal forms of the 
elements that structured nature. This belief brings to the surface a re-emergence of 
Platonic theories in support of natural theology (Daston and Galison, 2007, p. 58). Yet, 
differently from Platonic theories, and in the context of natural history, 18th century Man 
considered that through the recursive and empirical practice of drawing it was possible to 
‘foresee’ what was not yet there, or the divine process that the natural world was 
undergoing to become perfect10. Consequently, the taxonomical program within natural 
history aspired not only to reveal an omnipresent order ruling within nature through the 
archetypal, but also to ‘foresee’ the ideal forms within God’s intentions. 	  
As it is perceivable, for the practice of drawing to have such a programmatic role, one in 
which there is no separation between the act of drawing and the understanding of the 
world, it is highly dependent upon an active and cognisant ‘seer’ (composed by the eyes of 
an expert, the scientist, guiding the hand of the illustrator) that determinately seeks to 
construct the taxo- nomical grid. The presence of the ‘seer’ in the 18th  century framework 
is fully recognised and embraced within the overall scientific and philosophical 
programme (Daston and Galison, 2007), as only through his activity does it become 
possible to fully unleash the epistemological programme of natural history. As a result, 
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drawing within natural history can be presented as a recursive and empirical practice that 
enables an enquiry into all existing elements by an active ‘seer’ that was present in the 
process, not only as a rational being which would use reason to abstract principles, but also 
as a subjective and affective being that engaged and connected with the world. Drawing was 
therefore also an immersive process in which there was no separation between Man and 
nature, or the world, enabling Man to make visible the underlying laws, not so much 
behind the individual elements in front of him, but the overall divine order and laws that 
guided the natural world. Man was therefore active in the making of knowledge; however, 
he was not active in the making of the structure and consequently in the making of the 
world, which were imposed on him by God. Consequently, Man was separated from nature 
but only in as much as Man was an observer of the world and consequently could make 
visible and ‘foresee’ the laws and intentions of God. Nonetheless, Man was still part of the 
ontological grid, part of the world, which he observed. 	  
The preceding analysis of 18th  century Enlightenment through the perspective of natural 
his- tory, hence brought forward four features that enable the contextualisation of the 
emergence of cosmology within a wider framework than the one derived by uniquely 
observing a mechanistic perspective. The first of these features is the role of natural 
theology in the creation of a truth- to-nature epistemological model. This was prompted by 
the belief that there was an order to the world that was governed by God’s laws and 
intentions, which could be perceived through observations of the natural world and 
abstract reasoning. This belief led to the second feature, the taxonomical programme: the 
construction of an ontological grid within which potentially everything had a place by 
escaping the previous paradigm of linguistic signification. Such a pro- gramme relied on a 
process of interrogating the world that was based on a method and system for ‘seeing’ the 
world through modes of representation. This process was the practice of draw- ing, the 
third feature. In this context, drawing comes as a recursive, empirical and immersive 
practice that by unleashing the archetypal and ideal within elements enables the 
assemblage and construction of knowledge. Such an epistemological approach evidences the 
space that was opened for the presence of the human as an active agent in the making of 
knowledge, bringing forward the fourth feature, the active ‘seer’. 	  
Observing the foundational principles of the truth-to–nature epistemological model reveals 
the way in which rationalism, empiricism and metaphysics were connected within a single 
perspective, which, as outlined previously in this paper, was coincident with the 
philosophical perspective of Christian Wolff, one of the first to take cosmology as a 
working concept that lies at the basis of a field of knowledge. As such, surveying the 
potential presence of the four features of truth-to- nature within Wolff ’s understanding of 
cosmology puts forward the possibility to comprehend 18th  century cosmology as beyond 
a solely rational and mechanistic discipline. According to Wolff, philosophy was divided 
into three main branches: ontology, metaphysics and physics, in which the three branches 
were directly related to a top-down hierarchy, in which ontology was the grounding for 
metaphysics (from which cosmology was a branch), which in turn was the grounding for 
physics (Hettche, 2008). As such, 	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“[j]ust as cosmology and psychology (together) provide the basis for advancing an 
a pos- teriori proof for God’s existence, it is the result of theology’s a priori proof 
whereby the inquiry into the causes of contingent reality is justified” (Hettche, 
2008, p. 24). 	  
Consequently, one can discern in Wolff the presence of the essential ideas of natural 
theology guiding the cosmological enquiry, in which a metaphysical existence would justify 
the observed reality, finding the empirical support within the methods of physics to explain 
the mechanistic11 laws of God’s design (Hettche, 2008). Within Wolff ’s cosmology, the 
understanding of God’s design as mechanistic is deeply related with the fact that for him the 
subject matter of cosmology was the “world-whole” (Hettche, 2008, p. 16), in which the 
“world is a collection of mutable things that are next to each other, follow upon one 
another, and entirely connected with each other” ( Wolff cited in Hettche, p. 18). Therefore, 
in combination with natural theology and the usage of empirical methods, structuring the 
knowledge gathered was a mechanical and rational reasoning. If drawing, as in natural 
history, is regarded as an empirical tool then it is possible to suggest that cosmology as a 
discipline merged cosmogony and cosmography. As a result, cosmol- ogy would combine the 
need to understand the world through its functioning and organisation, its divine laws - or 
cosmogony - with empirical methods of enquiry, such as a process of analysis that is 
conveyed through the practice of graphein - or cosmography. Observing cosmology through a 
perspective that combines an enquiry of the world with a construction of knowledge that is 
lead and derived from a bodily practice driven by a ‘seer’ (drawing as the practice 
previously described), not only opens cosmology as a construction in which the human is 
present on a multi-level dimension, but also frames cosmology differently from the 
contemporary approaches. 	  
As a discipline, cosmology underwent a process of transformation in which both Wolff’s 
perspec- tive of cosmology as well as the proposed multi-level presence of the human 
(emergent through the role of drawing within natural history) would not generally persist. 
As a consequence, cos- mology came to be understood as the “science that accounts for 
the origin, development and laws that make the universe as a whole, but particularly the 
astronomical study of the beginning of the physical universe” (Hetherington, 1993, p. 116, 
cited in Campion, 2010, p. 2). Despite the fact that cosmology is still understood as a joint 
enterprise - ranging from theology to the arts - to understand what is and makes the 
Universe (Harrison, 2001, p. 15), cosmology mainly became focused on the scientific 
dimension. As such, nowadays cosmology as a practice became a science that attempts at an 
all-encompassing study of the physical12  (Harrison, 2001, p. 15; Balashov, 2002, p. 107) 
and material (McWilliams, 1928, p. vi; Narlikar, 1992, p. 362) nature of the Universe, a 
discussion that is framed by the sky. However, this understanding of cosmology raises a 
problem as it constrains cosmology to just one dimension, that of cosmogony through the 
lenses of science. The problem of taking cosmogony for cosmology, however, is not only 
present in the way that cosmology is practiced today, but also in the way that, as a concept, 
is applied retrospectively when looking into theological and mythological frameworks13. 
Such state of affairs prompts this paper to revisit the notion of cosmology, questioning 
what then is fundamental for the conceptualisation and discipline of cosmology nowadays. 
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In the work The Wisdom of the World, the philologist and philosopher Rémi Brague puts 
forward the argument that cosmology is primarily a discourse about the relation between 
Man and world and that it is because “the moral status of nature is disrupted in modernity” 
(Flynn, 2008, p. 219) that cosmology is no longer a reflection of an ontological order. This 
realisation sets Brague to discuss the necessity of the re-emergence of a moral foundation 
in thinking about cosmology and in order to support this pursuit Brague exposes the 
necessary relation between cosmos and world within cosmology. In the definitions of 
cosmography, cosmogony and cosmology that Brague puts forward, the word that emerges 
accounting and leading the definition is not cosmos, but world, as its synonym. By, 
relenting on the use of the word cosmos, Brague is not only making visible what, given an 
apparent obviousness could be too quickly dismissed, the straight connection between 
cosmos and world, but is also opening up the way to dismantle the idea of cosmology as 
attached to the heavens. Consequently, despite the determinacy of a moral quest, supported 
by Brague’s Catholicism, the argument potentiates a meta-discussion liberating cosmology to 
be re-thought beyond the restricting vision of a scientific project dominated by astronomy. 
Fundamental for Brague’s argument and underlying is move is the idea that “if the world is 
to arise as a thematic concept, then Man must arise as the subject for whom the world 
exists” (Flynn, 2008, p. 218). It is within this framework that Brague defines cosmology as 
that “as is implied by the word logos, is not that of a simple discourse, but a reflection on 
the nature of the world that as a world must be expressed” (Brague, 2003, p. 4) and 
therefore the existence of a human subject is a necessary condition for the 
conceptualisation of the world. As a con- sequence, cosmology comes to be a discourse of 
an ontological but also anthropological order (Brague, 2003, p. 5), however, in order to fully 
understand Brague’s concept of cosmology and its implications, it becomes necessary to look 
at the history of the emergence of the word cosmos. 	  
For Brague, the primary foundations of cosmology, as well as its limits, lie within the origin 
of the word ‘cosmos’ in the ancient Greek civilisation. As a result, a distinction and 
separation is made between the moment where a word to mean the world – cosmos - came 
into being and the previous conditions set by pre-Greek civilisations, where the process of 
imagination and construction of such a concept had started. Brague shows evidence that 
leads to the conclusion that early civilisations, as the Mesopotamian and Egyptian, did not 
have a word such as world in order to designate the entirety of all things that constitutes a 
world. Previous to the Greek civilisation, on a first stage, there existed enumeration - the 
listing of elements that made the whole - after the utterance of the whole - the usage of 
words that meant entirety and wholeness, expressing therefore the idea of a totality (Brague, 
2003; Rochberg, 2007). According to Brague, this meant that these civilisations had not yet 
grasped things in themselves in order to create a structure that makes of all things a unity. 
Phenomena were observed, understood, explained and integrated in an overall system 
without, however, Man looking to understand them as a unity from a single perspective; 
what Emma Brunner-Traut designated as ‘aspective’ (Brunner- Traut cited in Brague, 2003, 
p. 13). Consequently, a word that in itself expresses all things as a unity and that grows to 
be more then the sum of its parts, the word world, could not exist. It is therefore possible to 
conclude from Brague’s work that the word world came into being out of a necessity to 
designate the possible and different models for the structures and orders in which the 
entirety of all things could be organised and observed as one. However, because in pre- 
Greek civilisations Man existed in communion with the world, such an independent 
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structure could not be conceptualised and named. Consequently, without a word for world 
there could not exist an explicit and intentional reflection upon it. As such, following 
Brague’s argument, it is not feasible to discuss cosmology prior to the existence of the 
word cosmos, which in the Western world only came into being with the ancient Greek 
civilisation. 	  
The word chosen by the Greeks to express the unity of the whole, cosmos, is one that reflects 
the idea that the entirety of things needs a structure in which to be organised, as the word 
designates order14. From the idea of an ordered whole, the cosmos, to become synonym of 
world, Brague argues that two fundamental ideas that came to light during Socrates’ time 
had to take place. The first was Nature becoming unknowable and consequently 
unreachable. The second was the separation of Man from the natural world; or the entirety 
of all things that constituted the whole. These two ideas occurred when Socrates observed 
that only Man, in its ethical dimension, could be known and discussed and that therefore 
the domain of physics and nature were truly unknowable, because they were not subject to 
the moral laws of Man. It is important to note, as Brague does, that the Socratic 
understanding broke away from the dominant paradigm as “[t] he Greeks believed that the 
world and its human subjects were primarily connected through the existence of laws that 
governed them all, and that those laws were of a moral nature” (Brague, 2003, p. 29). Such 
transformation in belief created a chiasm that separated the laws of Man from those of the 
physical world, or ethics from physics and Nature. 	  
With the chiasm opened by Socrates, the first outcome was a symbolic deferment of the 
world, cosmos, to the sky. The physically distant sky came to symbolise the unreachable and 
consequently, the unknowable (Brague, 2003). Nature became unknowable, what once had 
been the reachable and close domain of the earthly and everyday phenomena, became 
merged with the unreachable domain of the heavens. Nature and heavens, earth and sky, or 
the whole, were now part of the same domain. The second outcome was Man becoming an 
independent entity from the whole, the world, or cosmos. A construction that followed, 
which may seem a necessary contradiction: that in order to have a word - the cosmos - that 
denominates the whole - the world - a part of the whole has to been taken from it - Man 
(Brague, 2003). According to Brague, this construction is however fundamental as in order 
to think of the whole as a unity it is first necessary to see the entirety of that unity from the 
outside, more precisely that the whole becomes an object that is seen and conceived as 
separate from the thinking subject. Therefore it is possible to conclude that the very own 
emergence of the word cosmos, as the ordered world, goes hand in hand with the creation 
of the dichotomies inner and outer, Man and world. 	  
Socrates therefore prompted the fundamental step of Man seeing himself independent from 
the whole, observing it as a separate entity, and opened up the possibility for the cosmos to 
mean the world, a world that however existed symbolically in the heavens. Nonetheless, the 
reflection of the cosmos as world, and therefore cosmology, only occurred with Plato, more 
precisely with the work Timaues that Brague sees as being the first Western cosmological 
work written down. In order to do so, Plato had to bridge the chiasm opened by Socrates 
and to establish a relation between Man and the world - the cosmos - reconciling Man with 
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the ordered structure of the whole (Brague, 2003), while still keeping humans on a separate 
domain. Plato bridged this chiasm by enabling moral ideas to be integrated in the structure 
of the order that makes the whole, by placing good as the principle that ruled both the 
physical and the human dimensions (Brague, 2003) and establishing a macro-micro 
correspondence between them. Good stopped being a feature of the moral laws of Man 
and became the moral nature of the divine laws to which both nature and Man were 
subjected. As the ancient philosophy scholar Francis M. Cornford (1937) expresses 
regarding the Timaeus: 	  
“Looking deeper, we see that the chief purpose of the cosmological introduction is 
to link the morality externalized in the ideal society to the whole organization of 
the world… Now Plato intends to base his conception of human life, both for 
the individual and for society, on the inexpugnably foundation of the order of 
the universe. The parallel of macrocosm and microcosm runs through the 
whole discourse. True morality is not a product of human evolution, still less the 
arbitrary enactment of human wills. It is an order and harmony of the soul; and 
the soul itself is a counterpart, in miniature, of the soul of the world, which has 
an everlasting order and harmony of its own, instituted by reason15” (Cornford, 
1937, p. 6). 	  
As a result, with Plato, cosmology thus can be understood as the conceptualisation of a 
frame- work within which Man and nature existed as resultant of a higher divine moral 
programme. A programme that had its most perfect expression in the sky, as this was the 
domain of the unat- tainable divine knowledge, which, following a top down structure 
emerged on every single stage of the structure as a less perfect version of the previous 
structural stage. Within the shift to the structure of the world as moral, thinking about the 
world became inseparable from thinking what the human being is as well as his position in 
the structured order that constituted the cosmos, or the world. Consequently, Brague 
departs from Plato’s Timaeus to support the necessity of a moral foundation in thinking the 
world, as Man and world are necessarily bound by morality. Such necessity associated with 
the analysis of the emergence of the word cosmos in ancient Greece, takes Rémi Brague to 
defend that cosmology is a human reflection and articulation, not so much about the 
heavens as it is about the world and our relation with it, from the perspective of an observer 
that is subject to the same divine moral laws as the world. Therefore cosmology becomes 
an onto-anthropological enterprise however molded by morality. 	  
Given Brague’s understanding of cosmology it becomes possible to overcome the problem 
of a restricting vision of cosmology within a contemporary context. If the cosmos at a 
certain moment in time signified an unattainable realm where divine laws decree and for 
which the sky was the best representative, when it comes to thinking about the cosmos as 
world from a onto-anthropological perspective there is no distance between sky and the 
tangible nature, or the everyday world which humans inhabit, which has been symbolised by 
the earth. Therefore what seemed to be distant, antagonistic and irreconcilable realms (the 
laws of the heavens and the everyday life on earth) becomes united releasing cosmology 
from the contemporary approaches. In this paper, however, it is argued that three 
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disputable premises underpin Brague’s cosmo- logical definition. The first is a necessary 
moral cause binding Man and the world within the cosmological structure. This premise 
lessens Brague’s argument by restricting the human, the world and their interrelations to a 
moral feature, which moreover, only fully exists in its relation with the divine. Furthermore, 
it also assumes an existing separation between Man and world within a cosmological 
conceptualisation. Consequently, the first premise is supported by the second: that it is not 
possible to conceptualise the structural order of things without the human being seeing 
himself as existing on a separate realm. Thus, that Man exists as an autonomous entity that 
observes the world from the outside, raising a dichotomic epistemology. The third premise 
emerges from the belief that the conceptualisation of an idea is dependent not only on a 
separate thinking entity, but also on language. Therefore, a reflection upon the world relies 
on the existence of a word to express it. As a result, a conundrum is created within Brague’s 
work: that the conceptualisation of cosmology within an onto-anthropological perspective is 
something that begins with ancient Greek civilisation but also curiously ends with 
Enlightenment, the time that created the discipline of cosmology, and the disbelief in a 
moral world. 	  
In order to re-think cosmology outside Brague’s limited framework and within which an 
onto- anthropological conceptualisation can still exist, a different conceptualisation of the 
anthropological dimension within cosmology is required; one that does not rely on the three 
premises previously outlined. As this paper shows, the key to surpass the problems raised 
by Brague may lie in the 18th century framework of natural history. As outlined through 
the account of natural history, an underlying programme that relied on drawing as a 
recursive, empirical and immersive activity in which was embedded a human 
conceptualising presence, supported the 18th century episte- mological framework. This 
presence was acknowledged and accepted, moreover, incremental to the construction of 
that very same epistemological framework, as within the practice there was no separation 
between Man and nature, or the world, pointing towards the possibility of knowledge not 
having to be expressed in words in order to be thought. Consequently, although a 
conceptual separation of Man from nature in order for the word world to appear might 
have been important, it does not imply that Man exists as separate from the world, nor that 
the exist- ence of the word world is necessary for a conceptualisation of the world, the 
human and their interrelation. If Man and world are seen as an interconnected and 
integrated system, then an onto-anthropological conceptualisation is also embedded within 
practices and all modes of expression. 	  
Cosmology can therefore be redefined as a discourse about the onto-anthropological 
reflections and expressions of the multiple and contingent relations between Man and 
world, in which practices are recognised as modes of embedded conceptualisation and 
expression; escaping the requirement of an outside observer (in addition, a moral foundation) 
and a word to conceptualise and express cosmology. As a result, it becomes possible to 
attempt a framework of analysis of cultures prior to ancient Greece and post-
Enlightenment in which the reflection on the world does not come through the form of a 
written text, but can be found within a everyday practice or system of practices. An 
example of a practice deeply rooted within a pre-Greek society - the Mesopotamian –  that 
not only embodies in itself an understanding of the world, the human and their 
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interrelation, but also sits outside an astrology/astronomy context, is hepatoscopy, or 
divination through liver readings. Through the analysis of this practice it is possible to 
unleash this society’s cosmological model from an onto-anthropological perspective, 
dismantling part of Brague’s conundrum: the idea that before Greek civilisation there was 
no conceptualisation of the world as a structured whole in which is recognised and reflected 
Man’s position and role. Such analysis of the Mesopotamian practice of hepatoscopy will 
inform the second part of this paper. 	  	  
Endnotes 	  
1 The present paper undertakes a reflection on Cosmology informed by disciplines such as 
History, Cosmol- ogy, Art, Assyriology, Anatomy and Philosophy. The analysis is driven by 
a transdisciplinary approach to research, within a PhD context of which the title is: Enquiry 
on the Essence of Space: Khôra, K inaesthetic and the Sublime. 	  
2 Christian Wolff ’s Cosmologia Generalis published in 1730 was, according to Brague, the 
first out of a series of German publications to present works dedicated to cosmology and 
its reflection. 	  
3 Mechanical Philosophy is a term coined by Robert Boyle ( Westfall, 2000, p. 412) that 
indicates the belief that the natural world was arranged by combinations of inert particles 
of matter, featuring only size and shape, that moved according to mechanical laws and 
therefore natural phenomena could be explained in terms of such mechanical laws ( 
Westfall, 2000; Hankins, 2007, p. 13) 	  
4  Truth-to-nature as defined by Daston and Galison is a “code of epistemic virtue” 
(2007, p. 18) that precedes Objectivity as the main epistemological force driving natural 
philosophy. Characterising it is a “metaphysical dimension, an aspiration to reveal a reality 
accessible only with difficulty… the true genera of plants and organisms” (p. 58). In order 
to achieve such a goal the naturalists would combine empirical methods with abstract 
reasoning and would actively intervene in revealing the truth of nature without, however, 
being commanded by it. 	  
5 In the context of the naturalists, abstract reasoning implied the acts of selecting, 
comparing, judging and generalising (Daston and Galison, 2007). 	  
6  Within this context atlases are conceived as visual records of the present states of affairs 
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of knowledge and in which is “identify[ed] a discipline’s most significant objects of inquiry” 
(Daston and Galison, 2007, p. 17). 	  
7  In order for drawing to come to have such a programmatic role within natural history, 
it was necessary to develop both a system of analysis and a method of analysis (Foucault, 
1970) so that the questioning of the object of research and construction of the grid could 
happen. The first - the system - was the unleash- ing of the guiding principles of a formal 
grid with determined sites against which individuals could be ‘seen’, ‘read’ and placed in. 
The system of analysis therefore demanded a reflection on what constituted the 
construction of a grid, or on what constituted an order based on an a-temporal 
differentiation (Foucault, 1970). The second - the method - was a process according to the 
grid’s principles of ‘seeing’ and ‘reading’ each individual being/element in order to place 
them in their specific site, thus informing the grid. The method of analysis relied on 
algebraic operations to organise elements according to their differences and consequently 
on what constituted identity (Foucault, 1970), not however of the individual, himself, but 
of the overarching characteristics of a same group of individuals. 	  
8  For instance, in a typical period drawing, the usage of colour as an accidental trait was 
discouraged; it should even be avoided. What was supposed to be portrayed was the form, 
quantity, proportion and posi- tion of elements. (Daston and Galison, 2007, p. 59; 
Foucault, 1970, pp. 145-146). 	  
9 The idea of a perfect form was, at the time, related with the idea of a beautiful form, as 
both ‘perfectness’ and ‘beautiful’ were features of the true. As a consequence a true 
drawing was one where not only the ac- cidental had been eliminated, but also one where a 
form had been made beautiful trough the perfectness and perfect through beauty (Daston 
and Galison, 2007). 	  
10  According to Foucault this cannot be seen as the evolutionism of later 19th century 
and in fact two types of ‘evolutionism’ existed. The first, as mentioned, believes that all the 
species evolve on a continuum towards the perfection of God, being that all species have 
their own perfect form, although possibly will never achieve it. The second says that 
species have moved through time from one place in the taxonomical grid to another; 
explaining, for instance, that birds have wings as for one moment in time, when the earth 
was covered by water, they had had fins (1970, pp. 165-166). As such, the underlying idea 
is that there is a “general table of variables that defines all the possible forms of the living 
world” (Foucault, 1970, p. 167). 	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11  Given the fact that “mechanical philosophy was [seen as] a program of explanation, 
not a program of investigation” (Hettche, 2008, p. 411). 
 
12 According to Balashov, the usage of contemporary physics to explain the beginnings of 
the Universe by cosmology did not happen “until the 1970s, when … physics began to 
assume a truly historical dimension [by observing physical laws as dynamic]. The idea that 
the temporal career of the universe may include not only the history of matter but also the 
history of its basic properties, which figure in the laws, is largely a product of this interplay 
between particle theory and cosmology in their joint effort to probe the physics of the very 
early universe” (2002, p. 110). 	  
13  In a contemporary context, cosmology is used indistinctly from cosmogony, even 
when looking back into mythological accounts of the conceptualisation of the world. For 
instance, within the Mesopotamian culture, what is offered is a description of the 
mythological stories in which such conceptualisation may have happened (Brague, 2003). 
Yet, one example in which an analysis and elucidation of those stories hap- pen in relation 
to questions such as: What is the world within Mesopotamian culture? Or, in the context 
of a Mesopotamian culture, what is the place of human kind in relation to the whole? 
Going beyond a cosmogony is the contribution of the Assyriologist Francesca Rochberg 
(2007), Mesopotamian Cosmolog y in A Companion to the Ancient Near East. In this study, the 
usage of mythological stories to attempt to answer such questions is justified by the 
fundamental role of the gods in their creational and transformational actions, signifying 
that it was not possible to think of the world as an independent structure from the gods. 
However, if, as supported by Rochberg, in the Mesopotamian culture gods were not 
specific places or beings but metamorphic entities, and therefore should not be strictly 
associated with an understanding and interpretation of the heavens, then there is no reason 
to restrict such an analysis to a search within a combination of Mesopotamian mythology 
with Mesopotamian astronomy/astrology sources. 	  
14  The order put forward through the word cosmos is one that beyond recognising the 
existence of the whole as an ordered entity denotes the quality of such order, as the term 
refers in particular to the beauty that emerges from the perfectly ordered (Brague, 2003, p. 
19). 	  
15  However this reason, and as Cornford denotes, “[ W ]e shall find that if Plato’s 
language is to keep any substantial meaning, we must not ascribe to him either the belief in 
an omnipotent creator or the notion of natural law as a closed system of causes and effects. 
His Necessity is irregular and disorderly, and not inexorably determined, but open to the 
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persuasion of Reason; and Reason has need to persuade her, not having unlimited power 
to compel” (1997, p. 36). 	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Appendix C 
Diagram Drawings of Thesis Structure and Chapter Flow and 
Interaction 
  
  	  
	   353	   
  	  







































  	  
	   355	  
 
  	  
	   356	   
  	  
	   357	  
 
